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INTRODUCTION

he collection, pooling, and sharing of intelligence between the forces of
States involved in multinational military operations is indispensable for their
effectiveness and is a standard feature of modern coalition warfare. 1 However, such intelligence sharing also raises difficult questions of international
law, in particular as to whether States sharing or receiving intelligence may
be regarded as responsible for complicity in the wrongful acts of their partners. 2 Consider, for example, a situation in which a State provides intelligence to another which uses the intelligence for drone strikes that are (arguably) unlawful. 3 The legal framework governing such questions is complex,
consisting of general international law, particularly the law of State responsibility; international humanitarian law (IHL) or the law of armed conflict; international human rights law (IHRL), to the extent it applies extraterritorially
and in armed conflict; international criminal law, with regard to the possible
criminal responsibility of soldiers, intelligence officers and their military and
civilian superiors. That international legal framework coexists with the domestic laws, particularly military and criminal laws, of partner States. The
applicability of each of these regimes to intelligence sharing engages discrete
sets of difficulties, which are compounded by structural uncertainties in how
the different regimes interact.

1. See David Letts, Intelligence Sharing Among Coalition Forces: Some Legal and Ethical Challenges and Potential Solutions, in NATIONAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE AND ETHICS (Seumas
Miller, Mitt Regan & Patrick F. Walsh eds., forthcoming 2021, manuscript on file with author); Jonathan Howard, Sharing Intelligence with Foreign Partners for Lawful, Lethal Purposes, 226
MILITARY LAW REVIEW 1 (2018). On the various types of cooperative arrangements in the
context of military operations, see Berenice Boutin, The Interplay of International Obligations
Connected to the Conduct of Others: Toward a Framework of Mutual Compliance Among States Engaged
in Partnered Warfare, 96 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 529, 531–34 (2020).
2. The focus of this article is State responsibility. I will not be examining the related
question of complicity-based responsibility of international organizations such as NATO or
whether in some cases international law imposes any similar responsibility directly on nonState actors, such as armed groups. On responsibility issues regarding the involvement of
international organizations in multinational military operations, see generally Paulina Starski,
Accountability and Multinational Military Operations, in THE “LEGAL PLURIVERSE” SURROUNDING MULTINATIONAL MILITARY OPERATIONS 300 (Robin Geiß & Heike Krieger eds.,
2019).
3. For an example of a critical analysis of various forms of State assistance, including
the sharing of intelligence, to the U.S. drone program, see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
DEADLY ASSISTANCE: THE ROLE OF EUROPEAN STATES IN US DRONE STRIKES (2018),
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ACT3081512018ENGLISH.PDF.
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Under customary international law, as codified in the International Law
Commission’s (ILC) Articles on State Responsibility (ASR), 4 States accrue
responsibility for internationally wrongful conduct attributable to them, normally because such conduct is committed by the State’s own organs. The
acts of collecting and sharing intelligence may as such be internationally
wrongful if doing so would constitute a breach of an international obligation
arising from primary rules of international law, such as IHL and IHRL,
which will be addressed in more detail below. 5
Other rules, general or sector-specific, allow for State responsibility to
arise due to the assistance one State provides to the commission of a wrongful act by another State. 6 The most relevant such complicity rule of general
scope is codified in Article 16 ASR:
A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing
so if: (a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the
internationally wrongful act; and (b) the act would be internationally
wrongful if committed by that State.

The customary status of Article 16 was affirmed by the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Bosnian Genocide case. 7 While the customary status of the rule was questioned by some authors and States during the ILC
drafting process, 8 no State has formally opposed it since the ILC completed
its codification project, even if the practice in which the ILC grounded the
4. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts with Commentaries, 56 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/56/10
(2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 26, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/
2001/Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinafter ILC ASR].
5. International law also contains rules in specialized treaties that specifically address
questions of intelligence sharing, such as the Five Eyes or UKUSA Agreement, but these
are few and far between and will be outside the purview of this study. See further Scarlet Kim
et al., Newly Disclosed Documents on the Five Eyes Alliance and What They Tell Us about IntelligenceSharing Agreements, LAWFARE (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/newly-disclosed-documents-five-eyes-alliance-and-what-they-tell-us-about-intelligence-sharing.
6. On the notion of special, as opposed to general, complicity rules, see HELMUT AUST,
COMPLICITY AND THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 189 (2011).
7. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶ 420 (Feb.
26) [hereinafter Bosnian Genocide].
8. See AUST, supra note 6, at 169–73, 182–85; MILES JACKSON, COMPLICITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 150–51 (2015).
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rule is hardly constant and uniform. 9 The ILC set out an even more innovative rule in Article 41 ASR, which categorically prohibits State aid and assistance to another State’s commission of a serious breach of a peremptory
norm of international law. Article 41’s relationship with Article 16 will be
explored further below.
Some aspects of the Article 16 ASR rule are relatively uncontroversial.
However, the rule’s culpability (mental, subjective, fault) element has provoked much controversy. This is partly because the issue is inherently difficult and partly because the ILC’s pronouncements on the point were unclear
and contradictory. The proper interpretation to be given to that element is
indeed the single most important question in determining the relevance of
the Article 16 complicity rule in the intelligence-sharing context. The existence and elements of IHL- and IHRL-specific complicity rules and the extent of their divergence from Article 16 are also pivotal and unclear questions. The lack of clarity is exacerbated by the fact that the overwhelming
majority of States have remained silent on the scope of the culpability requirements of either the general complicity rule or the sector-specific ones.
In 2018 a workshop was convened at Nottingham that aimed at clarifying some of these issues, bringing together academics, independent experts,
and government legal advisers. The discussions at the workshop were based
on a series of hypothetical scenarios that separated out as much as possible
the discrete legal questions to be examined and progressed gradually in terms
of complexity. A report published after the workshop summarizes the discussions and areas of agreement and disagreement. 10 This article builds on
the workshop (although the views expressed here are mine alone). The article
also builds on recent academic studies on questions of responsibility
grounded in complicity in international law, with a specific focus on matters
of intelligence sharing in multinational military operations. 11

9. See AUST, supra note 6, at 190–91; JACKSON, supra note 8, at 152–53. See also JAMES
CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBILITY: THE GENERAL PART 408 (2013) (Article 16 was initially a measure of progressive development by the ILC).
10. Report of the Nottingham Workshop on Intelligence Sharing in Multinational Military Operations (2018), https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/law/documents/news-events/
workshop-intelligence-sharing-report.pdf [hereinafter Nottingham Workshop Report].
11. See AUST, supra note 6; JACKSON, supra note 8; VLADYSLAV LANOVOY, COMPLICITY
AND ITS LIMITS IN THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (2016); Harriet Moynihan, Aiding and Assisting: Challenges in Armed Conflict and Counterterrorism (Chatham House Research Paper, Nov. 2016), https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2016-11-11-aiding-assisting-challenges-armed-conflict-moynihan.pdf.
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My analysis proceeds as follows. Part II will draw on literature in legal
theory and philosophy of intention to explore the fault element of complicity-type rules and set the conceptual foundations for the discussion to follow.
Section III.A interprets the culpability element of Article 16 ASR, arguing
that it should best be seen as containing three alternative forms of fault: direct intent, indirect intent, and willful blindness but for which the State
would be considered to have acted with indirect intent. These are subjective
forms of fault that depend on what the State officials making relevant decisions (such as the one to share intelligence with a partner) knew, believed, or
wanted. Sections III.B and III.C examine rules on complicity specific to IHL
and IHRL. These rules differ from the generally applicable one in Article 16
ASR in that they apply to State assistance to non-State actors, such as organized armed groups taking part in multinational military operations, and in
that they prescribe lesser forms of fault, in particular, risk-based culpability
for serious violations of these two bodies of law. Section III.D looks at how
any risk-mitigation measures implemented by States should be conceptualized legally and at whether States can ever be justified in taking proscribed
risks. Part IV then explores the issue of perspective, explaining that complicity rules are applied both ex ante (by State officials making decisions on
whether to assist a partner or not) and ex post (by various actors, such as
domestic and international courts, who may be evaluating whether the assisting State was complicit in a partner’s violation of international law). This
shift in perspective has significant implications for establishing the assisting
State’s fault. Finally, Part V examines the two main scenarios of intelligence
sharing in military operations that may engage the complicity rules of international law: first, intelligence sharing assisting a wrongful act; and second,
sharing and receiving unlawfully obtained intelligence. Part VI concludes.
II.

ON CULPABILITY IN COMPLICITY

A. On the Elements of Complicity Rules and Article 16 ASR
Any complicity rule must delineate between those interactions between legal
or natural persons that should be deemed as wrongful or harmful and those
that are not (and may indeed be socially beneficial). The design of a complicity rule is, therefore, fundamentally about striking a fair balance. A very narrow rule may enable too many socially harmful interactions between two
persons, while a very broad one may inhibit useful cooperation too much.
This is particularly obvious in the international context. States cooperate all
1274
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the time for all sorts of reasons. They also cooperate with various non-State
entities, from corporations to armed groups. An overbroad complicity rule
may have the virtue of stopping harmful transactions (e.g., preventing the
sale of weapons that would be used by the buyer to kill civilians in violation
of IHL) but inhibit inter-State cooperation that could advance the welfare of
the relevant States and their people (e.g., intelligence sharing for the purpose
of combating terrorism). 12 The balance struck by a complicity rule will
mainly depend on the calibration of three elements: the causal relationship
between the assistance provided by the accomplice to the principal’s wrongful act, the culpability required of the accomplice, and the nature of the accomplice’s liability—that is, whether their conduct is regarded as equally
blameworthy as that of the principal so that the principal’s wrong is imputed
to the accomplice.
The culpability element of complicity rules is particularly prone to variation. We can see this reasonably clearly in the ILC’s fashioning of a generally
applicable inter-State complicity rule in Article 16 ASR. Some elements of
this rule are less controversial than others. First, it is clear that under Article
16 the assisting State is responsible for its own conduct in providing assistance
to a wrongful act, not for the wrongful act of the assisted State itself. 13 Article
16 is, in other words, a non-attributive, non-imputational complicity rule. 14
In some cases, this may be a distinction without consequence; in others, it
may be crucial (for instance, with regard to the assessment of damages). 15
Second, it is also clear that the parity of international obligations required
by Article 16(b) does not generally require that the obligations stem from the
same source; 16 all that is needed is for the obligations to have the same content. 17
Thus, for example, it would be wrongful under Article 16 for State A to
assist State B in the commission of inhuman treatment, even if States A and
B are parties to different treaties, both of which prohibit inhuman treatment. 18
12. See, e.g., AUST, supra note 6, at 266–68.
13. See ILC ASR, supra note 4, art. 16 cmt. ¶ 1.
14. See JACKSON, supra note 8, at 167–68.
15. See ILC ASR, supra note 4, art. 16 cmt. ¶ 10. See also Moynihan, supra note 11, at 7;
JACKSON, supra note 8, at 169–71.
16. For an extensive discussion, see AUST, supra note 6, at 258–65.
17. See CRAWFORD, supra note 9, at 410 (Article 16(b) “says nothing about the identity
of norms or sources”).
18. For a critique of the double obligation requirement, see JACKSON, supra note 8, at
162–67.
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Third, there is equally no dispute that the notion of aid and assistance is
a broad, flexible one. 19 The ILC’s view was that it had to consist of positive
acts (i.e., assistance by omission is excluded), 20 but the concept is otherwise
limited only by the Article 16 requirement of a causal nexus between the aid
and assistance provided by the assisting State and the wrongful act committed by the assisted State. 21 How that nexus is best described as an operational
legal test is a more difficult issue. The nexus threshold must be neither too
high nor too low; on the one hand, assistance need not be the but-for cause
of the wrongful act, while on the other, Article 16 should not capture incidental or de minimis acts of assistance. The most common formulations
used in that regard are whether the assistance significantly, substantially, or
materially contributed to the commission of the wrongful act. 22 I will not
dwell on the possible differences between these formulations here; the assessment will, in any event, be contextual and fact-specific. In any case, there
is little doubt that the sharing of intelligence can, in appropriate circumstances, constitute aid and assistance in the sense of Article 16—that is, it is
generally capable of satisfying the causal nexus requirement. 23
However, the fault element of Article 16 remains a matter of great controversy. The controversy stems in part from an apparent contradiction between the text of the article—which speaks of the assisting State providing
its assistance “with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally
wrongful act” by the assisted wrongdoing State—and the commentary to the
provision, which sets out an intent requirement:
Article 16 limits the scope of responsibility for aid or assistance in three
ways. First, the relevant State organ or agency providing aid or assistance
must be aware of the circumstances making the conduct of the assisted
State internationally wrongful; secondly, the aid or assistance must be given
19. See Moynihan, supra note 11, at 8; JACKSON, supra note 8, at 153–54.
20. See Bosnian Genocide, supra note 7, ¶ 432 (distinguishing between complicity and a
duty to prevent as negative and positive obligations, respectively). For critical analysis, see
JACKSON, supra note 8, at 155–57; LANOVOY, supra note 11, at 96.
21. See JACKSON, supra note 8, at 155–57; Erika de Wet, Complicity in the Violations of
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law by Incumbent Governments through Direct Military Assistance
on Request, 67 INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 287, 298–301 (2018).
22. See ILC ASR, supra note 4, art. 16 cmt. ¶ 5 (“There is no requirement that the aid or
assistance should have been essential to the performance of the internationally wrongful act;
it is sufficient if it contributed significantly to that act.”). See also JACKSON, supra note 8, at
157–58; Moynihan, supra note 11, at 8–9; LANOVOY, supra note 11, at 184–86.
23. See, e.g., Moynihan, supra note 11, at 8; AUST, supra note 6, at 198; LANOVOY, supra
note 11, at 178–80.
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with a view to facilitating the commission of that act, and must actually do so;
and thirdly, the completed act must be such that it would have been wrongful had it been committed by the assisting State itself. 24

According to the ILC commentary, the knowledge requirement is essentially about whether the “assisting or aiding State is unaware of the circumstances in which its aid or assistance is intended to be used by the other State.” 25
The ILC then appears to supplement this knowledge requirement by a further intent to facilitate the commission of the wrongful act. 26 We will look at
the contradictions in the commentary in more detail below.
Also, the commentary to Article 16 should be read together with that to
Article 41(2) ASR, which provides that States must not render aid or assist
in maintaining the situation created by a serious breach of jus cogens. The ILC
is explicit that this rule goes beyond that of Article 16 in that it applies to
assistance after the fact, that is, after the breach of jus cogens has occurred. 27
While the commentary also notes that the notion of aid and assistance in
Article 41(2) should be read in conjunction with Article 16, the former article
does not refer to any form of culpability on the part of the assisting State,
not even knowledge. The ILC explains that there was “no need to mention
such a requirement in article 41 (2) as it is hardly conceivable that a State
would not have notice of the commission of a serious breach by another
State.” 28

24. ILC ASR, supra note 4, art. 16 cmt. ¶ 3 (emphasis added).
25. Id. art. 16 cmt. ¶ 4 (emphasis added).
26. Id. art. 16 cmt. ¶ 5 (“A State is not responsible for aid or assistance under article 16
unless the relevant State organ intended, by the aid or assistance given, to facilitate the occurrence of the wrongful conduct.”); id. art. 16 cmt. ¶ 9 (“Where the allegation is that the
assistance of a State has facilitated human rights abuses by another State, the particular circumstances of each case must be carefully examined to determine whether the aiding State
by its aid was aware of and intended to facilitate the commission of the internationally
wrongful conduct.”).
27. Id. art. 41 cmt. ¶ 11. See also AUST, supra note 6, at 337.
28. ILC ASR, supra note 4, art. 41 cmt. ¶ 11.
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Scholars and States are broadly divided into two camps with regard to
the interpretation of the mental element of the (now) customary rule enshrined in Article 16. 29 First, many scholars advance a knowledge-based theory of the aid and assistance rule. 30 It would be unacceptable, so the argument goes, for a State that is (say) selling weapons to another State that it
knows the latter would use to commit war crimes to escape responsibility
under Article 16, simply on the basis that the assisting State’s officials do not
provide the assistance with the purpose of facilitating or committing war
crimes, although they know full well that this is what the assistance will be
used for. This basic normative argument is then supplemented by various
formal moves—for instance, that the text of an ILC codification project
should be given priority over the commentary, especially because in the ILC
drafting process the commentary goes through less scrutiny than the text. 31
Analogies are drawn to international criminal law, which, as a matter of customary law, sets out a knowledge-based test for complicity. 32 It would be
incongruent, under this view, to hold State officials criminally responsible
for providing assistance to other actors but not the States on whose behalf
they are acting. This is especially the case since the culpability thresholds of
international criminal law tend to be higher than for State responsibility (as
are generally those for criminal law as opposed to civil law). What could possibly justify a position whereby an individual who acted in their official capacity on the State’s behalf was criminally responsible for complicity in an
international crime, but the State on whose behalf the individual acted escaped any responsibility?
Second, there is the intent camp, which argues that a State can be responsible for complicity only if it provides assistance with the intention to
facilitate the assisted State’s wrongful act. The intent camp emphasizes the
need to interpret the text and the commentary together and claims that, realistically, a variant of an intent standard is the maximum to which all States
29. For a succinct account, see Moynihan, supra note 11, at 18–19. See also Nottingham
Workshop Report, supra note 10, at 6–10.
30. See, e.g., Vaughan Lowe, Responsibility for the Conduct of Other States, 101 KOKUSAIHO
GAIKO ZASSHI 1, 8 (2002); Olivier Corten, La Complicité dans le Droit de la Responsabilité Internationale: Un Concept Inutile?, 57 ANNUAIRE FRANÇAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 57 (2011);
JACKSON, supra note 8, at 160–61; LANOVOY, supra note 11, at 226–27.
31. See JACKSON, supra note 8, at 159–62; Giorgio Gaja, Interpreting Articles Adopted by the
International Law Commission, 86 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2015);
Nottingham Workshop Report, supra note 10, at 5–6.
32. See JACKSON, supra note 8, at 75–80.
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could agree. 33 As a matter of policy, a knowledge-based test would be overinclusive and would inhibit State cooperation that can help advance important public interests, such as the prevention of terrorism. The proponents
of this view argue that State practice is replete with examples of assistance
provided to partners with unclean hands, a point that militates against a customary rule prohibiting such assistance. They similarly argue that analogies
with international criminal law are inapposite because criminal law protects
a narrow set of values and interests that may require different standards than
the generally applicable law of State responsibility. 34
While this debate has attracted much scholarly attention, most States
have remained silent on the issue, a fact that contributes to the formal indeterminacy of Article 16. The situation was not helped by the ICJ’s foray into
the issue in the Bosnian Genocide case. There the Court had to decide whether
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was responsible for complicity in
genocide (prohibited in Article 3(e) of the Genocide Convention) in providing assistance to the forces of the Bosnian Serbs who committed genocide
in Srebrenica in July 1995. The Court decided to use Article 16 ASR, an interState rule, by analogy to supply content to the Genocide Convention rule
that prohibited States from assisting non-State actors in the commission of
genocide. 35 In doing so, however, the Court avoided conclusively pronouncing on the mental element of Article 16. It held in particular that it was not
necessary to decide whether or not an accomplice to genocide shared the
principal perpetrator’s specific, genocidal intent (which is itself a step above
an intent or purpose to facilitate the crime) because
there is no doubt that the conduct of an organ or a person furnishing aid
or assistance to a perpetrator of the crime of genocide cannot be treated as
complicity in genocide unless at the least that organ or person acted knowingly, that is to say, in particular, was aware of the specific intent (dolus
specialis) of the principal perpetrator. 36

33. See CRAWFORD, supra note 9, at 409.
34. See AUST, supra note 6, at 248–49. See also Helmut Aust, A Path towards the Moral
Sophistication of International Law? Some Remarks on Miles Jackson’s “Complicity in International
Law,” EJIL:TALK! (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.ejiltalk.org/a-path-towards-the-moral-sophistication-of-international-law-some-remarks-on-miles-jacksons-complicity-in-international-law/.
35. Bosnian Genocide, supra note 7, ¶ 420.
36. Id. ¶ 421.
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On the facts, while there was little doubt that the aid provided by the
FRY at least partly facilitated the Srebrenica genocide, there was also no evidence that the FRY authorities were “clearly aware” 37 that the Bosnian Serbs
were committing or were about to commit genocide, especially because the
decision to commit genocide was taken shortly before it was carried out. 38
On the other hand, the Court found that the FRY was responsible for failing
to prevent the Srebrenica genocide because it was aware, or should normally
have been aware, of a “serious risk” that genocide would take place in Srebrenica and did not act with due diligence to stop it. 39 Note the Court’s use
of a constructive knowledge standard for triggering the duty to prevent: that
the State should have known of a serious risk—that is, some significant possibility but not necessarily likelihood—that genocide would take place. 40
The contradictions between the ILC’s text of and commentary to Article
16 ASR, as well as the ICJ’s reluctance to clarify the mental element of the
rule, are likely the consequence of an almost existential dilemma as to how
this complicity rule should be calibrated. A culpability standard that required
knowledge could be criticized as overinclusive, while one that required intent
could be criticized as underinclusive. As I will proceed to show, however,
that dilemma is a false one. Article 16 could—and should—incorporate varying degrees of knowledge and intent, using complementary and alternative
forms of fault. Subject-specific complicity rules, such as those in IHL and
IHRL, could do so as well.
To demonstrate how this is the case requires, however, a theoretical detour. A major factor contributing to the level of disagreement regarding the
interpretation of Article 16 and its cognates is the terminological and conceptual difficulty of any question of knowledge and intentionality, exacerbated by the lack of consistency among the different national legal systems
in which international lawyers are first trained. Improving our understanding
of these issues thus requires resort to the accumulated expertise of those
who have devoted particular thought and energy to analogous questions,
such as psychologists, philosophers (of the law, of language, and of the
mind), and international and domestic criminal lawyers. To be clear, my aim
37. Id. ¶ 422.
38. Id. ¶ 423.
39. Id. ¶¶ 431–38.
40. Human rights bodies also generally use constructive knowledge regarding State fault
for failing to comply with positive duties of protect. In the ECHR context, see Vladislava
Stoyanova, Fault, Knowledge and Risk within the Framework of Positive Obligations under the European
Convention on Human Rights, 33 LEIDEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 601 (2020).
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here is only to develop a conceptual framework that is good enough for better
understanding the dilemmas posed by Article 16 ASR and similar State-focused complicity rules. My purpose is not to set out a full-fledged theory of
epistemology or intention, nor am I capable of so doing. That said, no
amount of conceptual “clarification” of the type we will embark upon can
ultimately overcome substantive moral and political disagreements, which
conceptual debates may only serve to mask. 41 But it is important to know
what we are really disagreeing about.
B. Culpability from the Individual to the State
Let us first dispense with the supposed difficulty of conceptualizing culpability in terms of mental elements, or the mens rea of States. 42 It is a truism
that States are abstract legal entities and thus physically incapable of directly
knowing or intending anything. When, however, we speak of knowledge or
intention in the context of the law of State responsibility, we do so with the
understanding that States are composed of and can, in reality, only act
through human beings. Therefore, to say that State A knows something or
intends something is simply shorthand for saying that a natural, physical person X, who is acting on behalf of the State—that is, whose conduct is legally attributable to the State—knows or intends something. This process is conceptually no different from imputing mental states to legal entities, such as corporations, under domestic law, even if the rules of attribution of conduct
will obviously be different. Every domestic legal system that allows for the
criminal liability of corporations must (except in cases of strict liability) attribute to the corporation the mens rea of some specific individual acting on
its behalf—an ordinary employee, a senior manager, a member of the board

41. See Nicola Lacey, A Clear Concept of Intention: Elusive or Illusory?, 56 MODERN LAW
REVIEW 621, 626 (1993) (“Among these various points, the principal message is this: the
real source of uncertainty and disagreement in the application of criminal law concepts such
as intention is not ultimately to do with the concept, but with practical, moral and political
issues. Should this person be convicted, and of what offence? What is the appropriate role
of criminal law in this area? Conceptual analysis of mens rea terms, let alone their stipulation,
is inadequate as a lid to keep a jar containing these kinds of substantive issues shut.”).
42. In a somewhat different context, see, e.g., James Green, Self-Defence: A State of Mind
for States?, 55 NETHERLANDS INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 181, 192–95 (2008).
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of directors, and so forth. 43 Attributing mens rea to States is, again, conceptually no different.
As a matter of international law, it does not matter what position X holds
in A’s governmental hierarchy. It is perfectly possible for an intelligence
agent to possess an item of information or intend a certain action without
the knowledge of their immediate superiors or the highest-ranking officials
of the State, who may even have contradictory intentions. 44 But this is simply
irrelevant. From the standpoint of the law of State responsibility, the State is
a unitary entity and remains responsible for the conduct of all of its organs,
even if the conduct is unknown to the head of State or government or is
ultra vires. 45
There is thus no conceptual barrier to thinking about the mental states
of States. These are the mental states of concrete human beings engaging in
the conduct (the provision of assistance) that is attributable to the assisting
State and that falls within the purview of Article 16 or a similar complicity
rule. 46 Whatever the mental element required by the rule really is, it is the
relevant State organ or agent that must act with such mental element—that
is, the fault lies with an individual or a group of individuals acting on the
State’s behalf, especially those individuals deciding on or engaging in the
prohibited conduct (such as the sharing of intelligence). 47 That said, it is entirely possible to find that the State acted with fault without identifying these
officials by position or name. I should add that I should not be taken as

43. For example, for the position in English law see Lennard's Carrying Co. Ltd. v.
Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd. [1915] AC 705 (House of Lords attributing to a company the
fault of a natural person who was the company’s “directing mind”); Tesco Supermarkets
Ltd. v. Nattrass [1971] UKHL 1, 26: “In my view, therefore, the question: what natural
persons are to be treated in law as being the company for the purpose of acts done in the
course of its business, including the taking of precautions and the exercise or due diligence
to avoid the commission of a criminal offence, is to be found by identifying those natural
persons who by the memorandum and articles of association or as a result of action taken
by the directors, or by the company in general meeting pursuant to the articles, are entrusted
with the exercise of the powers of the company.” For a comparative overview of corporate
liability for bribery in 38 OECD member States, including the various attribution rules used
in their criminal laws, see OECD, Liability of Legal Persons for Foreign Bribery: A Stocktaking Report (Dec. 9, 2016), https://www.oecd.org/corruption/liability-of-legal-personsfor-foreign-bribery-stocktaking-report.htm.
44. See also Moynihan, supra note 11, at 16–17.
45. See ILC ASR, supra note 4, art. 7, art. 7 cmt.
46. But see LANOVOY, supra note 11, at 339–40.
47. See ILC ASR, supra note 4, art. 16 cmt. ¶ 3.
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arguing that there are no hard cases in attributing fault to States. In the intelligence-sharing context in particular, and especially with regard to the use
of knowledge-based fault standards, one major difficulty is that the different
components of the State may not be exchanging the information they possess with each other, so that a proper assessment of the risk of sharing intelligence with a partner is never made. I will deal with this issue in more detail
below. 48 But such difficulties, conceptual or evidentiary, should not be exaggerated.
It is, of course, true that in numerous contexts the relevant culpability
standard is objective—for example, whether the State acted reasonably or with
due diligence to prevent some kind of harm that it knew or ought/should have
known about. 49 But this is not because there is some kind of generally applicable presumption against subjective culpability standards or because no
fault is required at all. Rather, the question of fault or culpability is entirely
context-specific and a matter of the proper interpretation to be given to the
primary rule or the complicity rule being applied. 50 It is perfectly appropriate,

48. See Part IV.
49. Responsibility for fault under an objective standard is not equivalent to strict liability, which is responsibility with no fault at all. The objective standards are themselves forms
of fault, just like negligence in domestic law. For a discussion of various fault standards,
including objective ones, in the context of positive obligations under the ECHR, see
Stoyanova, supra note 40.
50. As the ILC explains,
Whether there has been a breach of a rule may depend on the intention or knowledge of
relevant State organs or agents and in that sense may be “subjective.” . . . In other cases, the
standard for breach of an obligation may be “objective,” in the sense that the advertence or
otherwise of relevant State organs or agents may be irrelevant. Whether responsibility is
“objective” or “subjective” in this sense depends on the circumstances, including the content of the primary obligation in question. The articles lay down no general rule in that
regard. The same is true of other standards, whether they involve some degree of fault,
culpability, negligence or want of due diligence. Such standards vary from one context to
another for reasons which essentially relate to the object and purpose of the treaty provision
or other rule giving rise to the primary obligation. Nor do the articles lay down any presumption in this regard as between the different possible standards. Establishing these is a
matter for the interpretation and application of the primary rules engaged in the given case.

ILC ASR, supra note 4, art. 2 cmt. ¶ 3. See also id. art. 16 cmt. ¶ 3 (“the relevant State organ or
agency providing aid or assistance must be aware of the circumstances”) (emphasis added); art.
16 cmt. ¶ 5 (“A State is not responsible for aid or assistance under article 16 unless the relevant
State organ intended, by the aid or assistance given, to facilitate the occurrence of the wrongful
conduct”) (emphasis added).
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for example, for State responsibility for the commission of genocide to depend on the existence of a specific genocidal intent on the part of the relevant State officials, while the State’s responsibility for failing to prevent genocide would depend on an objective standard of conduct, such as due diligence. A wholly different matter is the proof of such subjective mental states
as knowledge or intent, which will again depend entirely on the context in
which such proof is being sought and will normally require inference from
conduct, with all the problems that this usually entails. 51
A more difficult question is the extent to which the legal categories of
mens rea and the “folk,” or lay, intuitions about mental states that support
them, correspond to actual psychological phenomena. This question can
only be answered (if at all) by psychologists and neuroscientists and is obviously beyond the scope of our inquiry. 52 My point is simply that to the extent
that intent and knowledge are workable and coherent concepts, at least in
law, there is no issue whatsoever with attributing them to the State.
C. Knowledge and Intent Compared
Before looking specifically at the mental element of complicity, it is important to define knowledge and intent as precisely as possible, 53 a task made
more difficult by terminological inconsistencies and variations between legal
cultures. Even within a single legal tradition the meaning of the terms can
vary from context to context, from one area of the law to another. Then
there are the “folk,” or lay, conceptions of knowledge and intent, 54 as well
as the very nuanced and sophisticated ones found in philosophical scholarship, which has found the question of the definition of intention “both intriguing and enormously difficult to answer in any simple terms.” 55 All this

51. See Moynihan, supra note 11, at 17; A.P. SIMESTER ET AL., SIMESTER AND SULLI147–48 (6th ed. 2016).
52. See Michael S. Moore, Intention as a Marker of Moral Culpability and Legal Punishability,
in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 179 (R.A. Duff & Stuart Green eds.,
2011).
53. Intent and intention are synonyms, although the former is more prevalent in formal
legal contexts. I will use them interchangeably.
54. There are many different conceptions of knowledge and intent in ordinary usage,
depending on the context. References to ordinary usage are necessarily reductivist and simplistic. See Lacey, supra note 41, at 627.
55. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 116 (2d ed. 2008).
VAN’S CRIMINAL LAW: THEORY AND DOCTRINE
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variation means that it is simply impossible to arrive at any kind of comprehensive set of definitions; accordingly, my ambition here is only to draw a
few important and necessary distinctions.
First, the legal concepts of knowledge and intent need not align perfectly
with the “folk” usage of the terms or with how these terms are used by philosophers. 56 Ultimately, law has to contain rules about these concepts, and
these rules serve a multitude of different purposes, a situation that can lead
to divergence from the usage of terms outside the legal context. 57
Second, knowledge and intent both require objects or referents; they can only
operate with regard to something. These objects can be (1) actions, (2) the
consequences/results of those actions, or (3) facts/attendant circumstances. 58 Philosophical discussions have generally revolved around the relationship between action and intention—all actions (as opposed to involuntary movements) are by definition intentional under some description. 59
Third, knowledge and intent differ in psychological valence—intent is a
pro-attitude (e.g., approval, admiration, liking, preference) in favor of a certain
course of events or line of conduct, while knowledge requires no such attitude. The agent wants to commit the action and thereby achieve some result;
they act with some goal in mind. 60 In the legal literature, we frequently say
that knowledge is a cognitive phenomenon while intent is a volitional one—
that is, it involves the exercise of the free will or choice of a person who is
pursuing some kind of goal.
56. Id. at 116–17.
57. See generally R.A. Duff, Intentions Legal and Philosophical, 9 OXFORD JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 76 (1989).
58. See HART, supra note 55, at 119.
59. For a classical account, see ELIZABETH ANSCOMBE, INTENTION (1957). For a sophisticated and more recent exploration of distinctions between beliefs, desires, and intentions and between intentions and intended actions, see RICHARD HOLTON, WILLING,
WANTING, WAITING (2009).
60. I am avoiding using the terms desire and motive here. The relationship between
intention and desire is a complex issue in both the philosophical and legal literature, the key
issue being whether intention is a species of or entails desire. See, e.g., R.A. DUFF, INTENTION, AGENCY AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY: PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND THE CRIMINAL
LAW 44–82 (1990); John Finnis, Intention and Side Effects, in 2 INTENTION AND IDENTITY:
COLLECTED ESSAYS 173 (John Finnis ed., 2011). Motive is a goal further removed causally
from the intended action and its immediate result. Motive in that sense is also a sub-species
of intention, but intention relates to consequences that are (in the criminal context) outside
the defined scope of the elements of the offense, and the intention as to these consequences
is thus legally not a part of the intent required by the offense. See also SIMESTER ET AL., supra
note 51, at 137.
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A person can thus intend to perform some action, know or foresee that
the action is likely or not likely to lead to a result, and act with or without the
intention of bringing about that result. The same action can therefore be
intentional under one description but not under others. Imagine a scenario
in which A, a soldier, shoots at a person he sees on a hill and thinks is an
enemy soldier but turns out to have been B, a member of A’s own unit. The
proposition that A intentionally fired his weapon is true, as is the one that A
intentionally fired his weapon to kill the person on the hill, but the proposition that A intentionally fired his weapon to kill B is false. Whether A’s action is regarded as intentional thus depends on the words we use to describe
it.
In ordinary language, knowledge and intention can refer to both actions
and their consequences, but intention cannot refer to facts that are not consequences; in other words, facts that are not causally related to some action
also being described. One can know that the Earth revolves around the Sun,
but one cannot intend that the Earth revolve around the Sun. One can know
that there is such a thing as anthropogenic climate change, but one cannot
intend that there be such a thing. One can, of course, hope that a certain state
of affairs is or is not true, but one cannot intend it. Again, intent/intention
is a mental state tied to action—one can certainly intend to (now or in the
future) work on ameliorating climate change or act in some way because climate change exists. 61 As a legal matter, however, intent can (confusingly) be
redefined as hope or belief as to mere existence of attendant circumstances, if
intent is required for that type of element of an offense. 62
As for knowledge, it is traditionally (but not universally) defined in epistemology as a justified true belief, a definition that largely aligns with commonsense usage and legal practice. Thus, person A knows that proposition
P is true if and only if (1) P is, in fact, true; (2) A subjectively believes that P
is true; and (3) A is justified in so believing, perhaps because the belief is
formed on the basis of appropriate and relevant evidence. 63 A is able in this
61. See also DUFF, INTENTION, AGENCY AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY, supra note 60, at
87–89.
62. See SIMESTER ET AL., supra note 51, at 145–46.
63. See generally Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa & Matthias Steup, The Analysis of Knowledge,
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Mar. 7, 2017), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/. Disregard of the traditional definition generally turns on the issue of justifiability and so-called Gettier cases. See Edmund L. Gettier, Is Justified True Belief
Knowledge?, 23 ANALYSIS 121 (1963). See also PAUL BOGHOSSIAN, FEAR OF KNOWLEDGE:
AGAINST RELATIVISM AND CONSTRUCTIVISM (2006).
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sense to know anything from whether the lights are on in the room (something the person can establish through direct perception) to such facts as
that the Earth revolves around the Sun or humans are causing significant
changes to the climate (if A has the capacity to examine a sufficient quantum
of evidence in that regard and has done so). The legal conception of
“knowledge,” just like that of “intention,” need not, of course, align with
that of philosophy—this is especially the case with regard to the justifiability
criterion, which is less important to law than are moral or commonsense
intuitions about a person’s culpability. 64
Knowledge can relate to circumstances that existed in the past or that
exist in the present. Thus, A can know that there once existed a person called
Gaius Julius Caesar who became the dictator of Rome and was assassinated
on the Ides of March. A can know that dinosaurs once roamed the Earth and
then became extinct. A can know that another person, B, is sitting with him
in his room. These are facts that a human being can be certain about, to the
extent that a human being can know anything.
However, there are points of fact in the past or present about which one
cannot be certain—there are many things we do not know for sure, and will
never be able to know for sure, about ancient Rome or the life of Caesar or
the extinction of the dinosaurs. We may simply lack sufficient information
or evidence about specific points in the past or the present—for example,
whether Vladimir Putin has ever had a very naughty tape starring one Donald
Trump in his drawer. Similarly, we may have reasonably sufficient information—for example, regarding whether there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq in 2003—yet process it in a biased or otherwise erroneous
way. In short, it is simply a fact of life that we constantly have to make decisions in conditions of uncertainty, conditions no less unclear even if some
facts in the past or present can, in theory, be known with absolute certainty. 65
We also frequently speak of propositional knowledge (knowledge-that)
when it relates to circumstances or events in the future. A knows that he will
eventually die, since every person there ever was ultimately died and since he
has a sufficient understanding of human biology. A knows that if he drops a
tennis ball that he is holding in his hand the ball will start falling to the ground
because this is what has happened every time he dropped something and
64. See further Gregory M. Gilchrist, Willful Blindness as Mere Evidence, 54 LOYOLA OF LOS
ANGELES LAW REVIEW 405, 428–33 (2021). See also SIMESTER ET AL., supra note 51, at 157.
65. See also Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 070: Uncertainty, Risk, and Ignorance,
LEGAL THEORY LEXICON, https://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2011/05/
legal-theory-lexicon-070-uncertainty-risk-and-ignorance.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2021).
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because he is familiar with the nature of the force of gravity. A can even
know something that will occur billions of years into the future—for example, that in some five billion years the Sun will exhaust the hydrogen in its
core, exit its main sequence, expand into a red giant, and engulf the inner
planets of the Solar System.
In other words, one can know the future; there are future facts just as
there are facts in the past or the present. However, the vast majority of future
facts are contingent and thus not knowable in this sense, but are only assessable as a matter of degree of likelihood or probability. This is especially the
case when a future event depends on the actions of other human beings and
is thus necessarily contingent, a point of particular importance for our inquiry
into complicity. 66 We will return to it later.
D. A Continuum of Culpability
This brings us to the continuum of the types of fault that we are familiar
with from comparative criminal law. The diversification of culpability is a
consequence of ordinary moral intuitions under which the wrongfulness of
instances of the same conduct causing exactly the same consequences (e.g.,
death) will vary depending on the mental state of the wrongdoer, as will accordingly the level of responsibility and punishment. Domestic legal systems
also vary, of course, in how precisely they define the specific points along
this continuum.
One example of a carefully crafted diversified approach is the influential
Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute (MPC), which deliberately
avoids the ambiguity associated with the term “intent” 67 and instead distinguishes between four culpable mental states—purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence—requiring the proof of the mental state associated with
each specific material element of a given criminal offense. 68 For example,
MPC section 2.02(2)(a) defines purpose as follows:
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense
when:
66. See also James G. Stewart, The End of “Modes of Liability” for International Crimes, 25
LEIDEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 165, 194 (2012).
67. See MARKUS D. DUBBER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MODEL PENAL CODE 43–
44 (2d ed. 2015).
68. Element analysis thus parts ways with offense analysis, which looks at the crime as
a whole and requires a single mens rea for that offense.
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(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is
his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a
result; and
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the
existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist. 69

Section 2.02(2)(b) then proceeds to define knowledge:
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense
when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is
practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result.

Note how the MPC definition of purpose in section 2.02(2)(a)(i), requiring a “conscious object” to engage in the relevant conduct or to cause a
specific result corresponds to the philosophical definition of intention in the
context of goal-driven action. But the purpose with regard to attendant circumstances in section 2.02(2)(a)(ii) is actually either knowledge (awareness
that they exist, as also set out in section 2.02(2)(b)(i)), or subjective belief, or
even mere hope, that they exist (neither of which is knowledge as that term
is conventionally defined in philosophy). 70
Like most domestic legal systems, those U.S. jurisdictions that base their
criminal laws on the MPC essentially require that the members of a jury or
professional judges tasked with determining the culpability of an individual
establish the subjective mental state of that individual, a task that is of course
impossible through any direct means. The practical difficulties of inferring
mental states from an individual’s statements or behavior mean that fine distinctions of the kind drawn in the MPC can look artificial or impracticable;

69. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a) (AM. L. INST. 1985) [hereinafter MPC].
70. See also DUBBER, supra note 67, at 53–54. Similarly, see section 5.2(2) of the Criminal
Code Act 1995 of Australia, under which “[a] person has intention with respect to a circumstance if he or she believes that it exists or will exist.”
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they do not actually correspond to what finders of fact are really doing, especially if they can exercise a significant degree of discretion and do not have
to provide full reasoning for their decisions (as is the case with juries). 71
Moreover, our moral intuitions may well lead us to conclude that conceptually distinct mental states are equally culpable, deserving of the same
condemnation, and that, therefore, the various distinctions regarding mental
states should be collapsed. 72 In fact, in recent years psychologists and experimental philosophers have been testing the working of these intuitions, with
some striking findings. For instance, in an experiment in which the subjects
were presented with a vignette in which the protagonist commits an action
causing a harmful side effect as a consequence of an effect he actually desires,
the vast majority of subjects, when given a binary choice of descriptions of
the protagonist’s conduct (intentional v. unintentional), agreed that the
harmful side effect was caused intentionally but they were not willing to
agree with that proposition when the side effect was beneficial. 73 When given
multiple possible descriptions, however, the subjects most often chose the
label “knowingly” for such conduct and showed a capacity for making fine
distinctions on the basis of their assessment of the protagonist’s desire to
cause an effect—the greater the assessed desire, the greater the blameworthiness. 74 There is an ongoing controversy in this body of scholarship about
whether and to what extent people’s intentionality judgments are driving
their moral judgments (as has commonly been thought) or whether it is in
fact moral judgments about blameworthiness that drive (and bias) “folk”
judgments about intentionality (i.e., we think that a particular course of conduct is blameworthy and therefore think that it is intentional). 75
71. See Kevin Jon Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of Mens Rea, 99 JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL
LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 317, 317–22 (2009). See also James A. Macleod, Belief States in Criminal
Law, 68 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW 497 (2016).
72. See HART, supra note 55, at 117; JEREMY HORDER, ASHWORTH’S PRINCIPLES OF
CRIMINAL LAW 190–92 (2016).
73. See Joshua Knobe, Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language, 63 ANALYSIS
190 (2003); Joshua Knobe, Intentional Action in Folk Psychology: An Experimental Investigation,
16 PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 309 (2003).
74. See Steve Guglielmo & Bertram F. Malle, Can Unintended Side Effects Be Intentional?
Resolving a Controversy over Intentionality and Morality, 36 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN 1635 (2010).
75. See further Steve Guglielmo & Bertram F. Malle, Enough Skill to Kill: Intentionality Judgments and the Moral Valence of Action, 117 COGNITION 139 (2010); Joshua Knobe, Person as
Scientist, Person as Moralist, 33 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES 315 (2010); Joshua Knobe
& Zoltán Gendler Szabó, Modals with a Taste of the Deontic, 6 SEMANTICS & PRAGMATICS 1
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Be that as it may, it is simply a fact that most legal systems have, at least
in some contexts, long treated as intentional those actions producing certain
results that were done in mental states that were less clear-cut than the MPC
idea of purpose 76 and that do not correspond neatly with either “folk” or
philosophical thinking about intentionality. 77 In law, intent is “a term of art,
encompassing many situations that we would not call ‘intentional’ in ordinary language.” 78 Thus, for example, many common law systems have used
a concept of intent that includes not only the MPC idea of purpose, termed
direct intent, but also oblique, or indirect, intent. 79 Oblique intent treats as intentional those consequences of an action that were foreseen by the person
as inevitably resulting from their action, even though they were not the goal
of the action. 80 For example, A wishes to kill B, who is traveling on a train.
To do that, A blows up the train, killing not only B but a number of other
passengers, whose deaths are a matter of indifference to A but which he is
ready to accept in order to achieve his goal of killing B. The element of volition here—which could deserve the label of intent—is that A chose to act in
(2013); Jonathan Phillips, Jamie B. Luguri & Joshua Knobe, Unifying Morality’s Influence on
Non-moral Judgments: The Relevance of Alternative Possibilities, 145 COGNITION 30 (2015); Florian
Cova, The Folk Concept of Intentional Action: Empirical Approaches, in BLACKWELL COMPANION
TO EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY (Wesley Buckwalter & Justin Sytsma eds., 2016); Florian
Cova, Anthony Lantian & Jordane Boudesseul, Can the Knobe Effect Be Explained Away? Methodological Controversies in the Study of the Relationship between Intentionality and Morality, 42 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN 1295 (2016); Andrew J. Vonasch & Roy F.
Baumeister, Unjustified Side Effects Were Strongly Intended: Taboo Tradeoffs and the Side-Effect Effect,
68 JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 83 (2017).
76. See further Sarah Finnin, Mental Elements under Article 30 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Comparative Analysis, 61 INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW
QUARTERLY 325, 328–33 (2012).
77. In criminal law, this has especially been the case with regard to crimes involving
physical harm to other persons. See HART, supra note 55, at 119 (“for the law, a foreseen
outcome is enough, even if it was unwanted by the agent, even if he thought of it as an
undesirable by-product of his activities”).
78. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 443 (2000).
79. For the classical argument in favor of the inclusion of oblique intent, see Glanville
Williams, Oblique Intention, 46 CAMBRIDGE LAW JOURNAL 417 (1987). For a philosophical
critique of oblique intent, see Duff, Intentions Legal and Philosophical, supra note 57; DUFF,
INTENTION, AGENCY AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY, supra note 60, at 74–82 (note however that
Duff does not argue against responsibility in cases of oblique intent but disputes the conceptual coherence of the notion). For a critique of Duff, see Michael Gorr, Should the Law
Distinguish Between Intention and (Mere) Foresight?, 2 LEGAL THEORY 359 (1996). See also Finnis,
supra note 60 (criticizing the notion of oblique intent as misconceived).
80. I leave aside here the issue of whether having a goal is conceptually distinct from
desiring. For a discussion of this issue, see FLETCHER, supra note 78, at 440–42.
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the way he did, knowing what the consequences of his action would be. 81 In
proceeding with the action nonetheless, A reconciled himself to the consequences though he may not have desired them as such. In other words, it is
not that A simply had the foresight that something would happen, but rather
that while having such foresight, he consciously acted—as he could have
chosen not to do—in a way that would bring about those results. 82
Jurisprudence has varied from system to system and within systems as
to whether such oblique intent is a species of intent as such or simply evidential support for an inference that (direct) intent exists. 83 In the MPC
framework, this would be an instance of a person acting knowingly with regard
to a consequence, “aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will
cause such a result,” 84 a formulation designed to capture the contingent,
probabilistic nature of such knowledge. 85 In the private tort law context, the
orthodox position in American law is that the concept of intent encompasses
an oblique form, the equivalent of acting knowingly under the MPC. For
example, the Restatement of Torts (Second) defines the word “intent” as denoting
either that “the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes
that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it.” 86 The Restatement of
Torts (Third) retains this dual definition while modifying the language to make
it more consistent with the MPC conceptual framework: “A person acts with
the intent to produce a consequence if: (a) the person acts with the purpose

81. To a level of practical certainty higher in the scale than simply an appreciation of
high probability. See Williams, supra note 79, at 421.
82. See HART, supra note 55, at 121–22 (focusing on choice and control over the outcome with regard to both direct and oblique intent). See also Duff, Intentions Legal and Philosophical, supra note 57, at 87–88 (arguing that under a consequentialist moral paradigm control over the outcome is the basis of responsibility in cases of oblique intent); Steve Guglielmo, Andrew E. Monroe & Bertram F. Malle, At the Heart of Morality Lies Folk Psychology,
52 INQUIRY 449 (2009) (arguing that moral judgments about blame critically depend on an
assessment of the agent’s capacity to choose whether to do his action).
83. See, e.g., DAVID ORMEROD & KARL LAIRD, SMITH, HOGAN, & ORMEROD’S CRIMINAL LAW 90–9 (15th ed. 2018); Beatrice Krebs, Oblique Intent, Foresight and Authorisation, 7
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON JOURNAL OF LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE 1 (2018); M.
Cathleen Kaveny, Inferring Intention from Foresight, 120 LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW 81 (2004);
SIMESTER ET AL., supra note 51, at 142–43 (all discussing the evolution of case law in England and Wales).
84. MPC, supra note 69, § 2.02(2)(b)(ii).
85. See DUBBER, supra note 67, at 55.
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (AM. L. INST. 1979) (emphasis added).
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of producing that consequence; or (b) the person acts knowing that the consequence is substantially certain to result.” 87
In addition to the widespread adoption of oblique forms of intent, many
common law systems have traditionally avoided confining culpability strictly
to purpose in many other ways. 88 For example, the crime of murder is in
various common law jurisdictions defined as requiring either the purpose to
kill or the purpose to cause grievous bodily harm without a purpose of causing death. Similarly, common law systems generally employ the doctrine of
transferred malice—if A shoots at B with the intent of killing B, but misses
B and kills C, A will be guilty of the murder of C even though he did not
desire to bring about C’s death. In some common law jurisdictions, a cognate
doctrine is the felony murder rule, which imposes responsibility for murder
on any person who kills another, without desiring to do so, if the death arises
in the context of the commission of a specific felony, such as robbery. 89 Finally, in the complicity context, the doctrine of joint enterprise imposes criminal responsibility on a person who contributes to the commission of an offense by others with whom he shares a common purpose, such responsibility
extending even to crimes outside the common purpose but whose commission was foreseen. 90 All of these doctrines (rightly or not) enable the conviction for an offense (e.g., murder) of a person who did not act with the purpose
of bringing about the prohibited consequence.

87. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 (AM. L. INST. 2010). The commentary then
further explains,
A purpose to cause harm makes the harm intentional even if harm is not substantially certain
to occur. Likewise, knowledge that harm is substantially certain to result is sufficient to
show that the harm is intentional even in the absence of a purpose to bring about that harm.
Of course, a mere showing that harm is substantially certain to result from the actor’s conduct is not sufficient to prove intent; it must also be shown that the actor is aware of this.
Moreover, under Subsection (b) it is not sufficient that harm will probably result from the
actor’s conduct; the outcome must be substantially certain to occur.

Id. at 7.
88. See Moore, supra note 52, at 201–2.
89. See FLETCHER, supra note 78, at 447–48; DUBBER, supra note 67, at 90–92.
90. This remains the position under customary international criminal law, although not
under the Rome Statute of the ICC. This variant of common-purpose liability was recently
considered by the UK Supreme Court in R v. Jogee [2016] UKSC 8, [2017] AC 387, and by
the Privy Council in R v. Ruddock [2016] UKPC 7, holding that the common law of England
and Wales had taken a “wrong turn” (Jogee, ¶ 87) in allowing foresight as mens rea for joint
enterprise.
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Continental/civil law systems have similarly used an umbrella concept
of intent which includes dolus directus and dolus indirectus (corresponding to
direct and oblique intent in the common law). (In some systems, those same
concepts are labeled dolus directus in, respectively, the first degree and the second degree. 91 In order to avoid confusion, I will not use these terms, but
they convey the same basic idea.) 92 This is also the position in Article 30(2)–
(3) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which
provides as follows:
2. For the purposes of this article, a person has intent where:
(a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct;
(b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.
3. For the purposes of this article, “knowledge” means awareness that a
circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of
events. “Know” and “knowingly” shall be construed accordingly. 93

The construction that a person is aware that “a consequence will occur
in the ordinary course of events” is again meant to address the epistemic
problem of not being able to know the future and therefore allowing for
contingency. The formulation essentially conveys the same idea as foresight
of practical, virtual, or near-certainty. 94
91. See Finnin, supra note 76, at 332–33. Obviously, these various systems will also use
the equivalent of dolus in their own language, in addition or as an alternative to the Latin
terms.
92. See Mohamed Badar, The Mental Element in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court: A Commentary from a Comparative Criminal Law Perspective, 19 CRIMINAL LAW FORUM
473, 474, 482–87 (2008).
93. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 30(2)–(3), July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
94. For example, the influential project of a draft Criminal Code for England and Wales,
completed in 1989 by the Law Commission, uses very similar terminology to convey the
same idea. Section 18(b) of the Code provides that a person acts intentionally with respect
to: “a circumstance when he hopes or knows that it exists or will exist; (ii) a result when he
acts either in order to bring it about or being aware that it will occur in the ordinary course
of events.” 1 CRIMINAL LAW: A CRIMINAL CODE FOR ENGLAND AND WALES 51 (Law
Com. No. 177, 1989). The Commission’s commentary on the provision notes the impossibility of knowing the future and the provision’s openness due to contingency and embraces
a concept of indirect intent:
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Civil law systems frequently also include within an umbrella concept of
intent the sub-type called dolus eventualis, the closest common law equivalent
of recklessness. 95 Dolus eventualis is still regarded in such systems as dolus, i.e.,
a species of intent. 96 It differs from dolus indirectus in that the foreseen probability of the consequence resulting from the action is lower than practical

Where a person acts in order to achieve a particular purpose, knowing that this cannot be
done without causing another result, he must be held to intend to cause that other result.
The other result may be a pre-condition—as where D, in order to injure P, throws a brick
through the window behind which he knows P to be standing; or it may be a necessary
concomitant of the first result—as (to use a much quoted example) where D blows up an
aeroplane in flight in order to recover on the insurance covering its cargo, knowing that the
crew will inevitably be killed. D intends to break the window and he intends to kill the crew.
But there is no absolute certainty in human affairs. P might fling up the window while the
brick is in flight. The crew might make a miraculous escape by parachute. D’s purpose might
be achieved without causing the second result—but these are only remote possibilities and
D, if he contemplates them at all (which may be unlikely), must know that they are only
remote possibilities. The result will occur, and D knows that it will occur, “in the ordinary
course of events . . . unless something supervenes to prevent it.” It is, and he knows it is,
“a virtual certainty.” We have adopted the phrase, “in the ordinary course of events” to
ensure that “intention” covers the case of a person who knows that the achievement of his
purpose will necessarily cause the result in question, in the absence of some wholly improbable supervening event.

2 CRIMINAL LAW: A CRIMINAL CODE FOR ENGLAND AND WALES 192 (Law Com. No. 177,
1989). Similarly, under section 5.2(3) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 of Australia “[a] person
has intention with respect to a result if he or she means to bring it about or is aware that it
will occur in the ordinary course of events.”
95. This is the case, for example, in the law of South Africa, a hybrid common law/continental system. See, e.g., Director of Public Prosecutions, Gauteng v. Pistorius 2016 (2) SA
317 (SCA) (Paralympian Oscar Pistorius guilty of murdering his girlfriend, Reeva
Steenkamp, on the basis of dolus eventualis). See also Jens David Ohlin, Targeting and the Concept
of Intent, 35 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 79, 83, 87–91 (2013) (discussing
mens rea concepts in various legal traditions and exploring the issue of whether recklessness
and dolus eventualis are substantially equivalent or the latter is somewhat more demanding
than the former). Fletcher regards recklessness as equivalent to conscious negligence in
some civil law systems rather than as equivalent to dolus eventualis. See FLETCHER, supra note
78, at 446. The problem of distinguishing between dolus eventualis and conscious negligence
has long preoccupied criminal law scholars in the continental European tradition, but that
particular qualification issue is not of central importance to us here. See further DUBBER, supra
note 67, at 61–63. For an extensive comparative examination of mens rea standards, see
JEROEN BLOMSMA, MENS REA AND DEFENCES IN EUROPEAN CRIMINAL LAW (2012).
96. See FLETCHER, supra note 78, at 445–48.
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certainty, although municipal systems differ as to whether mere possibility
suffices for this species of intent or a particular risk threshold is required. 97
Intent defined as purpose or dolus directus covers those results of an action
that are conscious objects or goals of the action even in those situations in
which it is highly unlikely that the action will result in the desired consequence. 98 For example, if person A, who has no prior arms training, picks
up a rifle and shoots at person B five hundred meters away, he may be aware
that it is extremely unlikely that the action of taking a shot will result in B’s
death but still intend that B shall die. If by luck B actually is struck by the
bullet and dies, A would be liable for murder on the basis of his intent as
purpose/direct intent, even though A foresaw that B would most likely not
die. 99
However, oblique intent/dolus indirectus and recklessness/dolus eventualis
focus on foresight and lack the element of goal or desire: the consequence
of the agent’s action is unwanted but is foreseen, and the agent has reconciled with, or is indifferent to, its occurrence. The difference between oblique
intent and recklessness is that with regard to the former the occurrence of
the consequence is practically or virtually certain, while with regard to the
latter there is only a possibility or risk of its occurrence (with different descriptors used in different jurisdictions). 100 Again, in all of these cases the
agent chooses to act while being aware of the certain, probable, or possible
harmful consequences of their action.
The upshot of this analysis is as follows: “intent” and “acting intentionally” are legally ambiguous terms that are perceived differently in different
jurisdictions. 101 The key question is whether intent will, as a matter of law,
capture only those results of an action that were actively wanted, or also
97. See also DOUGLAS GUILFOYLE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 188–92 (2016);
Finnin, supra note 76, at 333–36; Ohlin, supra note 95, at 103–6 (exploring different conceptions of dolus eventualis).
98. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 79, at 431; Finnin, supra note 76, at 330–31 (any degree
of possibility suffices with direct intent).
99. See, e.g., ORMEROD & LAIRD, supra note 83, at 90; cf. R v. Dadson [1850] 175 Eng.
Rep. 499 (defendant convicted for intentionally shooting a man who he wrongly believed
was out of range).
100. See, e.g., ORMEROD & LAIRD, supra note 83, at 96–98 (discussing the difficulty of
distinguishing between intention and recklessness below a threshold of a certainty);
BLOMSMA, supra note 95, at 72–73. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 86,
§ 8A cmt. (discussing the progression from intent, to recklessness, and then to negligence
as the foreseen probability of a consequence decreases).
101. See FLETCHER, supra note 78, at 443.
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those that were foreseen with virtual certainty or with something less than
such certainty, but whose occurrence was acceptable to the agent. All legal
systems suffer from difficulties in dealing with intent, both doctrinally and
in practice.
E. Knowing What, Intending What?
We have, up to this point, discussed the mens rea of a person with respect
to their own actions, their consequences, and any attendant circumstances.
But our object of inquiry is, of course, the mens rea of complicity. In such
situations there are (at least) two agents—the principal and the accomplice—
each of whom is engaging in some kind of conduct with some kind of mens
rea. The conduct of the accomplice is the provision of assistance to the principal, which makes it easier for the principal to commit a wrong—for example, A sells B a gun that B then uses to kill C. The issue, therefore, is what
mens rea A needs to have with respect to his action of provision of assistance and its consequences, and with respect to any further action by B.
As a general matter, domestic legal systems tend to deal with accomplice
liability far more elaborately in the criminal law context than in the private
law context. 102 This is most likely because true tort complicity scenarios are
rare and can be captured by broadly defined torts (including inducing
breaches of contract) or by concepts such as joint tortfeasance. 103 One domestic legal system that has grappled with complicity scenarios more directly
in the tort context is the American one, in the jurisprudence of U.S. federal
courts under the Alien Tort Claims Act. But there the U.S. courts have
mostly imported mens rea standards from international criminal law to define complicity in tort for violations of international law, producing a jurisprudence that is substantial but complex and confusing, especially to outsiders and particularly when these standards are applied to corporate entities. 104
102. For two substantial recent works on private law accessory liability in common law
systems, see JOACHIM DIETRICH & PAULINE RIDGE, ACCESSORIES IN PRIVATE LAW (2015);
PAUL S. DAVIES, ACCESSORY LIABILITY (2015).
103. See also Hazel Catty, Joint Tortfeasance and Assistance Liability, 19 LEGAL STUDIES 489
(1999); Henry Cooper, Liability for Assisting Torts, 41 MELBOURNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
571 (2017); Sarah L. Swan, Aiding and Abetting Matters, 12 JOURNAL OF TORT LAW 255 (2019)
(again focusing on common law systems).
104. See also Chimène Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 HASTINGS
LAW JOURNAL 61 (2008); Oona A. Hathaway et al., Aiding and Abetting in International Criminal
Law, 104 CORNELL LAW REVIEW 1593, 1630–34 (2020).
1297

International Law Studies

2021

In trying to conceptualize the fault element of a State complicity rule in
international law resort to criminal law analogies is thus inevitable. Again,
this is—with due caution—not inappropriate since the mental attitudes that
the fault or culpability element tries to capture are those of individuals acting
on behalf of States. 105 I will therefore use the gun-seller example above as a
useful thought experiment. Note that in this scenario A’s action was knowing and volitional and hence intentional under some minimal description—
that is, the proposition that A intended to sell a gun to B is true since A
knew that he was giving a gun (and not something else, say, a gun-like toy)
to B, and wanted to engage in this conduct (that is, he was not compelled or
coerced to do so).
In that regard, even from this simple complicity scenario, it becomes
apparent that speaking of “knowledge” or “intent” as the mental elements
of accomplice liability is reductive and ambiguous. As explained above, both
knowledge and intent are propositional attitudes—each needs an object or
referent. 106 In our scenario, the gun seller, A, can have such attitudes towards
his own conduct (giving the gun to B) and towards B’s conduct (the killing
of C). These attitudes can be cognitive and volitional, both ranging on a
spectrum.
When we are speaking of the mens rea of complicity, we are therefore
speaking about the interplay of four different factors: (1) A’s cognitive assessment of whether B is committing or intends and is able to commit a
wrongful act, such as killing C, an assessment ranging from practical certainty
that he does not through various levels of risk or likelihood that he does up
to a practical certainty that he does; (2) A’s volitional or conative attitude
with regard to B’s action, ranging from disapproval through indifference to
approval; (3) A’s cognitive assessment of whether B intends to use the aid
that A provides for the wrongful act—for instance, intends to use the gun
given by A to kill C—again ranging from a practical certainty that B does not
to a practical certainty that he does; and finally (4), A’s volitional or conative
attitude with regard to his own action of assisting B, ranging from wanting
for this action not to facilitate B in the commission of the wrong through
indifference to wanting it to facilitate B’s commission of the offense.
Crucially, A’s assessment of B’s intent to kill C and of what B will do
with the gun is necessarily always an assessment of probability. A cannot read
B’s mind and so cannot directly know what B intends to do with the gun;
105. See Moynihan, supra note 11, at 19.
106. See supra Section II.C.
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instead, A must make inferences from B’s statements and behavior in their
context. 107 Similarly, B’s use of the gun will always temporally follow A’s
action of providing the gun, and sometimes may come long thereafter. 108
Therefore, it is always possible for A to assess erroneously B’s intent (to the
effect, e.g., that B never intended to kill C or never intended to use the gun
to do so) or for B to change his mind (e.g., he intended to use the gun to kill
C but before following through decides against it). In other words, B is an
independent moral agent, and A’s beliefs or knowledge about B’s current
and future intent and behavior are inevitably of a dynamic and probabilistic
nature. Knowledge, in this context, can only mean foresight.
This is not to exaggerate the practical difficulty of predicting the behavior of other people—we do so all the time 109—but simply to explain the
inferential and probabilistic nature of the process. In law, we can choose a
point on the cognitive spectrum to which we wish to attach the legal label of
actual knowledge—for example, A knows that B will use the gun to kill C if A
is practically certain that B will do so, thinks it is highly probable that B will
do so, or thinks it is likely that B will do so. But there is no categorical difference between that label and the knowledge of the existence of a risk—the
difference is one of degree, not one of kind. In either case, we are dealing
with probabilistic foresight. 110 We can know in the orthodox sense of justified
true belief only what some other person has already done or is currently doing; predicting future behavior is always an assessment of some degree of
probability.
That said, my main point is that there is no intrinsic reason why the mental element for complicity-type responsibility has to be at any specific point
on the cognitive/volitional spectrum above. There are, of course, normative
arguments as to where the line should be drawn. 111 But as a matter of positive
law, it is ultimately a choice for the legislator(s) or the courts as to where to
107. See SIMESTER ET AL., supra note 51, at 147–48.
108. See, e.g., ORMEROD & LAIRD, supra note 83, at 205–6.
109. The difficult question is how exactly we do this. In this regard, see Heller, supra
note 71 (discussing simulation and projection as the key mechanisms used by jurors when
assessing the mental states of other persons).
110. See Stewart, supra note 66, at 192–94; but see JACKSON, supra note 8, at 77–78.
111. See, e.g., Antony Duff, Intention Revisited, in THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW: THE LEGACY OF GLANVILLE WILLIAMS 148, 172–73 (Dennis J. Baker & Jeremy
Horder eds., 2013) (arguing in favor of a philosophically justifiable notion of intention as
direct intent, and specifically that with regard to complicity for some types of offenses indirect intent—which he does not deem to be a species of intention as such—should suffice
for culpability).
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draw the line—often not a wholly determinate line—in weighing the different competing normative and policy considerations at play. 112 It is simply a
fact that different systems have drawn this line in different places. It is also
a fact that, like international law, many systems have experienced periods of
(at times extreme) uncertainty and fluidity as to what the proper standards
should be. 113
Several considerations influence where the culpability line for complicity
should be drawn in criminal law. First, the complicity rule should not be
overbroad: it should not excessively inhibit otherwise lawful conduct that
could potentially serve some useful social purpose. This is essentially the
same concern as the one under Article 16 ASR with regard to inhibiting interState cooperation. Second, whether the accomplice is regarded as being
equally culpable as the principal (which sometimes goes against our moral
intuitions, and sometimes not), or is their culpability of a lesser kind. Third,
relatedly, is complicity regarded as imputational, that is, is the principal’s offence imputed to the accomplice, or is the accomplice being held responsible
for her own conduct of providing the assistance. Finally, the workability of
the rule, in other words, how easy it would be to apply in practice, for example with regard to questions of proof.
Again, in different systems these concerns are weighed differently, leading to different approaches to the nature of complicity generally and its mental element specifically. This is simply because these considerations are such
that their evaluation is perfectly open to reasonable disagreement. Indeed,
we can observe this same fragmentation even within the confines of international criminal law.
The Nuremberg military tribunals and the modern ad hoc tribunals settled on the accomplice’s knowledge that the aid provided will assist the principal’s crime as the relevant mens rea standard. It has been argued that this
standard reflects customary international law (although the discernment of
culpability standards for individuals from fragmented State practice is hardly

112. See JACKSON, supra note 8, at 46.
113. Consider, for example, how the UK Supreme Court departed from prior expansive
understandings of the culpability element in joint enterprise liability in Jogee, supra note 90, a
change in position that apex courts in other jurisdictions refused to follow, e.g., in Australia.
See Miller v. The Queen; Smith v. The Queen; Presley v. The Director of Public Prosecutions [2016] HCA 30. For an extensive analysis in the private law context of the different
strands of jurisprudence on the mental elements for accessory liability in equity, contract,
and tort, see DAVIES, supra note 102, at 109–22, 156–61, 203–9.
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an exact science). 114 However, overinclusiveness concerns 115 motivated the
Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to adopt a divergent position in which it formally reaffirmed
the knowledge mens rea standard but required the actus reus (and again not
the mens rea) of aiding and abetting to have been specifically directed to the
facilitation of the offense 116—a position rejected by other tribunals 117 and
subsequently abandoned by the ICTY itself. 118
The drafters of the Rome Statute of the ICC, on the other hand, opted
for the purpose of facilitating the commission of the crime as the mens rea of aiding
and abetting, 119 a formulation chosen as a compromise between diverse domestic legal traditions, perhaps also because of concerns that the customary
knowledge standard would be overinclusive. 120 The choice of the term “purpose” rather than intent is particularly interesting in light of the fact that, as
114. For a comprehensive analysis, see Manuel J. Ventura, Aiding and Abetting, in MODES
LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 173 (Jérôme de Hemptinne et al. eds.,
2019). See also Hathaway et al., Aiding and Abetting in International Criminal Law, supra note 104,
at 1600–17.
115. See Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Foreign Assistance Complicity, 54 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 531, 540–42 (2016); JACKSON, supra note 8, at 84.
116. See Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case. No. IT-04-81-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶
26–44 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013). In their concurring opinion, Judges Meron and Agius would have actually preferred to conceptualize specific direction as part of mens rea rather than actus reus. Id. at VII (joint separate opinion by Meron,
J., and Aguis, J.).
117. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 417–75 (Sept.
26, 2013).
118. See Prosecutor v. Šainović et al., Case. No. IT-05-87-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 1650 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Jan. 23, 2014); Prosecutor v.
Stanišić and Simatović, Case No. IT-03-69-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 94–108 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Dec. 9, 2015). See further Ventura, supra note 114; Leyla
N. Sadat, Can the ICTY Šainović and Perišić Cases Be Reconciled?, 108 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 475 (2014); Janine Natalya Clark, “Specific Direction” and the Fragmentation of International Jurisprudence on Aiding and Abetting: Perišić and Beyond, 15 INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW 411 (2015); Marko Milanovic, ICTY Appeals Chamber Reverses
Stanišić and Simatović Acquittal, Orders Retrial, Kills Off Specific Direction (Again!), EJIL:TALK!
(Dec. 15, 2015), https://www.ejiltalk.org/icty-appeals-chamber-reverses-stanisic-and-simatovic-acquittal-orders-retrial-kills-off-specific-direction-again/; JACKSON, supra note 8, at
80–85.
119. Rome Statute, supra note 93, art. 25(3)(c).
120. See, e.g., Hathaway et al., Aiding and Abetting in International Criminal Law, supra note
104, at 1628–29. Elies van Sliedregt & Alexandra Popova, Interpreting “for the Purpose of Facilitating” in Article 25(3)(c)? (Dec. 22, 2014), http://jamesgstewart.com/interpreting-for-thepurpose-of-facilitating-in-article-253c/.
OF

1301

International Law Studies

2021

we have seen above, the Statute otherwise uses the latter, which includes an
oblique, indirect form of intent. 121 While commentators have generally seen
this standard to be higher than the customary knowledge one, they have
much debated its exact parameters. In particular, a line of scholarship essentially argues that an oblique, indirect intent as to the result of facilitation (that
is, that the accomplice was practically certain that the aid provided would
facilitate the principal’s crime) could suffice to meet even this standard. 122
The ICC is yet to decide conclusively between various competing positions
on exactly how the purpose requirement should be interpreted. 123
F. Conclusion
To summarize some of the main conclusions so far:
First, there are numerous defensible ways in which a complicity rule can
be formulated. How a particular rule will be calibrated will depend foremost
on a policy choice, the placement of the line that needs to be drawn between
inhibiting socially harmful interactions and not inhibiting those that might
be socially beneficial.
Second, the calibration of a complicity rule will mostly depend on the
definition of its mental (culpability, fault) element and its causal nexus or
contribution element (my primary focus in this article is on the mental). Both
will inevitably be shaped by moral intuitions about the blameworthiness of
the accomplice’s conduct in specific cases, an approach sometimes leading
to inconsistent outcomes.
Third, there is no conceptual difficulty in ascribing fault to States. The
mental element is that of individuals who are the State’s organs or agents
making the relevant decisions and engaging in the relevant conduct. There is
also no great difficulty (although caution is warranted) in borrowing con-

121. Rome Statute, supra note 93, art. 30(2)(b). See also KAI AMBOS, TREATISE ON IN299–300 (2013).
122. See James G. Stewart, An Important New Orthodoxy on Complicity in the ICC Statute?
(Jan. 21, 2015), http://jamesgstewart.com/the-important-new-orthodoxy-on-complicityin-the-icc-statute/ (including comments thereto and the other posts in the symposium).
123. Its most elaborate judgment on this point to date is Prosecutor v. Bemba et al., Case
No. ICC-01/05-01/13-1989-Red, Public Redacted Version of Judgment pursuant to Article
74 of the Statute (Oct. 19, 2016). For a discussion of this case, see Manuel J. Ventura, Aiding
and Abetting and the International Criminal Court’s Bemba et al. Case: The ICC Trial and Appeals
Chamber Consider Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute, 20 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW 1138 (2020).
TERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 165–66,
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cepts and using analogies from criminal law, international or domestic, especially since comparative private law generally has few developed complicity
doctrines.
Fourth, terms such as “knowledge” and “intention” can be ambiguous
and confusing. Great care is needed in how they are defined and used, especially because of the variance between legal systems and traditions.
Fifth, in the complicity context, the accomplice may have any of a variety
of degrees of knowledge regarding the principal’s ongoing or future wrongful conduct and regarding how the principal would use the assistance that
the accomplice provides. As to any future conduct of the principal, the
knowledge of the accomplice is inherently contingent. It is always probabilistic foresight to some level of likelihood or certainty. Even for criminal complicity—let alone in the State responsibility context—the accomplice need
not foresee “the place, time and number of the precise crimes which may be
committed in consequence of his supportive contributions.” 124 Knowing
about the general type and nature of the offenses suffices. Accomplices may
also have various degrees of intent with regard to his own actions and with
regard to the wrongful conduct of principals.
Sixth, accordingly, a complicity rule can employ many permutations of
cognitive and volitional fault requirements. It may require purpose/direct
intent to facilitate. 125 It may couple that element with an additional volitional
requirement that the accomplice share the principal’s purpose—that is,
hopes that the principal will succeed. It may require intent to facilitate but
include within that concept not only purpose/direct intent but also
oblique/indirect intent, even dolus eventualis. 126 Or it may formulate fault in
124. Prosecutor v. Orić, Case No. IT-03-68-T, Judgment, ¶ 288 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia June 30, 2006).
125. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 93, art. 25(3)(c); MPC, supra note 69, § 2.06(3).
126. See, e.g., Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] § 27, https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html#p0167 (Ger.); Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch
[StGB] [Criminal Code] Dec. 21, 1937, arts. 12, 25, https://www. legislationline.org/download/id/8991/file/SWITZ_Criminal%20Code_as%20of%202020-07-01.pdf
(Switz.);
Criminal Code, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 85/05, 88/05, 107/05 (as
amended through Dec. 24, 2012), arts. 25, 35; https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/5480/file/Serbia_CC_am2012_en.pdf; Croatian Criminal Code, 2011, arts. 28, 38,
https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/7896/file/Croatia_Crimnal_Code_2011_
en.pdf. Note that unlike the Swiss, Serbian, and Croatian codes, which expressly include
oblique intent or dolus eventualis in the definition of intent, the German Criminal Code contains no definition of intent, which is left to jurisprudence and is regarded by German courts
to include dolus eventualis. See generally Greg Taylor, Concepts of Intention in German Criminal Law,
24 OXFORD JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 99 (2004).
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purely cognitive terms, as knowledge or degrees of foresight of the principal’s wrongdoing and how the principal will use the assistance provided. 127
Again, there is simply no inherently right answer for how the culpability element of a complicity rule should be formulated. 128 It even may be perfectly
defensible not to differentiate between accomplices and principals in the first
place, but to have a unified theory of participation in an offense or some
other wrong. 129
Bearing this in mind, let us now return to the complicity rules in international law that can specifically capture intelligence sharing in multinational
military operations: the generally applicable complicity rule in Article 16 ASR
and the regime-specific rules of IHL and IHRL.
III.

COMPLICITY RULES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO
INTELLIGENCE SHARING

A. Proper Interpretation to Be Given to Article 16 ASR
1.

On the Contradictions in the ILC Articles

The same competing considerations that underlie discussions of mens rea
for complicity in criminal law are relevant to the mental element of the rule
codified in Article 16 ASR. People can reasonably disagree as to how these
considerations should be weighed. The resulting uncertainty is fueled by the
lack of formal determinacy of the rule in Article 16 since relevant State practice is scarce, ambiguous, and open to interpretation. Reliance on the work
product of the ILC is made more difficult by the fact it is internally inconsistent—that is, the text of Article 16 is not fully congruent with the ILC’s
commentary—a difficulty that is compounded by the uneven use of the
terms “knowledge” and “intent” within the commentary.
The lack of consensus on how the mental element of Article 16 should
be interpreted is therefore completely understandable. But before venturing
127. See, e.g., Code Penal [C. pén] [Penal Code] arts. 121–27 (Fr.). See also the position
under customary international criminal law, supra note 90 and accompanying text.
128. It is instructive to consider in that regard how Herbert Wechsler, the principal
drafter of the MPC, favored knowledge as the mens rea for complicity but was overruled
on that point by other drafters who preferred purpose. See DUBBER, supra note 67, at 92–
93.
129. This is, for example, the position in Italian criminal law. For an argument that such
a unitary theory of perpetration should be used in international criminal law, see Stewart,
supra note 66.
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into a normative argument as to what the proper interpretation of Article 16
should be, it is important to explore the ILC’s inconsistencies in more detail.
In particular, it is necessary to understand that the ILC fails to distinguish
clearly between knowledge (or foresight) as to the existence of the wrongful
act by the wrongdoing State and knowledge as to the facilitation of the commission by the assisting State. It also fails to distinguish between the different
possible notions of intent.
The ILC commentary contradicts not only the text of the Articles but
itself as well, and it does so in the first two sentences:
Article 16 deals with the situation where one State provides aid or assistance to another with a view to facilitating the commission of an internationally
wrongful act by the latter. Such situations arise where a State voluntarily assists or aids another State in carrying out conduct which violates the international obligations of the latter, for example, by knowingly providing an
essential facility or financing the activity in question. 130

The phrase “with a view to facilitating” clearly refers to a species of intent and would most naturally be interpreted as referring to purpose/direct
intent to facilitate—the outcome of facilitation is the conscious object of the
assisting State’s conduct. The reference to assistance being provided “voluntarily” could be taken as referring only to the action of providing assistance,
for example, the provision of money or intelligence (which is voluntary and
not coerced or inadvertent), but not to its result (the facilitation of the wrongful act)—that is, the action is intentional under some minimal description.
The final reference to assistance being provided “knowingly,” of course,
lacks any explicit volitional element and is unclear as to what exactly the assisting State must know.
The ILC then explains that the requirement from the text of Article 16
that the assisting State needs to know “the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act” is in turn about the “circumstances making the conduct of
the assisted State internationally wrongful” and about “the circumstances in
which its aid or assistance is intended to be used” by the assisted State. 131 In
doing so, however, the Commission confuses knowledge of the ongoing or
future existence of the wrongful act with knowledge of how the assistance
provided would be used. It is perfectly possible for the assisting State to have
varying degrees of knowledge with regard to these two matters. For example,
130. See ILC ASR, supra note 4, art. 16 cmt. ¶ 1 (emphasis added).
131. Id. cmt. ¶ 4.
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the assisting State might be aware only of a substantial risk that the assisted
State would commit a wrongful act but know with practical certainty that the
aid provided would be used (or not) to further the wrongful act if the assisted
State goes through with the act.
Recall that in this context, knowledge means probabilistic foresight. One
can know with absolute certainty the circumstances of the wrongful act only
if it has already occurred (in which case Article 16 does not apply) or is ongoing. But of course, Article 16 is also meant to apply to future wrongful
conduct that the assisting State would be aiding, which is why the ILC speaks
of it knowing the assisted State’s intent. This encompasses not only the intent
to commit (or continue committing) the wrongful act but also its intent to
use the assistance provided to it for that act. However, it bears noting that
in this context the assessment of the assisted State’s intent is only part of the
overall prospective assessment of whether the wrongful act and its facilitation are likely to occur. It is possible, for example, for the assisted State to
intend to commit the wrongful act but for its occurrence to be objectively
unlikely because the assisted State lacks the means (technical or other) to
successfully proceed with its act and implement its intent.
A major problem with the ILC’s intent requirement as part of the assisting State’s fault is the inconsistent terminology used to describe it. 132 On
three occasions in the commentary the Commission used the “with a view
to facilitating” formula, which appears to (but need not) evoke purpose. 133
On three further occasions, the Commission referred to an assisting State
“deliberately” procuring, assisting, or participating in the wrongful act. 134
Also, on two occasions, the ILC used the term “intent,” noting first that a
“State is not responsible for aid or assistance under article 16 unless the relevant State organ intended, by the aid or assistance given, to facilitate the
occurrence of the wrongful conduct.” 135 It then seemingly coupled intent
with knowledge in connection with the specific example of assisting human
rights violations:

132. It is clear that the ILC is referring only to the assisting State’s intent to facilitate
the wrongful act, not to sharing the wrongdoing State’s intent to commit the wrongful act.
In other words, A can logically have intent to facilitate B’s wrongful conduct without actually sharing B’s intent regarding its wrongful conduct or any particular result of that conduct.
See also Moynihan, supra note 11, at 20.
133. See ILC ASR, supra note 4, art. 16 cmt. ¶¶ 1, 3, 5.
134. Id. cmt. ¶¶ 6, 7, 10.
135. Id. cmt. ¶ 5.
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Where the allegation is that the assistance of a State has facilitated human
rights abuses by another State, the particular circumstances of each case
must be carefully examined to determine whether the aiding State by its aid
was aware of and intended to facilitate the commission of the internationally
wrongful conduct. 136

Here the ILC seems to be saying that knowledge and intent are cumulative requirements, which it did not expressly say in any other part of the
commentary. The interaction between knowledge and intent is a more complex issue, as I will momentarily explain. But I hope to have demonstrated
by now that the only thing consistent about the commentary to Article 16 is
its inconsistency. This is also evident from the ILC’s commentary to Article
41(2), where it explains the absence of any reference to the assisting State’s
knowledge that it is assisting the maintenance of a situation caused by a serious violation of jus cogens by saying that it saw “no need to mention such a
requirement in article 41 (2) as it is hardly conceivable that a State would not
have notice of the commission of a serious breach by another State.” 137
While it is justifiable in principle to have a sliding scale of culpability that
would depend on the seriousness of the underlying violation (indeed, this is
precisely the argument that I wish to put forward later on), it makes little
sense to have strict liability for complicity. 138 It is one thing to say that elements of knowledge and intent can be inferred more easily and even presumed 139 when serious violations of jus cogens are at stake, but dispensing with
any form of culpability (even negligence, for example) seems excessive. 140
The assisted State may be capable of concealing a breach of jus cogens. The
assisting State may well be fully aware of the existence of a serious breach of
jus cogens but unaware that its assistance would facilitate the maintenance of
the situation. 141 While it remains unclear to what extent Article 41(2) reflects
customary law (although it is arguably more accepted as such in 2021 than it
was in 2001), 142 the culpability element of this enhanced complicity rule is, I
would submit, even less clear, except that it is lower than that of Article 16.
136. Id. cmt. ¶ 9 (emphasis added).
137. Id. art. 41 cmt. ¶ 11.
138. This leaves aside the problems with the notion of a “serious breach” of jus cogens,
which implies that there are some breaches of jus cogens that are not “serious,” e.g., isolated
acts of torture.
139. See LANOVOY, supra note 11, at 116.
140. But see AUST, supra note 6, at 421.
141. See also de Wet, supra note 21, at 308–9.
142. See Moynihan, supra note 11, at 22–23; AUST, supra note 6, at 342–44.
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That said, it is striking that the commentary to Article 41 appears to see
the culpability in Article 16 in purely cognitive terms (“notice”) rather than
volitional ones, as intent. The terminological confusion is good evidence that
the culpability elements of neither provision were thought through by the
Commission thoroughly enough. In particular, the ILC never really explains
what it means by intent, 143 a concept that is legally ambiguous without further definition. 144 In other words, the proposition that A intends to facilitate
B’s wrongful act could easily capture purpose/direct intent, oblique or indirect intent, and dolus eventualis. It is also perfectly possible—indeed only natural—that the various members of the ILC had read the references to intent
from the perspectives of their respective legal systems and cultures. In short,
the ultimate problem with the ILC’s work on Article 16 is not the contradiction between the text and the commentary but an overall lack of coherence
and clarity, which sets the stage for the false dilemma between knowledge
and intent as the culpability element of the complicity rule.
2.

The False Dilemma between Knowledge and Intent

How is this dilemma a false one? Let us consider a simple complicity scenario. State A assists State B by sharing intelligence. B then uses this information to interrogate and torture individual X in its custody (assume that the
causal nexus element is satisfied). 145 In trying to understand how the Article
16 complicity rule would apply to this scenario, we first need to clarify what
exactly State A (i.e., an official acting on its behalf) knew and intended with
regard to State B’s wrongful act and with regard to its own action of providing assistance to B. There are several permutations:
(i) A can know (i.e., be practically certain) that B is torturing X or intends
to do so in the future and know (i.e., be practically certain) that if it shares
intelligence with B, B will use the information to torture X, and have the
143. See Moynihan, supra note 11, at 18.
144. In fact, even when writing academically, the ILC’s last Special Rapporteur on State
responsibility, James Crawford, did not offer any definition of intent but rather used imprecise terms such as “actual intent” and “outright intent.” See CRAWFORD, supra note 9, at
407–8.
145. For one such case, in which an Australian national detained and tortured by U.S.
authorities complained that Australian authorities were complicit in the torture, inter alia
through the sharing of information, see Habib v. Commonwealth of Australia [2010]
FCAFC 12, §§ 17–18, 66–67.
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purpose of facilitating the torture, this being the conscious object of its action of providing assistance.
(ii) A can know (i.e., be practically certain) that B is torturing X or intends to torture X, and not be practically certain that the information it is
providing B will facilitate the torture of X yet still have the purpose of assisting B in the torture. (For example, A is not sure how useful its intelligence
actually is or whether B will choose to rely on it.)
(iii) A might believe that there is only a possibility of some degree (but
not certainty) that B is torturing or intends to torture X yet nonetheless be
certain that the information it provides would facilitate the torture if it took
place and still have the purpose of facilitating the act.
(iv) A might believe that there is only a possibility of B torturing X and
a possibility of A’s assistance being used to torture X but nonetheless have
the purpose of facilitating the torture. (Variants (ii)–(iv) raise the question of
whether the direct intent/purpose to facilitate compensates for deficits of
knowledge/foresight.)
(v) A can know (i.e., be practically certain) that B is torturing X or intends to do so in the future and also know (i.e., be practically certain) that if
it shares intelligence with B, B will use the information to torture X and yet
not have the purpose to facilitate torture, though being aware of its virtual
inevitability and the inevitability of its intelligence sharing facilitating the torture and reconciling itself with that inevitability by choosing to provide the
assistance.
(vi) A might believe that there is only a possibility (but not certainty) that
B is torturing or intends to torture X, yet nonetheless be certain that the
information it provides would facilitate the torture if it took place while reconciling itself with this possibility.
(vii) A can know (i.e., be practically certain) that B is torturing X or intends to torture X, and yet not be practically certain that the information it
is providing B will facilitate the torture of X though aware of the risk that it
may do so while reconciling itself with the possibility that the information it
provided could facilitate the torture.
(viii) A might believe that there is only a possibility (but not certainty)
that B is torturing or intends to torture X and only a possibility that the
information it is providing B will facilitate the torture of X but be aware of
and reconciling itself to both of these risks.
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Again, it is simply unclear where on this spectrum the ILC thought the
line of culpability under Article 16 should be drawn, except that at a minimum, it would include variant (i) and that in none of these scenarios would
A need to share B’s own purpose. Note how the knowledge (foresight) of
the two relevant sets of facts (that B would commit a wrongful act and would
use the aid A provided to commit it) vary through the scenarios, depending
on whether A is practically/virtually certain that such facts exist or will exist
or only appreciates a possibility or risk that they might exist. In terms of
knowledge, the scenarios could be differentiated even further by degrees of
possibility, for example, on a scale ranging from merely possible through to
a real risk and likelihood, up to high likelihood. As for intent, all of the scenarios above can be regarded as intentional under some legal understanding
of intention—the action of providing intelligence is always intentional under
some description, while in (i)–(iv) A has purpose/direct intent, in (v) indirect/oblique intent, and in (vi)–(viii) dolus eventualis as to the consequence
(facilitation of torture) of that action. 146
How then should the mental element of Article 16 be interpreted? First,
as to the knowledge requirement, it should be uncontroversial that this requirement will not be met only when an agent of State A has actual
knowledge in the orthodox sense of justified true belief that State B is in the
process of committing an internationally wrongful act but will also be met
when A is subjectively practically or virtually certain that B is committing
that act (or intends to commit it in the future). 147 Again, because of the impossibility of having actual knowledge about the future actions of another
person, the only type of knowledge that one can have about such actions is
a probabilistic one (foresight). Because Article 16 must, if it is to serve any
useful purpose, cover not only ongoing wrongful acts but also future and
contingent wrongful acts, the level of knowledge required has to be a realis-

146. Scenario (vi) may also be seen as one of conditional indirect intent, rather than
dolus eventualis.
147. To be clear, the knowledge in question is that of the circumstances making the act
of the assisted State wrongful. It does not require that either the assisting State or the assisted
State subjectively believe that the act is unlawful. Thus, if State A assists State B in the
objectively unlawful invasion of State C, A would be responsible under Article 16 regardless
of whether either A or B subjectively assessed that the invasion would be lawful. Error of
law is no excuse, and this is equally the case in situations in which the law is clear and in
those in which it is underdetermined and reasonable persons (and States) can disagree about
its content and application. See also Moynihan, supra note 11, at 11–12.
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tically obtainable, practical one rather than one requiring absolute certainty. 148 The second aspect of the knowledge requirement relates not to A’s
assessment of B’s intent to commit a wrongful act but rather to its assessment of B’s intent to use the assistance that A will have given it in its commission of the wrongful act. A needs to know not only that B is committing
or intends to commit a wrongful act but also that B will use A’s assistance
to facilitate its commission. Again, because this is an assessment by A of a
future action by B, an independent moral agent, it can only be contingent
and probabilistic and would be satisfied by a practical, virtual or near-certainty standard. 149
Second, a more difficult problem is how to distinguish between
knowledge to the level of practical certainty and knowledge to a very high
degree of likelihood. The issue is one of labeling or characterization—if we
are happy to say that A knows that B is torturing or intends to torture X
because A is 95 percent certain that this is the case, would we be as happy
to treat as knowledge in the context of Article 16 a 90 or 75 percent level of
certainty? In other words, if the knowledge in question is inherently probabilistic, as it must be with regard to events and conduct that will occur only
in the future, it is infeasible to draw bright lines demarcating the levels at
which probability amounts to knowledge. Such an assessment will always be
contextual and, in reality, may well be driven by moral intuitions about culpability, owing, for example, to the gravity of the wrongful act that was being
assisted. This is especially the case if the assessment of what A knew is being
done ex post facto by an independent actor (e.g., a court) that can draw inferences about practical certainty from high likelihood. 150
Third, an intent requirement would clearly be satisfied if A acted with
purpose/direct intent—that is, with the conscious object of facilitating the

148. See supra Section II.C.
149. See also de Wet, supra note 21, at 304–5.
150. Cf. MPC, supra note 69, § 2.02(7) (“Requirement of Knowledge Satisfied by Knowledge of
High Probability. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an
offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence, unless he actually believes that it does not exist.”) Note, however, that this MPC definition extends only to the knowledge of a fact that constitutes a material element of an
offense or its attendant circumstances, not to the results of one’s actions, as otherwise the
MPC’s definition of acting knowingly would collapse into its definition of acting recklessly.
See Jonathan L. Marcus, Model Penal Code Section 2.02(7) and Willful Blindness, 102 YALE LAW
JOURNAL 2231, 2236 (1993). See also infra Part IV.
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commission of the wrongful act. 151 The key issue here is the relationship
between intent and knowledge. Recall in that regard how the ILC, in its final
remark on culpability in the commentary to Article 16, appeared to couple
the two when it asserted that the assisting State needed to be “aware of and
intended to facilitate” the wrongful act. 152 But this is a misconception. Purpose/direct intent is the most culpable possible mental state. 153 There is no
reason of principle why it would have to be augmented by knowledge to a
level of certainty for the same element of a wrong (e.g., the prohibited consequence, such as facilitation). 154 An assisting State’s purpose, if present, to
facilitate the wrongful act would compensate for any deficits in
knowledge. 155
For instance, if A provided assistance (e.g., intelligence) to B believing
that it was unlikely that B would torture X or would use the assistance provided in torturing X, but nonetheless did so with the purpose of helping B
torture X, which B then actually did, there seems to be no legitimate reason
why A should not be held responsible under Article 16 for the assistance it
provided. A is no less blameworthy in this scenario than if it had been practically certain that the wrong would be committed—it provided assistance
with the purpose of facilitating the wrongful act, and this purpose was ultimately realized, however unlikely this may have seemed ex ante. This is essentially the same situation as that of our unlikely sniper hypothetical
above—if A shoots at B from half a mile away with the purpose of killing B,
knowing that it was extremely unlikely that the bullet will hit him, but in fact

151. Again, under no interpretation of Article 16 would A also need to have the purpose (want, hope, desire) that B actually commit the wrongful act, e.g., to torture X.
152. See supra note 136.
153. See SIMESTER ET AL., supra note 51, at 134–35.
154. Cf. MPC, supra note 69, § 2.02(5) (“When acting knowingly suffices to establish an
element, such element also is established if a person acts purposely.”). In other words, proving purpose obviates any need for proving knowledge with regard to that same element of
the crime. See also DUBBER, supra note 67, at 60 (“Purpose is the ‘highest’ mode of culpability—purposeful action is more culpable and punished more severely than any other type of
action, including knowing action. Yet along the probabilistic axis, knowledge lies far ahead
of purpose; purpose, when it comes to conduct and result, is defined without respect to
probability. What matters is whether the actor had the ‘conscious object(ive)’ of acting in a
certain way or bringing about a certain result. It does not matter how likely it is that he will
succeed in realizing his conscious object(ive).”).
155. Consider also the complicity rule in Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute, which
requires the purpose to facilitate but does not impose any additional knowledge requirement.
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the bullet does hit B, we would hold A liable for murder. 156 Similarly, if A
provides assistance to B with the purpose of facilitating B’s killing C while
knowing that it was unlikely that the assistance would actually be useful—
for example, A gives B a poorly maintained gun with only one (very old)
bullet in the chamber—but B manages to kill C with it, we would regard A
as an accomplice precisely because he acted with purpose/direct intent.
In short, the culpability requirements would, in my view, be met not only
in scenario (i) above but also in scenarios (ii)–(iv). If it could be demonstrated, for example, by reference to internal government memoranda or
from appropriate inferences, that State A purposely facilitated the wrongful
act of State B, it should not matter whether A was less than certain that B
would commit the act or would use the assistance provided to do it, if in fact
eventually B does commit the wrongful act and does use the assistance provided to it by A for that purpose. It does not seem sensible to require a
showing of both purpose and practical certainty as to the consequence of facilitating a wrongful act. 157 Purpose may be said to require some belief that
the action is in principle capable of causing the result (facilitation of the
wrong) 158 but no more than that. 159 For example, if State A appreciates a
degree of possibility that its ally State B will invade State C, provides B openended permission to use its airspace for an assault on C, and does so with
the purpose of facilitating B’s conduct if it chooses to go through with its
plan (“We are with you no matter what”), A will be liable under Article 16
ASR if B invades C and uses A’s airspace to do so even if A thought ex ante
that there was a significant possibility that the invasion would not occur (e.g.,
because C would give in to B’s demands).
Fourth, a different question is whether the intent requirement would also
be satisfied if A were practically certain that B intended to torture X and
practically certain that the assistance A provided would facilitate B’s torture
of X—that is, if A acted with oblique or indirect intent, as in scenario (v)
above. Again, it is commonplace in numerous legal systems that consequences that result from one’s actions and that were subjectively foreseen
156. See also FLETCHER, supra note 78, at 448–49.
157. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 87, § 1 cmt., at 7 (“A purpose
to cause harm makes the harm intentional even if harm is not substantially certain to occur.”).
158. See BLOMSMA, supra note 95, at 67–69.
159. See DUFF, INTENTION, AGENCY AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY supra note 60, at 55–
59. But see SIMESTER ET AL., supra note 51, at 235–38 (discussing knowledge of the essential
elements of the crime as a prerequisite for accessory liability, as in Jogee, but failing to distinguish between the different scenarios of direct and indirect intent to facilitate).
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with practical certainty are treated as having been intended, or that such certainty creates an almost inescapable evidentiary inference that they were intended. 160 If A blows up an airplane with the purpose of killing B and there
are other people on the airplane at the time who A is practically certain will
die as a result of the explosion, then A indirectly intends to kill those people. 161 If similarly, A provides B with an explosive while practically certain
that B will use the explosive to blow up the airplane and is reconciled to this
course of events, there is no great difficulty in saying that A intended to
facilitate B’s crime. Again, numerous legal systems that require intent to facilitate wrongful conduct as the mens rea of complicity would find that indirect
or oblique intention satisfies that requirement—that is, they do not limit intent to purpose. 162 It is difficult to regard A as substantially less culpable in
this situation as in the one in which A is acting with purpose/direct intent. 163
Here A not only knows (foresees) with practical certainty that B will commit
a wrongful act but also that the assistance it provides will facilitate it and

160. See also ORMEROD & LAIRD, supra note 83, at 92–94 (discussing English case law
and uncertainty regarding the nature of oblique intent).
161. See supra Section II.D.
162. This is, for example, the position under English law. See ORMEROD & LAIRD, supra
note 83, at 198, 200–203 (oblique intent to assist sufficient; evidentiary inference of intent
can also be made with regard to the further requirement that the accessory intend that the
principal commits the crime with the requisite mens rea). See also SIMESTER ET AL., supra
note 51, at 229–30; supra note 126 and accompanying text; J.C. Smith, Criminal Liability of
Accessories: Law and Law Reform, 113 LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW 453, 465 (1997) (“If it were
to be decided that intention should be required [for complicity], the jury would be told that
they should not find D guilty of murder unless they were sure that D either wanted P to act
as, and with the intention which, he did, or knew that it was not merely a “real possibility”
but virtually certain that he would do so.”).
163. See, e.g., Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65 (2014) (The majority of the Court,
per Kagan J., ambiguously using the terminology of intent for the federal aiding and abetting
statute that could include both acting purposely and acting knowingly in MPC terms—that
is, both direct and oblique intent. Alito J. noting in his dissent that “[t]he Court refers interchangeably to both of these tests and thus leaves our case law in the same, somewhat conflicted State that previously existed. But because the difference between acting purposefully
(when that concept is properly understood) and acting knowingly is slight, this is not a matter of great concern.” Id. at 85.
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proceeds regardless. 164 Indirect intent should therefore be regarded as one
of the modes of culpability under Article 16 ASR. 165
Fifth, and finally, it would be going too far to include dolus eventualis—
foresight and conscious acceptance of some lesser degree of risk than certainty—as satisfying the intent requirement of Article 16. 166 This is in part
because, unlike with oblique intent, common law systems do not traditionally
regard dolus eventualis as a species of intent. 167 Primarily, however, it is because
Article 16 is a rule of general scope, applying to all rules of international law
regardless of their importance or the values they enshrine. The complicityin-torture scenario that we have used is therefore somewhat misleading in
the Article 16 context since this complicity rule would equally apply to (say)
the intelligence provided by A to B facilitating breaches of obligations under
international trade or investment law vis-à-vis C or facilitating a cyber operation potentially violating C’s sovereignty. Moral intuitions about the scope
of complicity rules do not necessarily operate identically when the violation
at issue is not something as grave as torture or crimes against humanity. Inhibiting inter-State cooperation in all situations in which a State is aware of
(some degree of) risk would most likely be harmful to, rather than beneficial
for, the general welfare. 168 It is therefore perfectly sensible to leave any purely
risk-based liability to context-specific primary rules, which can better take
into account the particular needs and values of the branch of international
law in question and do so through bespoke rules on complicity (a negative
duty of refraining from providing assistance) and prevention (a positive duty
to prevent or mitigate harm). Indeed, both in domestic and international law,
we can observe that the gravity or seriousness of the potential violation and
its consequences affect framing complicity and prevention rules. In that regard, we will turn shortly to the relevant rules of IHL and IHRL.
The ICJ’s Bosnian Genocide judgment provides an instructive example. Recall how the Court found that the FRY knew of a serious risk that the Bosnian Serbs would commit genocide in Srebrenica but was not certain they
would do so. 169 The Court also found that the magnitude of the aid the FRY
164. Cf. DUBBER, supra note 67, at 54 (noting that the MPC drafters considered the
distinction between acting purposely and acting knowingly as to a consequence (i.e., acting
with indirect intent) to be of limited significance in the criminal context, a point that can be
made even more emphatically in the noncriminal context).
165. See Moynihan, supra note 11, at 19–20; de Wet, supra note 21, at 307.
166. See Moynihan, supra note 11, at 20–21.
167. See Ohlin, supra note 95, at 103–6.
168. See AUST, supra note 6, at 239–40.
169. See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text.
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provided to the Bosnian Serb war effort made it inevitable that this assistance
would (as in fact it did) facilitate the Srebrenica genocide. 170 The FRY’s decision to continue providing the aid despite being subjectively aware that it
might be used for genocide would have satisfied a dolus eventualis threshold,
but the Court required more—that the FRY had supplied “aid to the perpetrators of the genocide in full awareness that the aid supplied would be used
to commit genocide.” 171 The Court thus found that the culpability element
for complicity under the Genocide Convention, which it had (but need not
have) equated with complicity under Article 16 ASR, was not met. Crucially,
however, reaching this finding was in practice facilitated by the existence of
an obligation of prevention under Article 1 of the Genocide Convention,
which was purely risk-based and applied to all States regarding any genocide
in the world, an obligation that Serbia was found to have violated. 172 In some
other context, the complicity analysis might turn out differently in the absence of such a broad prevention obligation.
3.

Willful Blindness, Constructive Knowledge, and Negligence

Let us now turn to the question of whether the Article 16 culpability requirement could be satisfied in the absence of direct or indirect intent to facilitate
the wrongful act. A strand of scholarship argues in favor of importing into
Article 16 the common law doctrine of willful blindness, which could in
some rather exceptional cases compensate for the lack of practical certainty. 173 Other scholars argue in favor of an objectivized, constructive
knowledge standard that would deem the assisting State to have “knowledge
of the circumstances of the wrongful act” even when it cannot be proven
that it had the relevant knowledge subjectively if objectively it should have
been had it acted as some kind of “reasonable” State. 174 There are problems
with both positions. The first is defensible in principle but relies on a concept
that stems from only one legal tradition and is subject to much confusion
and dispute even within that tradition. The second effectively reduces the
170. The Court did not, however, carefully distinguish between the certainty of genocide and the certainty of how the aid would be used, nor did it make an express finding of
the FRY’s knowledge of the latter. See Bosnian Genocide, supra note 7, ¶ 422.
171. Id. ¶ 423.
172. See further Marko Milanovic, State Responsibility for Genocide: A Follow-Up¸18 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 669, 680–88 (2007).
173. See, e.g., Moynihan, supra note 11, at 14–15; JACKSON, supra note 8, at 53.
174. See André Nollkaemper et al., Guiding Principles on Shared Responsibility in International
Law, 31 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 15, 40–43 (2020).
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culpability requirement in Article 16 to negligence when, as explained above,
even dolus eventualis would be an overbroad fault standard for a complicity
provision that is general in scope and is meant to apply to all rules of international law, regardless of their purpose or importance.
The willful blindness doctrine finds its origins in English case law, later
traveling across the Atlantic to U.S. state and federal jurisdictions. To simplify a complex story, the doctrine has had three basic forms. 175 First, as a
method of establishing subjective, actual knowledge by inference: the jury is
instructed that on the evidence before it, it can find that the willfully blind
defendant must have known the relevant fact. Second, as an imposition of a
duty on defendants to pursue inquiries and verify the facts before them once
suspicion arises that the relevant facts might exist: here it is effectively a
should have known constructive knowledge standard, met by a negligent failure
to establish the facts fully. Third, it is applied as a requirement of proving
(by inference if necessary) that the defendant had the purpose of avoiding acquiring information that, had it been acquired, would have constituted actual
knowledge. 176
The first of these variants of the willful blindness doctrine is unobjectionable but also does not necessitate the label. International courts often
draw inferences about what a State (i.e., its officials) knew about relevant
circumstances; 177 the classic example is the ICJ finding in the Corfu Channel
case that Albania “must have known” that a third party had mined its waters. 178 If the evidence so warrants, there is no reason of principle why international courts (or other bodies) cannot do the same when applying Article
16 ASR in establishing whether the assisting State knew (was practically certain) that the wrongdoing State would commit the wrongful act and that the
assisting State knew (was practically certain) that its assistance would facilitate the act. 179 The willful blindness label does not add much explanatory
power to this process. What the fact finders are doing in such instances is
175. See generally Marcus, supra note 150.
176. See SIMESTER ET AL., supra note 51, at 157–59.
177. See, e.g., JAMES DEVANEY, FACT-FINDING BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF JUSTICE 72, 170–77, 199–217 (2016); Michael P. Scharf & Margaux Day, The International
Court of Justice’s Treatment of Circumstantial Evidence and Adverse Inferences Evidence and Adverse
Inferences, 13 CHICAGO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 123 (2013); C.F. Amerasinghe,
Presumptions and Inferences in Evidence in International Litigation, 3 LAW & PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 395 (2004).
178. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 19–20 (Apr. 9).
179. See also Boutin, supra note 1, at 537.
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drawing an inference from the circumstantial evidence available to them, including the relevant party’s evasive attitude towards the truth. 180
The second variant is tantamount to using negligence as the fault element
of Article 16—the assisting State (objectively) could have known, to a practical
certainty, what the assisted State would do but (subjectively) did not know this,
because it failed to take the steps that would have led it to such knowledge.
Scholars assembled at the University of Amsterdam’s SHARES Project had
thus proposed that the complicity rule should apply to aid and assistance
provided “knowingly” and that this criterion would be met by constructive
knowledge—that is, “when an international person knew or should have
known the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act.” 181 But this
position was, in fact, expressly considered and not taken up by the ILC during the drafting of Article 16. 182 In any event, it is not, in my view, normatively desirable. Constructive knowledge presumes a positive duty of the relevant party to make inquiries, to behave according to some objective standard, such as reasonableness, in verifying the facts. 183 While such a duty may
be appropriate in specific contexts, it is hardly appropriate across the board
for complicity in all possible violations of international law regardless of their
role and importance. 184 As a policy matter, such a duty would be so burdensome and overbroad, and inhibit so much potentially beneficial cooperation,
that acceptance by States is extremely unlikely. On a more formal level, the
authorities cited in favor of this position by its proponents are hardly impressive—a third party submission in a case before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (i.e., not the Commission’s decision itself), 185 and
the ICJ Corfu Channel case, which the proponents of the constructive
knowledge standard misconstrue. 186 As explained above, the Court in Corfu
Channel drew an evidentiary inference that Albania must have known—that
is, did, in fact, know—about the mines. It never applied a constructive

180. For a detailed argument in favor of willful blindness being conceptualized in U.S.
criminal law solely as a method of proof, see Gilchrist, supra note 64.
181. Nollkaemper et al., supra note 174, at 42.
182. See CRAWFORD, supra note 9, at 406; Moynihan, supra note 11, at 12; JACKSON,
supra note 8, at 161.
183. See Moynihan, supra note 11, at 15–16. See also JACKSON, supra note 8, at 162; de
Wet, supra note 21, at 302.
184. For a discussion in the context of European Convention on Human Rights Articles 2 and 3, see Stoyanova, supra note 40, at 607–8.
185. See Nollkaemper et al., supra note 174, at 42 nn. 114–15.
186. Id. at 42 n. 118.
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knowledge standard, by which Albania did not subjectively know about the
mines but objectively should have. 187
Finally, the advocates of the constructive knowledge position fail to appreciate a fundamental point. In many situations, the assisting State could
not acquire actual knowledge even if it acted reasonably according to some
objective standard. Practical certainty may not be obtainable even after all
due, feasible verification. These are cases neither of willful blindness nor of
negligence in acquiring knowledge but of genuine uncertainty and risk. What
matters in such cases are rules imposing responsibility on the basis of risk
and measures mitigating such risk, rules and measures that can only be sector- or even issue-specific within, say, IHL or IHRL.
Therefore, the only variant of the willful blindness doctrine that really
deserves the label and is potentially defensible in the Article 16 context is the
third one, requiring proof of a purpose to avoid the truth. 188 Again, this is
not about drawing an inference as in Corfu Channel (although the purpose of
evasion could be established inferentially) or about holding the State to some
kind of diligence, reasonableness standard. It is about demonstrating that the
assisting State’s officials actively took measures designed to shield themselves from problematic information, information that would establish with
certainty that the wrongful act would be committed and that the aid provided
would facilitate it. In other words, only if the knowledge deficit on the part
of A (A is not practically certain either that B intends to torture X or that B
intends to use the assistance provided by A to do so) is because A has deliberately avoided acquiring information that would have produced practical
certainty, then A’s willful blindness would compensate for its lack of
187. See Corfu Channel, supra note 178, at 18–20 (Noting that Albania “constantly kept a
close watch over the waters;” that “its intention [was] to keep a jealous watch on its territorial waters;” that “the [mining] operation was carried out during the period of close watch
by the Albanian authorities;” that an indicator of Albania’s knowledge was that it “did not
notify the presence of mines in its waters, at the moment when it must have known this”
and that this “attitude does not seem reconcilable with the alleged ignorance of the Albanian
authorities that the minefield had been laid in Albanian territorial waters. It could be explained if the Albanian Government, while knowing of the minelaying, desired the circumstances of the operation to remain secret.”). This reasoning has nothing to do with negligence or constructive knowledge—the Court simply drew inferences about what Albania
actually knew from the evidence before it and did so completely appropriately. See also AUST,
supra note 6, at 245, who refers to the inference-drawing process as a modification of the
intent standard, when it is in reality simply a method of proof.
188. For a psychological account of deliberate ignorance as a mental state, see Ralph
Hertwig & Christoph Engel, Homo Ignorans: Deliberately Choosing Not to Know, 11 PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 359 (2016).
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knowledge. The deficit in the cognitive element would be overcome by the
existence of an additional volitional element—the purpose of avoiding inconvenient information since the State is normatively regarded as being
equally culpable. 189 Such a conception of willful blindness is defensible but
requires proof of a different kind of ulterior purpose, one that elevates the
accomplice’s overall culpability. 190
Therefore, willful blindness could arguably be used as a general principle
of law supporting a limited departure from requiring practical certainty in
cases in which it can be reliably proven that the assisting State deliberately
chose to ignore available information in order to avoid having actual
knowledge. The principle simply seeks to close a loophole susceptible to
abuse. The principle is entirely irrelevant to scenarios (i)–(iv) above; as explained, if it can be shown that the assisting State acted with the purpose/direct intent of facilitating the wrongful act, any deficits in its knowledge are
immaterial. Willful blindness is relevant really to scenarios (vi)–(vii) only as
a method of upgrading them to scenario (v), one of indirect or oblique intent.
But for willful blindness, a proven purpose of avoiding the truth, State A
would have been practically certain that B would commit the wrongful act and use
A’s aid to do so—that is, A would have been acting with indirect intent.
4.

Conclusion on Article 16 ASR

To summarize, the culpability requirement of Article 16 ASR should
properly be interpreted as follows:
(1) If the assisting State provides to a wrongdoing State assistance that
materially facilitates the commission of the internationally wrongful act,
which is then in fact committed, and does so with the purpose/direct intent
of facilitating that act—that is, it has the facilitation of the wrongful act as a
conscious object of its action—it will be responsible under Article 16 even
if prior to providing the assistance it thought that the commission of the
wrongful act and its facilitation by the assistance provided were merely possible, rather than certain. The purpose/direct intent to facilitate will compensate for deficits in knowledge.

189. See also de Wet, supra note 21, at 302–3. It is also possible to argue for a willfulblindness doctrine that encompasses dolus eventualis or recklessness as to the facts (as opposed to purpose on one extreme and mere negligence on the other). See Alexander F. Sarch,
Beyond Willful Ignorance, 88 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW 97 (2017).
190. See also Moynihan, supra note 11, at 14–15; JACKSON, supra note 8, at 53.
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(2) If, on the other hand, the assisting State acts without such purpose,
it will still be responsible under Article 16 if it was practically certain that the
wrongdoing State would commit the wrongful act, practically certain that its
own action of providing the assistance would facilitate its commission and
chose to provide the assistance despite this practical certainty. In such cases,
the assisting State is acting with indirect or oblique intent.
(3) If, in the absence of a purpose to facilitate the wrongful act, the assisting State is less than practically certain either that the wrongdoing State
intends to commit a wrongful act, or that the provision of assistance would
facilitate the act, it will be responsible under Article 16 only if the deficits in
knowledge are caused by its own willful blindness—that is, if it purposely
avoided relevant information that would have dispelled any real uncertainty,
so that it would have acted with indirect intent.
(4) In all other situations, the assisting State will not be responsible under Article 16 but may be responsible under other primary rules of international law.
To be clear, the argument presented here does not reduce the culpability
requirement of Article 16 to knowledge, actual or constructive, of the circumstances of the wrongful act. I am not arguing that a State will be responsible for providing assistance whenever it knows (is practically certain) of the
existence or future existence of these circumstances. The State must also
intend to facilitate the wrongful act, as the ILC asserts in the commentary.
But this intent is construed either as the purpose to facilitate in the sense of
a conscious object to do so or as foresight to the level of practical certainty
that the assistance provided will facilitate the wrongful act, coupled with a
decision to proceed with the assistance nonetheless, consciously accepting
that the assistance provided will facilitate the wrongful act (indirect or
oblique intent). Again, the assisting State need not share the assisted State’s
intent, however defined.
This conception of the fault requirement is coherent and workable, and
it does not excessively inhibit inter-State cooperation. 191 In particular, there
is nothing wrong with the culpability requirement having multiple, alternative forms of fault, nor does the inclusion of indirect or oblique intent in the

191. Cf. CRAWFORD, supra note 9, at 409 (Noting that the primary reason behind the
intent requirement in Article 16 is to obtain support from States, defining its scope “in a
manner acceptable generally to governments. It was sensible not to advance a relatively
novel principle potentially detrimental to state sovereignty in its broadest possible form.”).
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culpability requirement lead to overly burdensome, unreasonable outcomes. 192 It will be relatively rare for State A to have been practically certain
that State B intended to commit a wrongful act and also practically certain that
B would use assistance A provided to commit that act. Even with the further
inclusion of situations of willful blindness but for which practical certainty
would have existed, the scope of inhibited State cooperation remains limited.
Moreover, because under Article 16 the assisting State is being held responsible for its own conduct of assisting a wrongful act and not for the wrongful
act itself—that is, this mode of complicity is not imputational—there is justification for a degree of culpability lower than purpose/direct intent. 193 Finally, a mental requirement that would include both direct and indirect intent, as well as elements of willful blindness, would be more practicable and
operational, especially in situations of external assessment (e.g., judicial review or parliamentary scrutiny ), and it would allow us to move beyond the
dilemma between intent and knowledge.
That said, the culpability requirement as defined above does not capture
situations of assistance in which there is only a risk (up to some high threshold of probability) that the assisted State will commit a wrongful act or use
the assistance given to it to commit the act. Nor does it capture situations in
which the assisting State was negligent in acquiring and assessing information
that could have, and should have, led it to practical certainty. The imposition
of such a broad culpability requirement, essentially motivated by concerns
that proving any intent element would be unworkable, 194 can be appropriate
only in context-specific settings, not for all possible violations of international law. Moreover, the difficulty of establishing intent, direct or indirect,
should not be exaggerated; domestic and international courts do so routinely. 195 Nor must intent be proven according to some criminal law beyond

192. For example, the draft Criminal Code for England and Wales in section 27(1)(a)
provides that intention is required for culpability in accessory liability, but the commentary
to the Code makes clear that intention can be either direct or indirect: “D will intend his act
to assist E if he does the act in order to assist E or if he knows that its effect in the ordinary
course of events will be to assist him (and similarly with encouragement). A motive to assist
or encourage the principal is not necessary.” 2 CRIMINAL LAW: A CRIMINAL CODE FOR
ENGLAND AND WALES, supra note 94, ¶ 9.25, at 207.
193. Cf. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 87–88 (discussing the imputational nature of complicity in international criminal law, by contrast to the law of State responsibility).
194. See Nollkaemper et al., supra note 174, at 43.
195. See also infra Part IV.
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a reasonable doubt standard of proof—international courts generally apply
flexible evidentiary rules and draw inferences when appropriate. 196
Finally, I should clarify that the argument presented above is normative
and conceptual. It does not purport to be discovering custom. State practice
and opinio juris, which are often context-specific, simply lack the required degree of granularity, at least for the time being, to draw firm conclusions about
the content of the customary rule. The best one can say is that the proponents of broader forms of culpability have a greater burden of proving that
the rule includes such an element than those who argue for narrower positions, already logically included within the broader ones and therefore by
definition more likely to garner acceptance from a larger number of States.
That said, the authority of the interpretation of the culpability requirement
of Article 16 presented above will depend, as will any such interpretation, on
how it is received by those applying the rule.
Let us now turn to two bodies of international law that do (or may) contain primary, context-specific complicity rules that are tailored to the specific
values and interests that they seek to protect, and which will apply in multinational military operations—IHL and IHRL. Three important preliminary
points should be kept in mind. First, to the extent that they apply in the interState context, such regime-specific rules have the character of lex specialis to
the general, residual rule in Article 16 ASR, something for which the ILC
Articles expressly allow. 197 Second, unlike the purely inter-State rule in Article 16 ASR, these special complicity rules can cover interactions between
States and non-State actors, such as organized armed groups. 198 Third, there
is absolutely no necessity of logic or practicality that these specific rules have
culpability elements identical to the one in Article 16. 199

196. See also Moynihan, supra note 11, at 21–22.
197. See ILC ASR, supra note 4, art. 55. See also de Wet, supra note 21, at 290.
198. For an argument that there is a rule of general applicability on State complicity in
the wrongful acts of non-State actors, see Richard Mackenzie-Gray Scott, State Responsibility
for Complicity in the Internationally Wrongful Acts of Non-State Armed Groups, 24 JOURNAL OF
CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 373 (2019).
199. See also Duff, Intention Revisited, supra note 111, at 172–74 (arguing for a variable
culpability element for complicity, depending on the severity of the principal’s offense).
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B. Complicity under International Humanitarian Law
1.

A Negative Duty under Treaty and Customary IHL

While IHL does not specifically regulate the collection or sharing of intelligence as such, it does impose obligations on States regarding their relationships with third parties. Under Common Article 1 (CA1) of the four 1949
Geneva Conventions, all “High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and
to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.” 200 In the
words of the authoritative Pictet Commentary, this overarching obligation
applies to the respect of each individual State for the Convention, but that
is not all: in the event of a Power failing to fulfil its obligations, each of the
other Contracting Parties (neutral, allied or enemy) should endeavour to
bring it back to an attitude of respect for the Convention. The proper
working of the system of protection provided by the Convention demands
in fact that the States which are parties to it should not be content merely
to apply its provisions themselves, but should do everything in their power
to ensure that it is respected universally. 201

A substantially similar duty exists under customary IHL. Thus, Rule 139
of the International Committee of the Red Cross’s (ICRC) customary IHL
study provides that “[e]ach party to the conflict must respect and ensure respect for international humanitarian law by its armed forces and other persons or groups acting in fact on its instructions, or under its direction or
control,” 202 while under Rule 144 “States may not encourage violations of
international humanitarian law by parties to an armed conflict. They must
exert their influence, to the degree possible, to stop violations of international humanitarian law.” 203
The overarching conventional and customary obligation to “respect and
ensure respect” for IHL has been much debated. It is generally regarded as
having both a positive and a negative component (as do IHRL obligations
addressed below). The scope of the former is more controversial than that
200. See, e.g., Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 1, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III].
201. COMMENTARY ON THE THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 18
(Jean Pictet ed., 1960).
202. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW r. 139 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY].
203. Id. r. 144.
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of the latter, provoking division among both scholars and States. 204 The basic
tenet of the expansionist camp, whose most notable proponent is the ICRC,
is that States have a positive duty to exert influence on third parties engaging
in an armed conflict to stop their violations of IHL—for example, the
United States or the United Kingdom would have a positive obligation to
exert influence on Saudi Arabia to prevent Saudi violations of IHL in its
conflict in Yemen. 205 On the other hand, the more restrictive camp argues
that broad interpretations of the positive obligation under CA1 are not
grounded in its drafting history or in State practice. 206
For our purposes, however, this debate is largely beside the point. We
are concerned not with the positive obligation of States to influence other
actors but with the negative obligation incumbent on States not to assist other
actors in their violations of IHL. This obligation is categorically different
from any positive duty to exercise influence because it simply requires restraint on behalf of the (potentially) assisting State—for example, the United
States or the United Kingdom not selling weapons to or sharing intelligence
with Saudi Arabia if these would be used for violations of IHL. 207 While
there may be some debate on whether this obligation should be grounded in
the “respect” or the “ensure respect” language of CA1 or the corresponding

204. For an overview, see Brian Finucane, Partners and Legal Pitfalls, 92 INTERNATIONAL
LAW STUDIES 407, 417–19 (2016).
205. See, e.g., Robin Geiß, The Obligation to Respect and Ensure Respect for the Conventions, in
THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS: A COMMENTARY 109 (Andrew Clapham, Paola Gaeta
& Marco Sassòli eds., 2016); Oona A. Hathaway et al., Ensuring Responsibility: Common Article
1 and State Responsibility for Non-State Actors, 96 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 539, 569–77 (2017);
Marten Zwanenburg, The “External Element” of the Obligation to Ensure Respect for the Geneva
Conventions: A Matter of Treaty Interpretation, 97 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 621 (2021).
206. See, e.g., Frits Kalshoven, The Undertaking to Respect and Ensure Respect in All Circumstances: From Tiny Seed to Ripening Fruit, 2 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW 3 (1999); Carlo Focarelli, Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Soap Bubble?,
21 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 125 (2010); Michael N. Schmitt & Sean
Watts, Common Article 1 and the Duty to “Ensure Respect,” 96 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES
674 (2020).
207. Even Frits Kalshoven, who wrote the classic skeptical account of the expansive
interpretation of the “ensure respect” language in Common Article 1, had fewer misgivings
about negative duties of restraint. See Kalshoven, supra note 206, at 56 (1999) (“[T]here is a
considerable distance between the negative duty to refrain from encouraging people on your
side to disregard the law, and a positive duty to induce people on the other side of the fence
to respect the law.”).
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customary rule, 208 there is little debate that this obligation actually exists. 209
According to an instrument endorsed by the European Union Council:
Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions is generally interpreted as
conferring a responsibility on third party States not involved in an armed
conflict to not encourage a party to an armed conflict to violate international humanitarian law, nor to take action that would assist in such violations . . . . 210

The broad language of CA1 and the object and purpose of the Geneva Conventions can easily accommodate a negative duty not to encourage or assist.
Although it has not been extensively discussed, it also seems reasonably clear
that the negative duty has not provoked the kind of opposition on the part
of some States that the wide-ranging positive duty to prevent has. 211

208. The ICRC’s view, for example, is that the negative duty stems from the “ensure
respect” limb of CA1. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST GENEVA CONVENTION: CONVENTION (I) FOR THE AMELIORATION
OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN THE ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD
¶¶ 153–61 (2016) [hereinafter COMMENTARY OF 2016]. See also Nottingham Workshop Report, supra note 10, at 16.
209. See Geiß, supra note 205, at 130.
210. See General Secretariat of the European Council, User’s Guide to Council Common
Position 2008/944/CFSP, COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 56 (2019), https://www.
consilium.europa.eu/media/40659/st12189-en19.pdf (hereinafter EU User’s Guide) (defining common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment).
211. See also Moynihan, supra note 11, at 26–27; AUST, supra note 6, at 388; Nottingham
Workshop Report, supra note 10, at 12–14. Helmut Aust, Complicity in Violations of International Humanitarian Law, in INDUCING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 442 (Heike Krieger, ed., 2015); Marco Sassòli, State Responsibility for Violations of
International Humanitarian Law, 84 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 401, 412–
13 (2002); Knut Dörmann & Jose Serralvo, Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions and the
Obligation to Prevent International Humanitarian Law Violations, 96 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF
THE RED CROSS 707, 726–27 (2014); Tom Ruys & Luca Ferro, The Enemy of My Enemy: Dutch
Non-lethal Assistance for “Moderate” Syrian Rebels and the Multilevel Violation of International Law,
50 NETHERLANDS YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 333 (2019); Cornelius Wiesener,
Taking One for the Team: Legal Consequences of Misconduct by Partners, 3 SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL
OF MILITARY STUDIES 45, 48 (2020); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 3, at 34; John
Hursh, International Humanitarian Law Violations, Legal Responsibility, and US Military Support to
the Saudi Coalition in Yemen: A Cautionary Tale, 7 JOURNAL ON THE USE OF FORCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 122, 149 (2020); Boutin, supra note 1, at 538; LANOVOY, supra note 11,
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The ICJ’s Encounter with Complicity in Nicaragua

In short, treaty and customary IHL contain a primary negative obligation of
States not to encourage or assist third parties in their violations of IHL. 212
This primary, IHL-specific complicity rule exists in parallel with the secondary, generally applicable complicity rule in Article 16 ASR. Also, unlike the
latter, it clearly applies to State assistance being provided to non-State armed
groups. As the ICJ held in Nicaragua:
[T]here is an obligation on the United States Government, in the terms of
Article I of the Geneva Conventions, to “respect” the Conventions and
even “to ensure respect” for them “in all circumstances,” since such an
obligation does not derive only from the Conventions themselves, but
from the general principles of humanitarian law to which the Conventions
merely give specific expression. The United States is thus under an obligation not to encourage persons or groups engaged in the conflict in Nicaragua to act in
violation of the provisions of Article 3 common to the four 1949 Geneva
Conventions. 213

The existence of the IHL-specific negative complicity rule may not be in
doubt, but its exact parameters are, for example, with regard to any mental
element in respect of the assisting State. This element, again, need not align

at 208. But see Verity Robson, The Common Approach to Article 1: The Scope of Each State’s Obligation to Ensure Respect for the Geneva Conventions, 25 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY
LAW 101, 111 (2020) (arguing that Article 16 ASR is the only relevant complicity rule—that
is, that no such rule exists under IHL).
212. See COMMENTARY OF 2016, supra note 208, ¶ 158 (“Pursuant to common Article
1, the High Contracting Parties have certain negative obligations, which means they must
abstain from certain conduct. In particular, they may neither encourage, nor aid or assist in
violations of the Conventions. It would be contradictory if common Article 1 obliged the
High Contracting Parties to ‘respect and to ensure respect’ by their own armed forces while
allowing them to contribute to violations by other Parties to a conflict.”). See also id. ¶¶ 158–
63; Geiß, supra note 205, at 130–31.
213. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 220 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua]. See also id. ¶ 255 (“[G]eneral
principles of humanitarian law include a particular prohibition, accepted by States, and extending to activities which occur in the context of armed conflicts, whether international in
character or not. By virtue of such general principles, the United States is bound to refrain
from encouragement of persons or groups engaged in the conflict in Nicaragua to commit
violations of Article 3 which is common to all four Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949.”).
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with the requirements of Article 16 ASR. For instance, it is entirely possible
for CA1 to require a lower level of fault than Article 16. 214
The text of IHL treaties provides no guidance on the elements of the
IHL-specific complicity rule. In Nicaragua, the Court’s examination of U.S.
complicity in violations of IHL by the “contras” was confined solely to the
U.S. production of a manual on psychological operations, which the Court
framed in terms of U.S. encouragement or incitement of the violations. 215 This
language is particularly interesting because States are generally not seen to
bear responsibility simply for encouraging or inciting violations by others. 216
The Court said nothing about the degree of culpability required for encouraging violations of IHL. It did, however, find the United States responsible
for encouragement by providing the manual, while noting that it was “material to consider whether that encouragement was offered to persons in circumstances where the commission of such acts was likely or foreseeable.” 217
This appears to be a reference to purely objective likelihood or foreseeability
rather than subjective foresight on the part of U.S. authorities. But it is unclear whether the Court simply regarded this objective element as cumulative
with an implied subjective element. To put it mildly, it is unlikely that the
Court thought that any provision of assistance that was objectively likely to
lead causally to further IHL violations would count as “encouragement.”
It is difficult to draw any reliable conclusions from Nicaragua as to what
the Court would have thought on the fault element of the IHL complicity
rule for providing to a non-State actor (or a State) assistance that does not
qualify as encouragement or incitement. In particular, Nicaragua did not ask
the Court to rule on whether the U.S. provision of weapons, money, and
logistical assistance (which included the sharing of some intelligence) 218 to
the contras violated IHL because it facilitated the contras’ violations of
IHL. 219 Its submissions (and the Court’s analysis) framed these acts of assistance as violations of the prohibitions on the use of force and intervention. 220
The only IHL-specific complicity finding was that regarding the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) manual on psychological operations.
214. See COMMENTARY OF 2016, supra note 208, ¶¶ 160–61.
215. Nicaragua, supra note 213, ¶ 256.
216. See ILC ASR, supra note 4, general cmt. to pt. 1, ch. IV, ¶ 9; AUST, supra note 6, at
388. See further Miles Jackson, State Instigation in International Law: A General Principle Transposed,
30 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 391 (2019).
217. Nicaragua, supra note 213, ¶ 256 (emphasis added).
218. Id. ¶ 243.
219. Id. ¶¶ 216–17.
220. Id. ¶¶ 195, 205, 228, 241.
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Fault Standards in the Arms Trade Treaty

To my knowledge, the only treaty in which States expressly set out culpability
standards regarding obligations similar, but not equivalent, to the IHL-specific complicity rule is the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), 221 which does so in
two different provisions. First, Article 6 ATT categorically prohibits arms
exports in certain circumstances; in particular, Article 6(4) provides that a
State party
shall not authorize any transfer of conventional arms . . . if it has
knowledge at the time of authorization that the arms or items would be used
in the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches
of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, attacks directed against civilian
objects or civilians protected as such, or other war crimes (emphasis
added).
Article 7 then further provides that in situations in which a transfer is not
categorically prohibited by Article 6, the State shall “assess the potential”
that, if transferred, the arms “could be used” to commit or facilitate serious
violations of IHL or human rights. If, after making this assessment and
adopting any available mitigating measures, the State party determines there
is an “overriding risk” of such consequences occurring, it shall not authorize
the export. 222
The key difference between these ATT rules and the IHL-specific complicity rule is that the ATT prohibitions are entirely inchoate. They do not
require that the harmful consequences of the arms transfer actually occur.
Rather, a State that authorizes an export of weapons contrary to Articles 6
or 7 ATT violates the treaty by the mere act of export, even if no violations
of IHL are ultimately facilitated by it. 223 The IHL complicity rule, by contrast,
does require the prohibited consequence to occur—that is, the responsibility
of the accomplice cannot arise without the principal committing the wrong,
221. Arms Trade Treaty, Apr. 2, 2013, 3013 U.N.T.S. 52373. For a standard reference
work on the treaty, see STUART CASEY-MASLEN ET AL., THE ARMS TRADE TREATY: A COMMENTARY (2016). As of July 1, 2021, the ATT has 110 States parties, and a further 31 signatories that are yet to finally express their consent to be bound by the treaty.
222. This regime of course only applies to weapons that can in principle be used lawfully and whose export is not categorically banned by some specific treaty.
223. See CASEY-MASLEN ET AL., supra note 221, ¶¶ 6.85, 6.92. This is the same position
as with State non-refoulement obligations under IHRL discussed below.
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and without the accomplice’s conduct actually facilitating the wrong, to some
degree of causal contribution. 224
But even if the ATT rules are different from those of IHL, they are sufficiently similar in their basic purpose for the ATT to serve as an instructive
example, especially in light of its drafting history. A draft text of Article 6,
originally proposed by the United States, prohibited transfers only when
these would be done “for the purpose of facilitating” international crimes,
borrowing the complicity mens rea language from Article 25(3)(c) of the
Rome Statute. 225 This purpose formulation was met with pushback from
other States, who considered it to be too narrow, 226 and was replaced with a
knowledge requirement that was left undefined. 227 As in the ASR context,
the Article 6 ATT knowledge requirement must be dual—the transferring
State must know (i.e., be practically certain) that the recipient State is committing or will commit international crimes, and it must know (i.e., be practically certain) that the recipient State would use the arms provided to commit
these crimes. 228 Again, as in the ASR context, this “knowledge” is inherently
a probabilistic assessment of contingent events in the future, if at a high level
of certainty.
The probabilistic nature of the assessment is even more apparent in Article 7 ATT, which speaks of the “potential” that the arms “could be used to
commit or facilitate” a serious violation of IHL, then refers to measures that
might “mitigate risks” and to refuse to proceed with the export in case there
remains an “overriding risk” despite such measures. The provision is broader
than Article 6 in multiple ways: for instance, it is not confined to international
crimes but encompasses all serious violations of IHL and IHRL; its causality
requirements are arguably lower; and it refers not to knowledge (i.e., practical
certainty) that transferred arms would be used for the proscribed harms but to
the risk that they could be so used. 229 However, it bears reiterating yet again

224. To be clear, one form of responsibility does not exclude the other—it is entirely
possible for the State to first violate the inchoate ATT prohibition by authorizing the weapons transfer and for it to subsequently also violate the IHL complicity rule, if the weapons
facilitate a violation of IHL.
225. See id. ¶ 6.12.
226. Id. ¶ 6.13 (Mexico arguing that no government would accept internally that it was
acting for the purpose of facilitating international crimes and that therefore a purpose standard would be devoid of practical effect).
227. Id. ¶ 6.14.
228. See id. ¶¶ 6.93–94.
229. Id. ¶¶ 7.02, 7.31, 7.35–38.
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that the difference between practical or near certainty and mere potential or
risk is one of degree, not of kind.
4.

Minimum Standards for IHL-specific Complicity

The culpability element of the IHL complicity rule remains substantially uncertain. The same can be said of the causal contribution element. There is
simply no binding authority as to what their contents are or should be. Standards employed elsewhere, such as in the ATT context, cannot simply be
transplanted wholesale, however instructive they are. An attempt to arrive at
such standards from State practice is, in my view, bound to fail since that
practice simply lacks the necessary coherence and granularity. The argument
I propose is, therefore, like most of this article, conceptual and normative.
What can be said with certainty is that the applicability of the IHL-specific complicity rule, which is rooted in CA1 and custom, does not depend
on whether the assisting State is a party to an armed conflict or on the classification of that conflict as an international armed conflict (IAC) or noninternational armed conflict (NIAC). 230 States parties to the Geneva Conventions must respect them and ensure respect for them “in all circumstances.” There is no reason of principle why the complicity rule, which demands abstention only from the assisting State, should apply differently depending on its involvement in the conflict or the nature of that conflict. 231
Indeed, we have seen in Nicaragua how the ICJ had no issue with applying
its encouragement analysis to the U.S. supply of the manual to the contras,
who were involved in a NIAC against the Nicaraguan government. Of
course, the somewhat different content of IHL in IACs and NIACs might
lead to relatively rare occasions in which the same kind of assistance would
be wrongful in IACs but lawful in NIACs, but this turns on the wrongfulness
of the principal’s conduct, not on differing applicability of the IHL complicity rule. 232
We can also say with certainty that, whatever the exact parameters of the
IHL-specific complicity rule, it has added value when compared to Article

230. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 158 (July
9). See also Moynihan, supra note 11, at 32–33; Geiß, supra note 205, at 116.
231. See also COMMENTARY OF 2016, supra note 208, ¶ 185; Geiß, supra note 205, at 132–
33.
232. See also Nottingham Workshop Report, supra note 10, at 15–16.
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16 ASR, at least in covering State assistance to non-State armed groups. 233
Article 16 does not by its own terms apply to non-State actors, and there
appears to be little evidence of such a secondary rule of general applicability
that would be divorced from the relevant primary rules, unless Article 16 was
regarded simply as one instantiation of a broader, general principle of law. 234
We can also say that the CA1 complicity rule is broader than Article 16 in
that it covers not only assistance but also “mere” encouragement. 235
But what should the culpability element of the IHL-specific complicity
rule look like?
First, at a minimum, the culpability element of IHL complicity should
include all the modes of fault in the general customary rule in Article 16 ASR.
If States were prepared to accept those culpability standards for complicity
in all existing rules of international law, regardless of the importance of the
interests they protect, then surely the same standards would constitute the
limit above which no IHL-specific complicity rule could go. In other words,
because its primary purpose is to prevent particularly grave harms against
individuals (and States), it is justified for IHL to impose lower, less stringent
culpability requirements that would inhibit more potentially harmful interactions between and among States and non-State armed groups. 236 But it could
certainly not impose higher, more stringent culpability requirements than Article 16 ASR, especially because the IHL-specific complicity rule does not
impose consequences any more burdensome for the complicit State than
does Article 16. 237
233. See COMMENTARY OF 2016, supra note 208, ¶¶ 158–59 (referring to prohibited
State assistance to “a Party to a conflict,” which is the standard formulation used to include
non-State armed groups in non-international armed conflicts, as opposed to States—that is,
the High Contracting Parties).
234. In the Bosnian Genocide case the ICJ did apply Article 16 by analogy to Serbia’s
provision of aid to non-State actors, the Bosnian Serb forces. But it only did so because the
Genocide Convention expressly prohibits complicity in genocide—that is, contains an (undefined) bespoke complicity rule, whose content the Court had to fill. See also JACKSON,
supra note 8, at 220–21 (discussing Bosnian Genocide and arguing that there is no conceptual
bar to rules prohibiting State complicity in the wrongful conduct of non-State actors).
235. See CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY, supra note 202, r. 144; Geiß, supra note 205, at 131–
32; Théo Boutruche & Marco Sassòli, Expert Opinion on Third States’ Obligations vis-àvis IHL Violations under International Law, with a Special Focus on Common Article 1 to
the 1949 Geneva Conventions 21 (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/legal-opinions/eo-common-article-1-ihl---boutruche---sassoli---8-nov-2016.pdf.
236. See COMMENTARY OF 2016, supra note 208, ¶ 160. See also AUST, supra note 6, at
388; Boutin, supra note 1, at 539; Boutruche & Sassòli, supra note 235, at 20.
237. See Geiß, supra note 205, at 131.
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This point was broadly accepted at the Nottingham workshop on intelligence sharing. In particular, even experts vocal in their advocacy of a purpose/direct intent standard under Article 16 ASR were comfortable applying
a standard lower than purpose under CA1 and customary IHL. 238 This only
makes sense from a policy perspective—the importance of the interests protected by IHL can warrant a departure from default, generally applicable
standards, and one such departure could be in less demanding culpability
requirements. An IHL-specific rule to that effect would not excessively inhibit potentially beneficial cooperation in the way the same rule would do if
it applied to all possible violations of international law.
Thus, at a minimum, the IHL complicity rule would cover State assistance to other States or non-State actors if such assistance was done:
(1) With the purpose/direct intent to facilitate a violation of IHL, regardless of whether the assisting State knew (was practically certain) that the
violation would occur or that its aid would, in fact, facilitate it. Again, deficits
in knowledge are compensated for by the existence of purpose as the most
culpable form of fault. 239
(2) With the oblique/indirect intent to facilitate a violation of IHL—
that is, if the assisting State was practically certain that a violation of IHL
was occurring or would occur, was practically certain that its assistance
would facilitate the violation and had reconciled itself to this virtual inevitability. 240
(3) With willful blindness, in the sense that the assisting State would
have been acting with oblique intent but for its purpose to avoid acquiring
information that would have led it to practical certainty. 241
Second, above that minimum the fault element of the IHL complicity
rule ultimately might best be conceptualized as a sliding scale, depending on
the importance of the IHL rule that is implicated. Put differently, CA1 and
its customary equivalent can employ a culpability requirement that varies
with the severity or seriousness of the principal’s IHL violation. Thus, for
example, the Article 16 ASR standards might be perfectly appropriate for
complicity in violations of “vanilla” rules of IHL, such as the Article 38 Geneva Convention III rule that the detaining power shall provide prisoners of
war with opportunities for taking physical exercise, including sports and
238. See Nottingham Workshop Report, supra note 10, at 14–15.
239. See supra Section III.A.2.
240. Id.
241. See supra Section III.A.3.
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games, 242 or the Article 71 rule that prisoners of war must be allowed to send
and receive correspondence. 243 But less demanding requirements might be
appropriate for complicity in serious violations of IHL, for instance, those that
constitute grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, deliberate attacks on
civilians, or subjection of civilians to torture or inhuman treatment. 244 It is in
principle perfectly sensible to vary the content of complicity rules depending
on the importance of the underlying interests, as we could see, for example,
from the various gradations of liability in Articles 6 and 7 ATT or indeed
from the ILC’s (imperfect) implementation of the idea in Article 41(2)
ASR. 245 This is as true internally, within regime-specific complicity rules as
in IHL, as it is for complicity for violations of different rules of unequal
importance within the same regime. The absence of any hard text specifically
regulating culpability in most specific regimes and the ensuing interpretative
discretion formally enable such a variable conception of fault.
This leads us to what is, in my view, the main outstanding issue—should
there be a risk-based culpability rule for complicity in serious violations of
IHL?
5.

Risk-based Culpability for IHL-Specific Complicity

Let us assume a situation in which State A provides assistance (e.g., intelligence) to State or non-State actor B without the direct or indirect intent that
B use this assistance to commit a serious violation of IHL (e.g., attack civilians). A is only aware of a risk, to some degree of probability, that B would
commit the violation and use the assistance A provides to do so. If, in this
scenario, A provides the assistance to B despite the risk and B, in fact, proceeds to use that assistance to commit a serious violation of IHL, should A
be responsible for complicity in B’s wrongful act under the IHL-specific
complicity rule?
We should carefully distinguish this scenario from other possible forms
of culpability. This would not be responsibility for the inchoate act of creating
242. GC III, supra note 200, art. 38.
243. Id. art. 71.
244. I deliberately do not provide a more detailed definition of the notion of a serious
violation of IHL, because the exact parameters of that definition are not central to my argument here and because the concept is otherwise frequently used, e.g., in Article 7 ATT. I
would just note that a violation of IHL can be serious (e.g., an act of torture or unlawful
killing) even without being widespread or systematic. For a discussion, see CASEY-MASLEN
ET AL., supra note 221, ¶¶ 7.39–49.
245. See also Moynihan, supra note 11, at 23.
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risk or exposing the possible victim to risk, responsibility of the kind that
exists under Article 7 ATT, where the violation is consummated simply by
exporting arms despite an overriding risk. Nor is it responsibility like that
under the non-refoulement rule in IHRL and refugee law, whereby a State
can violate the right to life or the prohibition of torture or inhuman treatment simply by deporting or extraditing a person to another State, despite a
real risk that they would be ill-treated there, even if the ill-treatment never
actually occurs. 246 In the scenario above A is not responsible for complicity
simply by providing aid to B despite the risk of harm; it can be responsible
only if B actually commits the wrongful act and the aid A had provided causally contributed to that act. 247 In the absence of such causal contribution A
can only be responsible for violating some other, positive duty of prevention
(e.g., ensuring respect for IHL), but not for complicity proper.
Nor is the scenario above one of so-called constructive knowledge. That is
a situation in which a person (or State) did not subjectively know to practical
certainty something that could have been known to such certainty; the fact was
knowable in principle and should have been known to such certainty, so that the
person (or State) is culpable, to some standard such as negligence, for not
knowing. In other words, had one acted with care and done all that a reasonable person could be expected to do in such circumstances to verify all
relevant information, one would have arrived at practical certainty. As previously explained, the notion of constructive knowledge implies a positive
obligation to make such inquiries. 248
But our scenario is different. It is one where even the most diligent of
States could not have (probabilistically) known to near certainty what the
recipient of the aid would do. This is, in short, a “pure” situation of risk—
even after making all possible inquiries, the assisting State knows that there
is some possibility that the assisted party would commit a serious violation
of IHL and would use the aid provided to do so, but it cannot be certain
whether or not this will be the case. 249
246. See AUST, supra note 6, at 393–401. See further Elihu Lauterpacht & Daniel Bethlehem, The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-Refoulement, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNHCR’S GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 87 (Erika Feller, Volker Türk & Frances Nicholson eds., 2003).
247. See JACKSON, supra note 8, at 7–8.
248. See supra Section III.A.3.
249. It is also possible to apply an objectivized, constructive standard not to actual,
near-certain knowledge but to knowledge of a degree or risk—that is, the State should have
known (but did not know) that there was a risk that its aid would be misused; it may not have
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This is, in practice, by far the most common scenario of States providing
assistance to third parties, including in military operations. Assisting States
are rarely practically certain what the recipients of their aid will do with it,
but they frequently discern a degree of risk that their aid will be misused. As
a normative matter, the first question is whether responsibility for complicity
is desirable when the assisting State is not practically certain—and cannot be
certain—about what the assisted party will do, but nonetheless appreciates
some degree of risk and consciously disregards that risk by continuing to
provide the assistance.
In the ATT context, States have already answered that question essentially in the affirmative for serious violations of IHL and IHRL, even if the
responsibility is inchoate and not one of complicity proper. That treaty, however, is not necessarily reflective of customary law and is confined to the
transfer of weapons—a type of assistance that is manifestly capable of causally contributing to grave violations of international law. That said, numerous
other treaties and instruments regarding arms transfers use risk-based formulations to prohibit certain transfers. 250 If the causal contribution to the
wrong of other forms of assistance, such as intelligence sharing, is as substantial as that of weapons and the seriousness of the underlying wrong (e.g.,
a deliberate attack against civilians) remains the same, it is difficult to see why
they should be treated differently. It is not the type of assistance but the
importance of the interests and values implicated by the underlying violation
that justifies resort to a risk-based form of culpability. 251
If this mode of culpability is desirable in principle, the even more difficult question would be how the relevant risk threshold should be defined.
On one end of the spectrum we could require a very high likelihood of the
harm occurring, but such a threshold would be impossible to differentiate

subjectively foreseen the risk, but such a risk was foreseeable. To be clear, the argument I am
making for risk-based culpability in complicity for serious violations of IHL and (below)
IHRL is based on a subjective approach—that is, the State did foresee a risk—even though
I am not excluding the possibility that objective approaches might be appropriate in some
specific instances. The argument is so confined to avoid overinclusiveness concerns.
250. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, ARMS TRANSFER DECISIONS: APPLYING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW CRITERIA—A PRACTICAL GUIDE 5–6 (2d ed. 2016) [hereinafter ARMS TRANSFER DECISIONS—A PRACTICAL GUIDE].
251. See AUST, supra note 6, at 239 (“Risk-based responsibility for complicity may be
justified where particularly important legal values are at stake.”). See also Nottingham Workshop Report, supra note 10, at 16–17.
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from actual knowledge—that is, practical, virtual near certainty. 252 On the
other end of the spectrum we could require merely the possibility of the harm
occurring, but such a low threshold would be overinclusive and would inhibit far too much potentially beneficial cooperation. There is always a possibility that almost any kind of aid will be misused.
Occupying the middle ground would be formulations requiring the
State’s awareness of a real, significant, or substantial risk, such as, for example, those used in the IHRL non-refoulement context. 253 Such formulations
imply that the risk is neither low nor negligible, without implying that the
violation is more likely to occur than not. Alternatively, the rule could explicitly require the level of risk to be likely or probable, i.e., that the assisting
State would be culpable had it assessed it as more likely than not that the
assistance it provided would be used for a serious violation of IHL, and the
assistance later was in fact so used.
The current state of the law is such that it is difficult to know exactly
where the risk threshold lies; this certainly cannot be discerned with mathematical precision. However, what can be said is that comparative practice in
both criminal and tort law is replete with examples of risk-based modes of
culpability, such as recklessness, dolus eventualis, gross negligence, or conscious (advertent) negligence. 254 The boundaries between these forms of
fault are porous, but the forms all have subjective awareness of some degree
of risk in common. 255 And in various international legal contexts, States have
been comfortable with the regulation of their conduct on the basis of anticipated risk, as for instance, with the precautionary principle in international
environmental law. 256
It is therefore difficult to see how, precisely, States could reasonably object to the notion that A would be acting contrarily to its obligation to respect
and ensure respect for IHL if, knowing it to be likely that the assistance it
provided to B, including weapons, money, or intelligence, would be used to
commit war crimes or other serious violations of IHL, it chose to provide
the assistance anyway, and B, in fact, committed the wrongful act, the aid
provided contributing materially. This would probably be the case even if
252. See supra Section II.D.
253. See, e.g., LANOVOY, supra note 11, at 210.
254. As opposed to inadvertent, unconscious negligence, where the person is not subjectively aware of the risk but objectively should have been aware of it.
255. See JACKSON, supra note 8, at 52–53.
256. See further Sonia Boutillon, The Precautionary Principle: Development of an International
Standard, 23 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 429 (2002).
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the risk threshold were somewhat lower than likelihood if it was (say) clear,
real, or substantial. The ICRC is thus of the view that irrespective of any
obligations under the ATT or other arms transfer instruments, all States have
a CA1 “negative obligation [that] would require a State to assess whether the
recipient is likely to use the weapons to commit IHL violations and, if there
is a substantial or clear risk of this happening, to refrain from transferring
the weapons.” 257 And as explained above, there is no reason of principle why
this rule would be confined to weapons transfers—other forms of assistance
that can substantially causally contribute to the wrongful act, such as the
sharing of intelligence, must be equally covered. Nor is there any reason of
principle why this complicity rule would apply any differently to assistance
provided by States to non-State actors. 258
In conclusion, the CA1 and customary duty to refrain from assisting
third parties in committing serious violations of IHL can also reasonably
encompass those situations in which the assisting State is aware only of a risk
that its aid would be used to facilitate the violation but nonetheless chooses
to provide it. 259 The State providing assistance despite the risk would not be
acting unlawfully at that precise moment; its provision of assistance would
only become unlawful if it was later in fact used to commit, and made a
substantial contribution to, a serious violation of IHL. By providing the aid
despite the risk, the assisting State would be exposing itself to legal risk. It
would be taking a gamble that its aid would not, in the end, be misused, and
it would be liable, to the extent of its own causal contribution to the harm,
if it judged poorly. And it would in any event be making its decisions dynamically, in light of the possibly changing circumstances and information available to it.
C. Complicity under International Human Rights Law
1.

Generally

Let us turn now to IHRL, whose applicability to multinational military operations and intelligence sharing within such operations raises numerous issues. First, as with IHL, IHRL obligations can stem from both customary
and conventional international law. But the source of obligation matters
more for IHRL than for IHL for a number of reasons. On the one hand,
257. ARMS TRANSFER DECISIONS—A PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 250, at 13.
258. Id. at 11.
259. See also Dörmann & Serralvo, supra note 211, at 734; Letts, supra note 1, at 13.
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customary IHRL is vaguer in content than customary IHL—and there is no
IHRL equivalent of the ICRC’s customary IHL study. 260 On the other hand,
human rights treaties possess dedicated independent enforcement mechanisms that are lacking for customary IHRL and for both customary and conventional IHL. The subject-matter jurisdiction of these mechanisms (such as
the European Court of Human Rights) is normally limited to their founding
treaty. 261 An applicant cannot use (say) the individual complaints mechanism
of the European Court by alleging a violation of some treaty other than the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
Today all States are parties to at least some human rights treaties. The
treaties that are most relevant for the question of intelligence sharing in multinational military operations are those on civil and political rights, which
have some significant gaps in ratifications. For example, to engage with
China on these issues regarding purported violations of freedom of expression or privacy, one would have to rely on customary IHRL, since China is
not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 262 the UN treaty that protects these rights. Both customary and conventional IHRL could be enforced before domestic courts, depending on
domestic (constitutional) rules on the incorporation of international law into
the municipal legal order. Dedicated enforcement mechanisms, whether international or domestic, inevitably make IHRL more appealing than IHL to
activists and potential litigants and equally inevitably lead to court cases or
other kinds of procedures in which questions of intelligence sharing will be
scrutinized. This is an emerging trend that will likely only grow.

260. See further Richard B. Lillich, The Growing Importance of Customary International Human
Rights Law, 25 GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW 1 (1996);
Hugh Thirlway, Human Rights in Customary Law: An Attempt to Define Some of the Issues, 28
LEIDEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 495 (2015); Michael Wood, Customary International Law and Human Rights (European University Institute Working Paper AEL 2016/03,
2016), https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/44445/AEL_2016_03.pdf.
261. The one major exception is the African Court, whose jurisdiction extends to all
human rights instruments accepted by a State party. See Protocol to the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 3, June 10, 1998, OAU Doc. OAU/LEG/AFCHPR/PROT (III). Human
rights bodies can, of course, take into account other legal rules in interpreting their own
respective treaties.
262. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171.
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Second, IHRL, like IHL, imposes both negative and positive obligations
on States. States must not only respect IHRL themselves but must also exercise due diligence to prevent and suppress violations by third parties within
their jurisdiction. 263 However, the key question of principle for our purposes
is whether the negative duty to respect human rights also includes an IHRLspecific obligation not to be complicit in human rights violations by third
parties. As with IHL, the answer to that question appears to be in the affirmative, but the jurisprudence of human rights bodies on this issue is embryonic. And if the obligation exists, the even more difficult question, afflicted
by indeterminacy, is that of its content, specifically as to its culpability element.
Third, even if the IHRL-specific complicity rule exists, as it does in my
view, it is controversial to what extent that rule would operate extraterritorially—that is, to State assistance to actors committing violations outside its
borders. 264 The extraterritoriality problem is likely the greatest impediment
to the wider application of the IHRL complicity rule for the time being.
Fourth is the important systemic question of the relationship between
IHL and IHRL. Here too the overall trend has also been towards an increasing acceptance that IHRL applies in armed conflict, but numerous controversies remain, for example, about the utility, coherence, and meaning of the
lex specialis principle. 265 That said, the most important question is not whether
263. See generally Dinah Shelton & Ariel Gould, Positive and Negative Obligations, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 562 (Dinah Shelton ed.,
2013).
264. See generally EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
(Fons Coomans & Menno T. Kamminga eds., 2004); MARK GIBNEY & SIGRUN SKOGLY,
UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS (2010); MICHAL
GONDEK, THE REACH OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN A GLOBALISING WORLD: EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES (2009); MARKO MILANOVIC, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: LAW, PRINCIPLES, AND POLICY
(2011); KAREN DA COSTA, THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF SELECTED HUMAN
RIGHTS TREATIES (2012).
265. See generally Marco Sassòli & Laura Olson, The Relationship Between International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law Where It Matters: Admissible Killing and Internment of Fighters in
Non-International Armed Conflicts, 90 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 599
(2008); William Schabas, Lex Specialis? Belt and Suspenders? The Parallel Operation of Human
Rights Law and the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Conundrum of Jus ad Bellum, 40 ISRAEL LAW
REVIEW 592 (2007); Anja Lindroos, Addressing Norm Conflicts in a Fragmented Legal System: The
Doctrine of Lex Specialis, 74 NORDIC JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 (2005); Marko
Milanovic, The Lost Origins of Lex Specialis: Rethinking the Relationship between Human Rights and
International Humanitarian Law, in THEORETICAL BOUNDARIES OF ARMED CONFLICT AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 78 (Jens David Ohlin ed., 2016).
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IHRL applies to military operations but how it applies, and specifically how
the normative demands of human rights can be reconciled with practical operational requirements and realities on the ground. 266 At the very minimum,
we could say that human rights bodies would likely find violations of IHRL
due to intelligence sharing if these violations would simultaneously also be
violations of IHL (e.g., torture or directing attacks against civilians). More
difficult would be those cases in which the demands of IHL and IHRL potentially conflict, such as the targeting and detention of combatants, on
which IHL rules are more permissive than those of IHRL (for example, IHL
would permit the killing of combatants even if it was possible to capture
them instead and they posed no immediate threat, whereas IHRL would normally require the exhaustion of non-lethal options). However, the latter cases
will be far less common than the former, and I will not examine this issue
further here.
In short, while the jurisprudence on the applicability of human rights
treaties extraterritorially and in times of armed conflict is very much in flux,
it seems unlikely that the increasing trend towards applying human rights law
to such situations will reverse itself. Human rights case law specifically addressing extraterritorial intelligence sharing is also embryonic. 267 However,
State responsibility for intelligence sharing and related matters, such as electronic surveillance, has increasingly been raised in human rights terms. Intelligence operations generally have been subjected to increased public scrutiny
since the Snowden revelations of the electronic surveillance capabilities of
agencies such as the U.S. National Security Agency and UK Government
Communications Headquarters. This has in turn provoked litigation domestically and internationally, as well as such important activity within the UN
system as the adoption by the UN General Assembly and the Human Rights
Council of a number of resolutions on the right to privacy in the digital
age. 268
266. See further PRACTITIONERS’ GUIDE TO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT
(Daragh Murray et al. eds., 2016).
267. See infra Section V.B.
268. See generally Marko Milanovic, Human Rights Treaties and Foreign Surveillance: Privacy in
the Digital Age, 56 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 81 (2015). On tensions between the United States and the United Kingdom due to concerns that shared intelligence
may be misused, see Bradley Bamford, The United Kingdom’s “War against Terrorism,” 16 TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 737 (2004); Richard J. Aldrich, US-European Intelligence
Co-operation on Counter-Terrorism: Low Politics and Compulsion, 11 BRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 122 (2009).
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Some States in multinational military operations, such as the United
States and Australia, may, as a matter of fact, be subject to less exacting scrutiny of their compliance with relevant human rights treaties than others, such
as Belgium, France, or the United Kingdom, which have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights. Even so, because of the close relationships inherent in cooperation in multinational operations, it is inevitable that the increased level of scrutiny by the European
Court will also have effects even on non-European partner States. 269 The
same will increasingly be true for other human rights systems, such as the
Inter-American one. Questions of intelligence sharing in multinational military operations will undoubtedly be litigated more frequently before both
domestic courts and international institutions applying human rights law,
generating significant legal risks for States. 270
In the remainder of this Section, I will, therefore, first look at whether
an IHRL complicity rule exists and then examine its culpability element. Finally, I will discuss the extraterritoriality issue in more detail. These are, in
my view, the key pivots on which the practical relevance of this rule will turn.
2.

Is There an IHRL-Specific Complicity Rule?

The question of the existence of an IHRL-specific complicity rule is very
similar to that of the IHL rule examined above. As with IHL, an IHRL complicity rule is not explicit in the text of any treaty but could, in principle, apply
not only in the inter-State context but also to State assistance to non-State
actors. 271 As with IHL, the architecture of IHRL recognizes both negative
and positive obligations of States, viz., the duties to respect, protect, and
fulfill human rights. Unlike the IHL duty to “ensure respect,” however, the
IHRL duty of protection is both broad and incontestable; indeed, it has generated so much jurisprudence that there is less need for a negative complicity
rule. 272 Also, unlike IHL, which for the most part possesses unity at least as
269. See Letts, supra note 1, at 14.
270. See Nottingham Workshop Report, supra note 10, at 39.
271. Various examples in emerging jurisprudence are discussed below. Note that an
IHRL-specific complicity rule does not logically require that non-State actors must themselves be directly bound by IHRL, which is a topic of some complexity—in other words,
there is no need for a parallelism of obligations requirement of the kind found in Article 16
ASR, whose purpose is to safeguard State sovereignty and the pacta tertiis rule. See further
Andreas Th Müller, Human Rights Obligations of Armed Groups, in THE “LEGAL PLURIVERSE,”
supra note 2, at 444; Boutin, supra note 1, at 541.
272. See generally Shelton & Gould, supra note 263.
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a matter of customary law, IHRL is a fragmented regime, with different treaties with different sets of parties and different authoritative interpreters, and
its customary substrate is less clear. It is thus to an extent a misnomer to
speak of an IHRL-specific complicity rule—variants of such a rule can be
specific to and differ in their elements between treaties such as the ICCPR,
the ECHR, the American Convention on Human Rights, the Convention
Against Torture (CAT), and so forth. That said, the “respect,” “ensure,” “secure,” or “protect” language of all these treaties is broad enough to be easily
interpreted as including a negative duty of States not to be complicit in human
rights violations by third parties. 273
A State violates the negative duty to respect human rights if an action
infringing on human rights is attributable to it. A State violates the positive
duty to protect on the basis of an (attributable) omission—that is, a failure
of the State’s organs or agents to exercise due diligence and take all reasonably feasible measures to prevent or stop an infringement on human rights
by another State or by a non-State actor. The vast majority of human rights
violations litigated before international human rights bodies are of the negative duty to respect. 274 However, human rights bodies have developed a longstanding, sophisticated jurisprudence on the substantive positive duty to protect (or ensure) human rights, pioneered by the Inter-American and European Courts. 275 That case law contains rules on, for example, the thresholds
of knowledge of the risk of harm that trigger a protective duty, rules that
have been applied broadly, from risks to the lives of specific persons to pervasive environmental harms. 276
But the sheer breadth of these positive obligations has meant that human
rights bodies have generally not found it necessary or useful to articulate
273. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 8, at 198 (no reason why Article 1 ECHR “cannot be
interpreted to include a prohibition on participation in rights violations carried out by other
actors”); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 3, at 32; Juan E. Méndez, Report of the
Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, ¶ 48 U.N. Doc A/HRC/25/60 (April 10, 2014).
274. See Marko Milanovic, Special Rules of Attribution of Conduct in International Law, 96
INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 295, 315–16 (2020).
275. See, e.g., Velásquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 4, ¶ 172 (July 29, 1988); Osman v. United Kingdom, App. No. 23452/94, ¶¶
115–16 (1998) (ECtHR), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58257; Human Rights
Committee, General Comment No. 36 (2018) on Article 6 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, on the Right to Life, ¶¶ 18–22, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36
(Oct. 30, 2018) [hereinafter General Comment No. 36].
276. See further Stoyanova, supra note 40.
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theories of complicity. This is compounded by the tendency of some of these
bodies—primarily the European Court—to elide the distinction between
negative and positive obligations when dealing with situations in which immediate human rights violations prima facie appear to be committed by nonState actors. 277 For example, to this day it remains unclear whether the European Court’s case law on northern Cyprus directly holds Turkey responsible for the conduct of the separatist pro-Turkish authorities, that is whether
a negative violation of the duty to respect is being attributed to Turkey or
whether Turkey is being held responsible for failing to secure human rights
and prevent violations by the separatist entity. The same goes, for instance,
for the relationship between Russia and the Transnistrian separatists in Moldova and Abkhazian and South Ossetian separatists in Georgia. 278
In short, human rights bodies have yet to produce a line of cases that
unambiguously adopt a complicity theory stemming from the negative duty
to respect human rights as the responsibility frame distinct from both the
direct attribution of the human rights violation and the responsibility for
failing to prevent it. 279 But that jurisprudence appears to be emerging. For
instance, in its General Comment No. 36 the Human Rights Committee held
that States “have obligations under international law not to aid or assist activities undertaken by other States and non-State actors that violate the right
to life.” 280 But even though this looks like the articulation of an ICCPR complicity rule, the Committee, in fact, said nothing about the fault and causality
elements of this rule, while the footnote at the end of that sentence refers
readers to Article 16 ASR and the ICJ’s examination of complicity in the

277. See further James Crawford & Amelia Keene, The Structure of State Responsibility under
the European Convention on Human Rights, in THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS AND GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW 178 (Anne van Aaken & Iulia Motoc eds.,
2018).
278. See Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995); Cyprus v. Turkey, 2001IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1; Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2004-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 179;
Catan and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2012-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 309. See further Milanovic,
Special Rules of Attribution, supra note 274, at 342–47.
279. For an argument that IHRL could develop such a rule, focused on torture but
generalizable to all human rights violations, see Miles Jackson, Freeing Soering: The ECHR,
State Complicity in Torture and Jurisdiction, 27 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
817 (2016).
280. General Comment No. 36, supra note 275, ¶ 63.
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Bosnian Genocide case. 281 To my knowledge, no individual case of the Committee deals with complicity directly. 282
On the other hand, in the European Court, a developing line of cases
deals with States assisting violations by other States or by non-State actors
with “acquiescence or connivance.” This line of cases originated in the
Court’s 2001 judgment in the inter-State case of Cyprus v. Turkey, in which it
held that “the acquiescence or connivance of the authorities of a Contracting
State in the acts of private individuals which violate the Convention rights
of other individuals within its jurisdiction may engage that State’s responsibility under the Convention.” 283 That case and its progeny used the “acquiescence or connivance” language in describing the relationship between a
State and a prima facie non-State actor directly committing the human rights
violation at issue. 284 But in the 2012 Grand Chamber El-Masri judgment and
four subsequent Chamber judgments, the Court used that same language in
describing the behavior of Macedonia, Poland, Lithuania, and Romania in
providing assistance to U.S. rendition and torture of suspected terrorists during the “war on terror.” 285 As a doctrinal matter, these judgments are hardly
a model of clarity; the Court seems to be vacillating between attributing the
conduct of U.S. agents to the assisting States, finding them at fault for failing
to prevent the wrongful conduct of third parties, and grounding responsibil-

281. Id. at 20 n.254.
282. I will not be discussing here complicity-type scenarios (such as rendition) addressed by the Committee in its consideration of State party reports, because these do not
sufficiently articulate and develop formal complicity doctrines. See, e.g., Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report of Romania, ¶¶ 33–34, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/ROU/CO/5 (2017).
283. Cyprus v. Turkey, supra note 278, ¶ 81.
284. See further Marko Milanovic, State Acquiescence or Connivance in the Wrongful Conduct of
Third Parties in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, in SECONDARY RULES OF
PRIMARY IMPORTANCE: ATTRIBUTION, CAUSALITY, STANDARD OF REVIEW AND EVIDENTIARY RULES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Gabor Kajtar, Basak Cali & Marko Milanovic eds.,
forthcoming 2021) (manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3454007.
285. See El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2012-VI Eur. Ct.
H.R. 263, ¶ 206; Al Nashiri v. Poland, App. No. 28761/11, ¶¶ 452, 517 (2014) (ECtHR),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-146044; Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, App.
No. 7511/13, ¶¶ 449, 512 (2014) (ECtHR), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-146047;
Al Nashiri v. Romania, App. No. 33234/12, ¶¶ 594, 676–77, 690 (2018) (ECtHR),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-183685; Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania, App. No.
46454/11, ¶¶ 581, 641–42, 656 (2018) (ECtHR), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001183687.
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ity in complicity. Indeed it is probably complicity that provides the best conceptual frame here, as is most evident from the four Chamber judgments,
which expressly speak of Poland’s, Lithuania’s, and Romania’s responsibility
for complicity and for enabling the wrongful conduct of U.S. authorities. 286 The
European Court thus seems to be applying an emerging ECHR-specific
complicity doctrine that covers State assistance to both State and non-State
actors committing human rights violations, even if the exact parameters of
that doctrine remain unclear. 287
The complicity jurisprudence of other human rights bodies is even less
clear. For example, an older Human Rights Committee case appeared to use
State acquiescence as an attribution rule rather than as a separate type of
complicity-based responsibility. 288 The Inter-American Commission’s and
Court’s jurisprudence similarly seem to be vacillating between conceptualizing State support to the wrongful conduct of third parties as a failure to prevent violations 289 and as a basis for attribution. 290 The same goes for the
African Commission. 291 Generally speaking, it is only those treaties dealing
with human rights violations that constitute international crimes, such as tor-

286. Al Nashiri v. Poland, supra note 285, operative paras. 5–6; Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v.
Poland, supra note 285, operative paras. 5–6; Al Nashiri v. Romania, supra note 285, operative
paras. 5–6; Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania, supra note 285, operative paras. 6–7.
287. For an extended analysis, see Milanovic, State Acquiescence or Connivance, supra note
284. See also Nina Jørgensen, Complicity in Torture in a Time of Terror: Interpreting the European
Court of Human Rights Extraordinary Rendition Cases, 16 CHINESE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 11 (2017).
288. U.N. Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 1416/2005, Mohammed
Alzery v. Sweden, ¶ 11.6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005 (Nov. 10, 2006).
289. See Velásquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, supra note 275, ¶ 173.
290. See Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations, Costs, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 134, Judgment, ¶¶ 120–23 (Sept. 15, 2005). See further JACKSON,
supra note 8, at 190–99; LANOVOY, supra note 11, at 328.
291. See African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, General Comment No.
3 on The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The Right to Life, (Article 4), ¶
9 (2015), https://www.achpr.org/legalinstruments/detail?id=10 [hereinafter African Commission, General Comment No. 3] (“A State can be held responsible for killings by nonState actors if it approves, supports or acquiesces in those acts or if it fails to exercise due diligence
to prevent such killings or to ensure proper investigation and accountability.” (emphasis
added)).
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ture and enforced disappearance, that specifically mention (individual) complicity, 292 but the relevant treaty bodies have not articulated clear doctrines
of State complicity. 293
However, all human rights bodies have produced voluminous and substantially similar jurisprudence on the IHRL non-refoulement principle, particularly in the context of the right to life and the prohibition of torture and
other forms of ill-treatment. 294 As explained above, liability in such cases
accrues merely from the State transferring an individual to some other State
or entity despite a real risk of harm, even if the harm ultimately does not
materialize. 295 The IHRL non-refoulement rule is thus inchoate and not one
of complicity as such, but it is nonetheless relevant. If States are prepared to
accept that exposing individuals to the risk of serious harm can in and of
itself violate human rights even if the risk does not materialize, then a fortiori
they would accept that providing to a third-party assistance that causally contributes to harms also violates human rights.
To conclude, an IHRL-specific (or treaty-specific) complicity rule is supported by emerging (if insufficiently clear) case law. 296 That human rights
bodies have not yet systematically articulated and applied such a doctrine is
best explained by the breadth of the positive duty of prevention, which is
long established in their jurisprudence. 297 But no reason of principle would
292. For example, Article 1 CAT requires “torture” for the purpose of the Convention
to be “inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity,” while Article 4 requires States to criminalize torture and any “act by any person which constitutes complicity or participation in
torture.” Similarly, Article 2 of the Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance requires the offender to be “acting with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State,” while Article 3 requires States to investigate such conduct and
under Article 6 punish anyone who is an “accomplice” to the offense.
293. See, e.g., Committee against Torture, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, General Comment No. 2, ¶ 18, U.N.
Doc. CAT/C/GC/2 (2008) (referring in one breath to complicity by State officials and their
failure to exercise due diligence).
294. See, e.g., Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 439 (1989); African
Commission, General Comment No. 3, supra note 291, ¶ 40. See further JACKSON, supra note
8, at 198–99; EMAN HAMDAN, THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-REFOULEMENT UNDER THE
ECHR AND THE UN CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR
DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT (2016).
295. See AUST, supra note 6, at 396.
296. See also Nottingham Workshop Report, supra note 10, at 29.
297. On the other hand, IHRL complicity discourse has been very prominent in an area
marked by an absence of “hard” legal obligations, viz. corporate complicity in human rights
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militate against it. On the contrary, such a rule could lead to greater descriptive and conceptual accuracy and hence to greater certainty and predictability. It could enhance human rights bodies’ ability to apportion blameworthiness, providing them with the language to express variability in the stigma
attached to human rights violations as a midway point on a spectrum that
ranges from the “mere” failure to diligently protect an individual to the direct
attribution of the violation to the State. 298 It could also feed more rigorously
into their decision-making on the apportionment of damages and other
forms of reparation. Finally, and crucially for our purposes, the extraterritorial scope of application of an IHRL-specific complicity rule (on which more
below) that requires States only to refrain from assisting third parties committing human rights violations could be different—and broader—than that
of the otherwise far more onerous positive obligation to prevent such violations.
3.

Culpability in IHRL Complicity

Once IHRL complicity rule or rules become established, the question would
immediately arise of how to define the constituent elements of such rules, in
particular the culpability element. Here the analysis can reasonably follow
that of the IHL-specific complicity rule. 299 First, at a minimum, the culpability element must include all of the modes of fault in the generally applicable
Article 16 ASR rule: purpose/direct intent, oblique or indirect intent, and
situations of willful blindness but for which the State would be acting with
oblique intent. An IHRL culpability rule cannot be stricter than the generally
applicable one.
Second, that default culpability element should extend to complicity in
all possible human rights violations, regardless of the nature of the right affected or the magnitude of the violation.
Third, complicity in serious human rights violations, the level of seriousness depending on either the nature of the right protected or possibly the
systematic character of the violation, could warrant a lower, risk-based form
of fault. 300 We have seen how the IHRL non-refoulement rule already provides for such a risk-based form of fault but only for exposures to a real risk
abuses. See generally ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE
ACTORS 195–268 (2006).
298. See JACKSON, supra note 8, at 198.
299. See supra Sections III.B.4–5.
300. Cf. AUST, supra note 6, at 397; Boutin, supra note 1, at 541.
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of grave harm to the person. This is a good example of how risk-based responsibility goes hand in hand with the severity of the underlying violation.
That rule has only exceptionally been applied outside the contexts of the
right to life and the prohibition of torture and other forms of ill-treatment.
When it has been so applied, the human rights bodies doing so have generally
elevated the threshold of violation, for example, requiring risk of a flagrant
violation of the right to a fair trial. 301
Culpability on a sliding scale for complicity in IHRL violations that
would depend on their severity or systematic character would thus be consistent with prior jurisprudence and would strike a reasonable balance between preventing harm and the risk of inhibiting beneficial cooperation between States (and non-State actors). 302 Therefore, a State would be liable if
it actively assisted a violation of the right to life, the right to health, or the
prohibition of ill-treatment by another State or a non-State actor if the assisting State knew 303 of a real risk that such a violation would happen and
that its assistance would be used in it and the violation does, in fact, happen
and the assistance does contribute to it. 304 A State would similarly be liable

301. See, e.g., Othman (Abu Qatada) v. United Kingdom, 2012-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 159, ¶¶
231–35, 263–67 (holding that a non-refoulement obligation arises under Article 5 ECHR
(liberty of person) and Article 6 (fair trial) but only for flagrant breaches of these rights).
302. See also JACKSON, supra note 279, at 829. See also Méndez, supra note 273, ¶ 52
(importance of the prohibition of torture warrants a different, more lenient, culpability
standard than the generally applicable one).
303. See supra note 249 on why the test should at least primarily be subjective rather
than objective—that is, what the State should have known. For a good example of relevant
State officials not knowing (early enough) subjectively of a risk of serious human rights
violations by their partner that they should have been aware of objectively, see New Zealand’s engagement with the CIA. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF INTELLIGENCE
AND SECURITY, INQUIRY INTO POSSIBLE NEW ZEALAND INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY
AGENCIES’ ENGAGEMENT WITH THE CIA DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PROGRAMME 2001–2009: PUBLIC REPORT, ¶¶ 116–21 (2019), https://cryptome.org/2019/
09/NZ-CIA-Detention-Programme.pdf [hereinafter NZOIGIS REPORT]. For an argument
that the relevant standard should be constructive knowledge, see Méndez, supra note 273, ¶
53, endorsed tentatively in the REPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT INQUIRY INTO OPERATION
BURNHAM AND RELATED MATTERS 308 (July 2020), https://operationburnham.inquiry.govt.nz/inquiry-report/.
304. See ARMS TRANSFER DECISIONS—A PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 250, at 10.
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if it assisted the systematic violation of other rights, such as the freedom of
expression or privacy. 305
4.

Extraterritorial IHRL Complicity

As things stand, the principal problem regarding the practical utility of an
IHRL complicity rule is not its lack of determinacy but its extraterritorial
scope. Scenarios in which a State provides assistance to State or non-State
actors operating on its own territory, as in the Strasbourg extraordinary rendition and CIA black site cases examined above, are relatively straightforward—the issue is how to label them (as complicity or as a breach of due
diligence) and with what consequences for reparation, not whether a violation would exist. The genuinely difficult scenarios are those in which a State
facilitates the commission of a human rights violation outside its own territory. Consider, for example, the facts of the Belhaj case. In 2004, the UK
secret services shared intelligence about Mr. Belhaj with the CIA and Libya,
information that led to his arrest by Malaysian officials in Kuala Lumpur,
transfer to and arrest by Thai authorities in Bangkok, and subsequent rendition by U.S. authorities to Libya, where he and his pregnant wife were detained and tortured. 306 The violations of their human rights were committed
in an extended causal chain in which at least five separate States participated.
Some of that participation (e.g., arbitrary arrest and detention) would separately constitute human rights violations.
But other contributions, such as the UK act of sharing intelligence, can
only be conceptualized as complicity. After prolonged domestic litigation, 307
the UK government settled out of court with Mr. Belhaj and his wife and

305. Again, as with IHL, I do not wish to engage further in developing a precise definition of serious violations of IHRL. A single act of torture or unlawful killing would constitute such a violation, whereas a single violation of privacy would not; however, a systematic violation of privacy (e.g., through a mass surveillance program without any safeguards)
could be classified as serious. For a much more extended discussion of the notion, see supra
note 244; CASEY-MASLEN ET AL., supra note 221, ¶¶ 7.50–82.
306. See Ian Cobain & Owen Bowcott, Settlement in Abdel Hakim Belhaj Rendition Case to
Be Announced, THE GUARDIAN (May 9, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2018/may/09/settlement-in-abdul-hakim-belhaj-rendition-case-to-be-announced.
307. For two of the cases in this multifaceted set of proceedings that had actually
reached the UK Supreme Court, see Belhaj & Another v. Straw & Others [2017] UKSC 3 and
Belhaj & Anor v. DPP [2018] UKSC 33. Neither deals with issues directly relevant to our
discussion.
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apologized for its participation in the wrongs they suffered. 308 In doing so,
however, the UK government admitted no legal liability and framed its (not
necessarily unlawful) wrongdoing merely as a failure adequately to mitigate
risk: “The UK Government’s actions contributed to your detention, rendition and suffering. The UK Government shared information about you with
its international partners. We should have done more to reduce the risk that
you would be mistreated. We accept this was a failing on our part.” 309
This (one imagines heavily lawyered) statement appears to be using the
language of complicity with a risk-based mode of fault but again admits no
legal liability. In particular, the UK government did not admit that relevant
human rights treaties, such as the CAT and the ECHR, even applied extraterritorially to someone in Mr. Belhaj’s situation—that is, that they cover a
situation of State complicity through the sharing of intelligence when the
person at risk of harm is located outside the State’s territory. 310
The extraterritoriality issue is absolutely pivotal for addressing complicity
scenarios in multinational military operations. At least from the perspective
of powerful, interventionist States, the majority of operations in which States
may share intelligence with State and non-State partners will take place outside their borders. Human rights bodies are yet to deal expressly in their case
law with such extraterritorial complicity scenarios. 311 Note in that regard that
308. See 640 Parl Deb HC (6th ser.) (2018) col. 926 (UK), https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2018-05-10/debates/B9AD50CD-9D54-41DA-A18B-1526E7658593
/BelhajAndBoudcharLitigationUpdate (statement of UK Attorney General, Jeremy Wright;
the government agreed to pay Mr. Belhaj’s wife £500,000 in compensation; Belhaj himself
requested no compensation).
309. Id.
310. A similar example is the United Kingdom’s involvement in the extraordinary rendition of Binyam Mohamed, which allegedly included the sharing of intelligence and the
feeding of questions to the officials of States using torture or other forms of ill-treatment.
See further Binyam Mohamed, THE RENDITION PROJECT, https://www.therenditionproject.org.uk/prisoners/binyam-mohamed.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2021). See also Binyam
Mohamed v. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [2010] EWCA (Civ) 65 (Court of Appeal decision allowing the publication of intelligence material shared by the United States with the
United Kingdom confirming that Mohamed was ill-treated).
311. There is to my knowledge only one isolated exception, an obscure admissibility
decision of the now-defunct European Commission on Human Rights in Tugar v. Italy,
which dealt with an Italian sale of land mines to Iraq, and which the Commission found to
be inadmissible as the arms sale was causally too far removed from the injury to the applicants. Tugar v. Italy, App. No. 22869/93, Eur. Comm. H.R. Dec. (1995), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-2342. The decision has not been cited in any subsequent judgment or admissibility decision of the European Court. In a similar vein, see the judgment of
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the non-refoulement cases are not genuinely extraterritorial (nor, again, are
they strictly about a form of complicity). The individual being transferred is
actually located within the territory of the transferring State—it is the risk to
the individual that is extraterritorial, but the violation is the act of transfer. 312
The issue, therefore, is how the principles developed in the jurisprudence so
far can be applied to scenarios of extraterritorial complicity.
The extant extraterritoriality jurisprudence of human rights bodies has
coalesced around two basic tests that revolve around the interpretation of
the concept of State jurisdiction in human rights treaties. The treaties are
regarded as applying outside a State’s territory when, first, the State exercises
effective overall control over a portion of the territory of some other State,
and second, its agents exercise authority, power, or control over an individual. 313 In the context of military operations, in particular, case law is clear
that any individual detained by a State outside its territory will be protected
by IHRL, but it is less clear when it comes to purely kinetic operations without territorial control (e.g., aerial bombardment or drone strikes). The overall
trend in the case law has been towards a more expansive and factual approach, but the jurisprudence (especially that of the European Court) remains internally inconsistent and riven with arbitrary distinctions. The expansive trend has also encountered some resistance among States, especially
powerful, interventionist States. 314
Under current case law, State assistance to State or non-State actors who
are operating in a territory controlled by that State, even if it is not the lawful
sovereign of that territory, would clearly be covered by the spatial conception
of jurisdiction. Thus, for example, if Russia, with the requisite degree of culpability, provided money, weapons, or intelligence to separatists in Abkhazia
the High Court of England and Wales holding that the transfer of a lethal drug from the
United Kingdom to the United States, where it would be used for the execution of an individual sentenced to death, does not trigger the applicability of the ECHR. R (Zagorski and
Baze) v. Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills and Another [2010] EWHC
(Admin) 3110 [57].
312. See Bankovic and Others v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, ¶ 68. There are,
however, genuine cases of extraterritorial non-refoulement, for example when the individual
is located in an embassy, military prison abroad, or a vessel on the high seas of the returning
State. See, e.g., Al-Saadoon v. United Kingdom, 2010-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 61; Hirsi Jamaa v.
Italy, 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R. 97.
313. See generally Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 99;
sources cited in supra note 264.
314. See further Marko Milanovic, Surveillance and Cyber Operations, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EXTRATERRITORIAL HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS (Mark Gibney et al. eds.,
forthcoming 2021) (manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3708440.
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and South Ossetia on the territory of Georgia that causally contributed to
human rights violations by these actors, the ECHR would apply if Russia
controlled that territory. 315 Or, if during the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. or UK authorities provided assistance to non-State actors operating in areas under their control, which was then used to violate human rights,
the relevant human rights treaties would have applied.
But in most complicity scenarios, as in the Belhaj example above, the assisting State will not control the territory where the victims of human rights
violations are located. In such a situation, complicity could be examined under the personal model of jurisdiction—would the act of State assistance be
regarded as authority, power, or control over the victim? The problem with
that construction is that it is the direct perpetrator of the human rights violation that is exercising authority, power, or control over the victim, even if
such concepts are interpreted broadly. 316 And under the most restrictive jurisprudence on the personal model, that of the European Court, even dropping a bomb on someone would not constitute an act of control; a fortiori,
neither could assisting a third party that then drops the bomb. 317
But the European Court’s restrictive position is not necessarily the correct one even for ECHR purposes; it may change in the future, and it has
not been emulated by other human rights bodies. An alternative position,
one that I have long advocated, is that the personal model inevitably collapses into the propositions that any State act that substantively violates human rights is an exercise of authority, power, or control over the victim and
that negative obligations of restraint—including the duty to refrain from assisting others committing violations—should apply without any territorial
315. See Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea), App. Nos. 20958/14 & 38334/18 (2014) (ECtHR), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-207622 (holding that Russia was in control of
Crimea and that therefore the ECHR applied in the area).
316. See also JACKSON, supra note 279, at 821; Nottingham Workshop Report, supra note
10, at 24.
317. See Bankovic; supra note 312; Georgia v. Russia No. 2, App. No. 38263/08 (2021)
(ECtHR), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-207757 (holding that ECHR does not apply to kinetic operations in the course of the active hostilities phase of an international
armed conflict). For further discussion, see Marko Milanovic, Georgia v. Russia No. 2: The
European Court’s Resurrection of Bankovic in the Contexts of Chaos, EJIL:TALK! (Jan. 25, 2021),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/georgia-v-russia-no-2-the-european-courts-resurrection-of-banko
vic-in-the-contexts-of-chaos/. See also Human Rights Watch Inc & Ors v. The Secretary of
State for the Foreign & Commonwealth Office & Ors, [2016] UKIPTrib 15-165-CH (UK
Investigatory Powers Tribunal holding that the ECHR does not apply to UK surveillance
activities abroad, relying explicitly on a Bankovic analogy).
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restriction. 318 An instructive example in that regard is the recent judgment of
the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany in which it held that the privacy guarantees of the German Basic Law apply to any surveillance activities
by German security services abroad because the organs of the German State
are comprehensively bound to respect fundamental rights. 319 That rationale
would be equally valid for an extraterritorial complicity scenario, even with
due caution that the Court’s decision was based on a domestic instrument
that contains no jurisdiction clause.
A further alternative is the functional model of jurisdiction, which conceptualizes it as control not over the victim but over the victim’s ability to
enjoy their human rights. 320 The most prominent proponent of this doctrine
is the Human Rights Committee, 321 although a variant thereof has also been
endorsed by the Committee on the Rights of the Child. 322 The Human Rights
Committee thus held that under the ICCPR:
a State party has an obligation to respect and ensure the rights under article
6 of all persons who are within its territory and all persons subject to its
jurisdiction, that is, all persons over whose enjoyment of the right to life it
exercises power or effective control. This includes persons located outside
any territory effectively controlled by the State whose right to life is nonetheless affected by its military or other activities in a direct and reasonably
foreseeable manner. States also have obligations under international law

318. See MILANOVIC, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREAsupra note 264, at 124–26, 209–22.
319. Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) [Federal Constitutional Court] May 19, 2020,
1 BvR 2835/17, ¶ 87, https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2020/05/rs20200519_1bvr283517en.htm (official English translation) [hereinafter 1 BvR 2835/17] (“The fundamental rights of the Basic Law are binding upon the
Federal Intelligence Service and the legislator that sets out its powers, irrespective of
whether the Federal Intelligence Service is operating within Germany or abroad. The protection afforded by Art. 10(1) and Art. 5(1) second sentence GG also applies to telecommunications surveillance of foreigners in other countries.”).
320. See Nottingham Workshop Report, supra note 10, at 25.
321. See General Comment No. 36, supra note 275, ¶ 63; U.N. Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 3042/2017, A.S. and Others v. Italy, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/130/
DR/3042/2017 (Jan. 27, 2021) (Italy bound to rescue shipwrecked migrants in the Mediterranean).
322. See U.N. Human Rights Committee, Communications Nos. 79/2019, 109/2019,
L.H. et al v. France, U.N. Doc CRC/C/85/D/79/2019–CRC/C/85/D/109/2019 (Nov.
2, 2020) (France has obligations vis-à-vis French children in Kurdish-controlled camps in
Syria).
TIES
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not to aid or assist activities undertaken by other States and non-State actors that violate the right to life. 323

Note how the Committee immediately follows its holding on extraterritoriality with its position on complicity. We can therefore reasonably assume
that the Committee thought that State assistance to a third party that directly
and reasonably foreseeably contributes to the third party’s violation of the
right to life would be within the extraterritorial scope of the Covenant—in
essence, that the assisting State also has power or control over the victim’s
enjoyment of the right to life, a power that it can exercise by refraining from
providing the assistance. There is, in short, very little daylight between this
theory and the one I advocated above, that negative duties of restraint should
apply without restriction. Some of the Committee’s prior case law seems to
support that construction. 324
To conclude, the extraterritoriality jurisprudence of human rights bodies
is constantly evolving, and is doing so in a more expansive direction. For
example, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has recently ruled that
persons affected by emissions of transboundary environmental harms would
be within the jurisdiction of the State from which the emissions came. 325
This trend has met with pushback from some States, and the European
Court remains an outlier with its more restrictive jurisprudence, especially in
situations of international armed conflict. 326 It seems reasonably clear that
extraterritorial complicity scenarios would require at least some departure

323. General Comment No. 36, supra note 275, ¶ 63.
324. See U.N. Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 1539/2006, Munaf v.
Romania, ¶ 14.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/96/DR/1539/2006 (July 13, 2009) (A State party
“may be responsible for extra-territorial violations of the Covenant, if it is a link in the causal
chain that would make possible violations in another jurisdiction. Thus, the risk of an extraterritorial violation must be a necessary and foreseeable consequence and must be judged
on the knowledge the State party had at the time.”). See also Juan E. Méndez, Interim Report
of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, ¶ 28, U.N. Doc. A/70/303 (August 7, 2015) (“States’ negative obligations
under the Convention [Against Torture] are not per se spatially limited or territorially defined”).
325. See The Environment and Human Rights (Articles 4(1) and 5(1) in Relation to
Articles 1(1) and 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC23/17, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser A) No. 23 (Nov. 17, 2017).
326. See Georgia v. Russia No. 2, supra note 317. For more expansive approaches, see, e.g.,
General Comment No. 36, supra note 275; African Commission, General Comment No. 3,
supra note 291, ¶ 14. See further Milanovic, Surveillance and Cyber Operations, supra note 314.
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from the European Court’s current jurisprudence, but that is perfectly possible—and again, other human rights bodies have never embraced Strasbourg’s restrictiveness. 327
If, in short, a human rights body was faced with a scenario in which State
A provided assistance to State or non-State actor B, knowing that this assistance would facilitate serious human rights violations and this in fact happens, it seems to me substantially more likely than not that the extraterritoriality issue would be resolved in a more expansive direction—at least eventually. 328 Imagine, for instance, a case in which it could be established that a
State supplied hacking tools or other assistance to a non-State hacker group
that then used these tools to launch a cyber attack against a hospital in another country. Or, consider the currently pending inter-State case between
the Netherlands and Ukraine against Russia before the European Court regarding the downing of the MH17 airliner over Ukraine; the Court may well
choose to examine the case from the standpoint of Russia’s complicity in
providing the pro-Russian rebels in Ukraine with an antiaircraft missile system. 329 And even under its current restrictive approach, the Court has found
the positive procedural obligation to investigate to be triggered extraterritorially even if the underlying violation was not regarded as within the State’s
jurisdiction, a position that the Court could easily adapt by analogy to an
extraterritorial complicity scenario. 330
D. Risk, Mitigation, and Balancing
The generally applicable complicity rule in Article 16 ASR and the IHL- and
IHRL-specific complicity rules all raise two further important questions.
327. See also JACKSON, supra note 279, at 822–28.
328. But see Yael Ronen, International Human Rights Law and Extraterritorial Hostilities, in
THE “LEGAL PLURIVERSE,” supra note 2, at 198 (arguing against extraterritorial application).
329. Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia, App. Nos. 8019/16, 43800/14 &
28525/20 (case pending before the ECHR).
330. In other words, the Court could say that even if the ECHR did not apply to a
State’s provision of assistance that materially facilitated a human rights violation, it would
apply to the State’s duty to investigate whether it was so complicit. See Georgia v. Russia No.
2, supra note 317, ¶¶ 331–32; Hanan v. Germany, App. No. 4871/16, ¶¶ 134–45 (2021)
(ECtHR), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-208279. See further Marko Milanovic, Extraterritorial Investigations in Hanan v. Germany: Extraterritorial Assassinations in New Interstate Claim
Filed by Ukraine against Russia, EJIL:TALK! (Feb. 26, 2021), https://www.ejiltalk.org/extraterritorial-investigations-in-hanan-v-germany-extraterritorial-assassinations-in-new-interstate-claim-filed-by-ukraine-against-russia/.
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First, what precisely is the nature and role of the various measures of mitigation that an assisting State might take to reduce the risk that the assistance
it provides to its partners, such as intelligence, would be misused to commit
a wrongful act? Second, can the risk of harm caused by the assistance be
balanced against the benefits of providing the assistance or against the harm
potentially caused by interrupting it?
Turning first to mitigation measures, it is important to note that these
can take many different forms. The nature of these measures will depend
greatly on whether the assistance is being provided in the context of an isolated, “one-off” situation or is part of a more durable relationship of partnership and cooperation. Diplomatic assurances by the recipient, 331 coupled
with caveats and conditions from the sender of information, as well as confidential bilateral communications to exert pressure and employ monitoring
mechanisms, are standard practice. 332 Also common, especially as part of
continuing and wide-ranging cooperation arrangements, are capacity-building measures such as the provision of training by the assisting State, including training for compliance with applicable international law. 333 The U.S. and
UK armed forces, for example, have provided such training to Saudi Arabia
in order to promote its compliance with international humanitarian law during the conflict in Yemen. 334 But the indispensable first mitigation measure
actually seems to be for the assisting State to adequately train its own officials

331. See, e.g., Othman (Abu Qatada) v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8139/09, ¶ 189
(2012) (ECtHR), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-108629 (assurances must be specific
rather than general and vague; must be given by a person vested with sufficient authority;
must take into account the issuing State’s record of compliance; should be mechanisms of
verification).
332. See further NZOIGIS REPORT, supra note 303, ¶¶ 223–39; Howard, supra note 1, at
46–47.
333. See further CASEY-MASLEN ET AL., supra note 221, ¶¶ 7.88–7.89; Moynihan, supra
note 11, at 41–44; Finucane, supra note 204, at 425–30; Wiesener, supra note 211, at 49–50.
334. See Saudi Arabia: Overseas Aid, Ministerial Answer to a Written Question in Parliament (Oct. 19, 2020), https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2020-10-13/102833; Dan Sabbagh, UK Spent £2.4m to Help Saudi Arabia Comply with
International Law, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 13, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2021/jan/13/uk-spent-24m-to-help-saudi-arabia-comply-with-international-law;
Larry Lewis, Promoting Civilian Protection during Security Assistance: Learning from Yemen (CNA
Research Memorandum, 2019), https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/IRM-2019-U019749-Final.pdf.
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(intelligence, military or civilian, at all levels) who are making relevant decisions regarding the appreciation of both legal and factual risks. 335 Note, however, that some forms of mitigation, such as the direct involvement in the
partner’s targeting decisions for the ostensible purpose of reducing civilian
casualties, may actually escalate into forms of assistance to the partner’s
wrongful acts or even amount to the joint commission of such acts. 336
With all of these mitigation measures, which again are frequently employed, the key question will always be effectiveness—do they actually work
in practice, in their specific contexts? 337 This is a question of fact. There are
many instances in which such measures appear to have been far from effective—none more so than continuing apparent violations of IHL by Saudiled coalition forces in Yemen, 338 undoubtedly assisted as they are by various
forms of aid by third States, including the United States and the United Kingdom, violations that the mitigation measures these States have implemented

335. See NZOIGIS REPORT, supra note 303, ¶ 85 (“[I]t is necessary and appropriate for
civilians to understand the military processes accompanying their work and its legal framework, together with their responsibilities within it. Without this knowledge they are at a
disadvantage in terms of understanding and evaluating the processes they were part of. It is
difficult to question something that you do not adequately understand. The omission of
adequate and consistent New Zealand LOAC [Law of Armed Conflict] training and/or legal
briefings constituted a significant gap in the preparation of those deployed to Afghanistan,
and those seconded to partner agencies in support of their military efforts in Afghanistan.”).
See also id. ¶¶ 110, 333.
336. See Finucane, supra note 204, at 430; Wiesener, supra note 211, at 50. See also LANOVOY, supra note 11, at 157–58. Note that U.S. and UK officials have denied any direct
involvement in Saudi targeting decisions. See Phil Stewart, Exclusive: U.S. Withdraws Staff from
Saudi Arabia Dedicated to Yemen Planning, REUTERS, Aug. 19, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-usa-saudiarabia-idUSKCN10U1TL (“At no point did
U.S. military personnel provide direct or implicit approval of target selection or prosecution”); Answer to a Question in Parliament by The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence
(Mar. 7, 2019), https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/201903-07/229818 (“The RAF [Royal Air Force] personnel in the Saudi Air Operations Centre
are liaison officers, not ‘targeteers.’ They play no part in the targeting processes of the Saudi
Arabian Armed Forces.”). See also Nottingham Workshop Report, supra note 10, at 10.
337. For an extensive discussion of several case studies in that regard, see Erica L.
Gaston, Regulating Irregular Actors: Can Due Diligence Checks Mitigate the Risks of Working with
Non-State and Substate Forces? (Working Paper 608, 2021), https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/CSAG_Regulating_irregular_actors_WEB.pdf.
338. See, e.g., Report of the Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on
Yemen, Situation of Human Rights in Yemen, Including Violations and Abuses Since September 2014,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/45/6 (Sept. 28, 2020).
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have not stopped. 339 But more important than the factual question of effectiveness for my analysis here is the legal question of how such measures
should be conceptualized.
The answer to that question is reasonably clear. Mitigation measures are
relevant for the application of the fault and contribution elements of a complicity rule. As for the latter, the effect of mitigation measures could be such
that the assistance provided does not, in fact, substantially or materially contribute to the commission of the wrongful act. If mitigation is effective in
this sense, the wrongful act may still happen, but it will not be facilitated by
the aid provided, and the assisting State will therefore avoid responsibility.
But such cases will probably be rare, and the analysis will be fact-dependent.
It is primarily with regard to culpability that mitigation measures play a central role; this role will depend on how, precisely, the fault element is defined.
First, if the fault element is one of purpose/direct intent to facilitate,
mitigation measures undertaken by an assisting State may provide evidence
to some kind of external ex post facto reviewer, such as a court, 340 that the
assisting State did not purposely facilitate the wrong. This determination will
necessarily require an examination of whether the mitigation measures were
simply a sham that the assisting State engaged in to disguise its ulterior purpose. The eventual ineffectiveness of these measures does not, however, ipso
facto prove that they were such.
Second, if the culpability element is one of oblique/indirect intent, which
requires practical certainty that the assisted party will commit a wrongful act
and will use the assistance provided to do so, mitigation measures can lower
the probabilistic assessment of the future conduct of the assisted party below

339. For an extensive discussion, see Hursh, supra note 211; ÉRIC DAVID ET AL., OPINION ON THE LEGALITY OF ARMS TRANSFERS TO SAUDI ARABIA, THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COALITION MILITARILY INVOLVED IN YEMEN (2019),

https://ipisresearch.be/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/191209-Yemen-EN_WEB-2.pdf;
Oona A. Hathaway et al., Yemen: Is the U.S. Breaking the Law?, 10 HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL 1 (2019); Arron Merat, “The Saudis Couldn’t Do It Without Us”: The UK’s
True Role in Yemen’s Deadly War, THE GUARDIAN (June 18, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/18/the-saudis-couldnt-do-it-without-us-the-uks-true-role-in-ye
mens-deadly-war; Lewis, supra note 334, at 13–14 (Saudi coalition’s risk of civilian casualties
per operation has increased over time), 23 (generalized training as to IHL compliance often
ineffective); Diane Bernabei & Beth Van Schaack, State Dept. Inspector General Report: A Troubling Message on Arms Sales, JUST SECURITY (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/72188/state-dept-inspector-general-linick-saudi-arms-sales/.
340. See further infra Part IV.
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a practical certainty threshold. Internally, from the perspective of the relevant decision makers within the assisting State, they could assess that with
adequate mitigation, there would no longer be practical certainty that the
assisted State or non-State actor would engage in the wrongful conduct and
misuse the aid provided. 341 Similarly, from the external perspective of reviewing how the assisting State made its decisions, the reviewing person or
body can determine that the mitigation measures sufficiently lowered the
probability of the wrongful conduct occurring and its facilitation by the aid
provided, such that the assisting State did not subjectively act with practical
certainty. This determination will require an assessment of how effective the
mitigation measures were in practice, especially in the context of a continuing
relationship. However, the mere implementation of mitigation measures is
in itself sufficient evidence that the State actually did subjectively appreciate
a risk of violations by its partner to some degree of possibility. 342
Third, if the culpability element is one of willful blindness but for which
oblique intent would have existed, the question to be decided would be
whether the assisting State acted with the purpose of avoiding relevant information. Genuine mitigation measures could then be evidence that it did
not act with such purpose.
Fourth, if the fault element is one of appreciation of risk below the level
of practical certainty, however precisely defined, then (as with indirect intent
above) mitigation measures could lower the subjective probabilistic assessment of the future conduct of the assisted party below the prescribed threshold of risk. 343 In other words, if the threshold was one of likelihood, mitigation might mean that the wrong was perceived by the assisting State as no
longer likely; if it was one of a real or substantial risk, mitigation might mean
that the risk of the wrong occurring was no longer real or substantial. Again,
the key question would be one of the effectiveness of the measures implemented in reducing the risk, as subjectively perceived by the officials of the
assisting State. If, because of mitigation, the risk (at the level prescribed) is
no longer there, the State can continue providing its assistance. If, however,
341. See also Nottingham Workshop Report, supra note 10, at 19.
342. See Hursh, supra note 211, at 144–45.
343. See NZOIGIS REPORT, supra note 303, ¶ 242 (“Only after identifying likely or
actual circumstances, assessing the risk, and, if necessary, considering options for mitigation,
should a decision be taken on whether to proceed with the intelligence exchange or proposed assistance (e.g., at a detainee interview). If, despite taking appropriate steps in mitigation, there remains a real risk of torture, then best practice dictates that the exchange or
cooperation should not proceed. The information sharing or participation in a detainee interview should be suspended, deferred or cease altogether.”).
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mitigation measures are unable to lower the appreciated risk below the proscribed threshold, the State must discontinue the assistance, such as the provision of intelligence. 344
In sum, mitigation is tied inextricably with the fault element of the complicity rule, and its exact effects will also depend on whether the potential
fault of the assisting State is being assessed ex ante, before it provides its
assistance, or ex post, after it has already provided the assistance that did, in
fact, facilitate the wrongful act of its partner. 345 In the context of a continuing
relationship both kinds of assessments will be made repeatedly, for each new
instance of facilitation.
A different question, however, is whether the practical certainty or a risk
below certainty that the aid will facilitate a wrongful act can, once established,
be balanced against other considerations—that is, against the possible harms
that could arise from the suspension of assistance or the possible benefits
that the State could obtain from continuing the assistance. Put differently,
the question would be whether continuing with the assistance despite the
certainty or risk of harm that mitigation measures are unable to adequately
lower could ever be justified, for example, on the basis that the assisting State
would earn money from arms sales or would enhance the overall security
and welfare of its people by assisting its partner.
This type of justifiability problem is frequent, explicitly or implicitly, in
comparative practice when dealing with such modes of culpability as recklessness or dolus eventualis. The Model Penal Code, for example, defines recklessness as the conscious disregard of “a substantial and unjustifiable risk . .
. that involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a lawabiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.” 346 This clearly calls
for some kind of value judgment as to whether the risk taking was objectively
justifiable or reasonable 347 (a task that in common law systems will generally
be performed by lay juries) and, in turn, leads to all sorts of fundamental
moral problems. Consider, for example, the actions of a surgeon who is performing an operation to separate a pair of conjoined twins. If the operation
is not performed, both twins will certainly die. If it is performed, only one
344. See also de Wet, supra note 21, at 311–12.
345. See further infra Part IV.
346. MPC, supra note 69, § 2.02(2)(c).
347. See SIMESTER ET AL., supra note 51, at 148 (“[In the recklessness context the] question of what is reasonable is an objective question, and it is not an issue of whether the
defendant thought the risk was reasonable[;] . . . defendants cannot be permitted to judge
what is right for themselves.”).
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has a chance of survival; the other will certainly die. Is the surgeon intending
(in a legal sense) to kill the latter sibling by performing the operation because
she is practically certain that this twin will die and reconciles herself to this
inevitability in order to save the other? Is her action intentional but nonetheless justified by circumstances of necessity?—and so forth. 348 Or, in a different scenario in which the surgeon is operating with the knowledge that there
is a very high risk that the person would die during surgery because of bleeding, but also that there is no other way of saving their life beyond the short
term, is the surgeon consciously disregarding a substantial risk that the patient would die—that is, is she acting recklessly in potentially depriving the
patient of the remaining days, weeks, or months of life? 349 The same scenarios could also be postulated from a complicity perspective—for example,
that of a nurse assisting the surgeon.
In the philosophical literature, such hard cases expose the fault lines between different approaches to ethics. A consequentialist approach (e.g., utilitarianism) will look at the morality of the action on the basis of the consequences it produces—for example, whether more lives will be saved in the
process, or suffering minimized. A deontological approach will look at
whether harms are intended either as ends in themselves or as means to an
end or are mere side effects and may employ such notions as the doctrine of
double effect. 350 The moral intuitions of ordinary people will be all over the
place with regard to the different permutations of the hard cases, which the
philosophical literature continues to examine to this day.
In the criminal law context, such cases are normally dealt with either by
objective assessments of whether risk taking was unreasonable (i.e., during
the assessment of the existence of the elements of the offense) or through
348. See, e.g., A (Children) [2000] EWCA (Civ) 254. For a short account of the case, in
which two of the appellate judges relied on necessity and one judge on arguments about
intention in authorizing the procedure, see Catherine Baksi, Landmarks in Law: The Moral
Dilemma of Separating Conjoined Twins, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 1, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/law/2021/feb/01/landmarks-in-law-the-moral-dilemma-of-separating-conjoined
-twins. The judge presiding over the case said that it was the “most difficult decision I had
to make in my 24 years on the bench.” Id. See further Henry Brooke, Address at the Seventh
Worldwide Judiciary Conference, Washington, D.C.: A Life and Death Issue in English Law
(Oct. 12, 2015), https://sirhenrybrooke.me/2015/10/12/my-talk-about-the-conjoinedtwins-case/ (written by one of the other judges in the Court of Appeal).
349. See DUBBER, supra note 67, at 60. See also SIMESTER ET AL., supra note 51, at 144,
149.
350. See further Alison McIntyre, Doctrine of Double Effect, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed, 2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/double-effect/; Ohlin, supra note 95, at 116–23.
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the prism of justifications and excuses. 351 To take a good example that has
not aged terribly well:
Weigend raises the question whether a person, who has a cold, repeatedly
sneezes in a bus, being aware there may be a 95% chance of infecting another passenger with the flu virus, is reckless as to the bodily injury. As
Spencer pointed out, “it is not reckless for a person who is suffering from
an illness that is curable and minor, like a cold, or ordinary flu, or even
mumps or measles, to run the risk of transmitting it to others if it would
seriously disrupt the affairs of himself or other people to avoid it.” 352

What a difference a pandemic makes! In a new social context, with a
more serious and disruptive disease, what objectively looked like trivial harms
to others balanced out by substantial disruption to the infected individual
could today very well be regarded as reckless behavior. But the point I hope
is clear—some forms of risk taking will be regarded as reasonable and justifiable, depending on a normative assessment balancing competing harms
and interests. A surgeon attempting to save somebody’s life despite a risk of
bleeding would not generally be regarded as reckless. A driver on the highway exceeding the speed limit in order to rush a person in distress to the
hospital might also not be regarded as acting recklessly, and so on. 353 Even
in conditions of normalcy, people are not considered to be acting recklessly
when they drive their car, even though we all appreciate that there is always
a measure of risk in driving a car; the social utility of car-driving is regarded
as justifying the risk. 354
In international law, we may also address such cases either through explicit or implicit balancing rules within particular sub-regimes or through the
generally applicable circumstances precluding wrongfulness in the law of
State responsibility. Thus, for example, in IHL we accept that civilians may
be justifiably killed if the principles of distinction, precautions, and proportionality are complied with. 355 In IHRL, we may also permit certain deaths
of innocents as unwanted side effects in operations to save many more lives,
351. See SIMESTER ET AL., supra note 51, at 683–93; JACKSON, supra note 8, at 49.
352. BLOMSMA, supra note 95, at 138 (citing Weigend and Spencer).
353. See id. at 138–39.
354. This assessment is contingent—the societal assessment of the utility of the practice
may well evolve. If, for example, computer-driven cars in time become demonstrably safer
than human-driven ones, a driver taking control over the vehicle may eventually be regarded
as reckless.
355. See CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY, supra note 202, rr. 7, 14–16.
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for instance, those of hostages held by terrorists, but again only if all feasible
measures are taken to minimize the loss of human life (including among the
terrorists). 356 Even in the context of absolute rules, such as the prohibition
of torture, implicit balancing may be at play at the stage of defining the categorically prohibited conduct—we would therefore say that a police officer
shooting a detainee in the leg during an interrogation would be committing
torture, but would not think the same if the officer shot the detainee to prevent him from escaping arrest.
For our purposes, the question is whether some form of balancing is
admissible if a State provides assistance to its partner while appreciating certainty or some level of probability that the assistance will be used to commit
a wrong but is acting in order to prevent some other harm from materializing. Think, for example, of U.S. and UK authorities sharing intelligence with
militias in Iraq and Syria engaged in combat against the Islamic State while
being either practically certain or appreciating a substantial risk that this intelligence would be used to capture and torture detained ISIS fighters. 357 The
United States and the United Kingdom are acting not with the purpose of
facilitating the torture but of defeating ISIS and thus protecting the lives of
their soldiers and their allies, their own peoples, and the peoples of Iraq and
Syria. If the United States and the United Kingdom continue sharing the
intelligence, it is possible, likely, or inevitable that some captives will be tortured and that the intelligence will facilitate the torture. If they stop sharing
the intelligence, it is possible or likely that the war effort against ISIS will be
less effective and that more innocents may die as a result. Or, to go back to
the Saudi intervention in Yemen, the United States and the United Kingdom
could argue that their provision of weapons and intelligence to the Saudis
reduced the number of violations that would have happened in any event,
356. Cf. Finogenov and others v. Russia, 2011-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 365 (Dealing with the
siege of a Moscow theater in which hundreds were taken hostage by terrorists. The European Court ruling that there was no violation of the right to life on account of Russian
security forces pumping the theater with an anesthetic gas, resulting in the deaths of many
hostages, but that there was a violation due to inadequate medical relief efforts.); Tagayeva
& Others v. Russia, App. No. 26562/0 (2017) (EctHR), http://hudoc.echr.coeint/
eng?i=001-172660 (Russia responsible for poorly planned rescue operation during the
Beslan school siege, which, for example, included the use of flamethrowers by the security
forces, resulting in the deaths of hostages).
357. See, e.g., Margaret Coker, U.S. Takes a Risk: Old Iraqi Enemies Are Now Allies, NEW
YORK TIMES (May 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/11/world/middleeast/iraq-iran-election-enemies.html (reporting on U.S. sharing of intelligence with Iraqi
forces and Shiite militias).
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and that the suspension of assistance could lead to more and not less harm
to the Yemeni civilian population.
When confronting such a scenario, the one thing we can confidently say
is that neither IHL nor IHRL allow for purely utilitarian balancing across the
board, even if they allow for balancing within the confines of specific rules.
Allowing States to rely on some kind of “lesser evil” reasoning in all contexts
would be a recipe for chaos, legal and moral. For example, even if we accepted the premise that in a given conflict respecting the targeting rules of
IHL would prolong a war and cost more lives in the long run, we would still
insist that the rules of IHL be respected. That said, there is very little existing
authority on whether the various complicity rules of international law, general or specific, should internalize some method of balancing.
The European Court confronted this question in the somewhat analogous non-refoulement context, and its answer was negative—once a real risk
of torture or other ill-treatment of a transferee to some other State is established, the transfer is categorically prohibited. Countervailing considerations,
such as that the transferee might be a dangerous terrorist and that by not
proceeding with the transfer the State increases the risk of harm to its own
population, have been disregarded as legally (and morally) irrelevant. 358 In
short, when faced with the risk of serious harm to the life or bodily integrity
of a person, the Court adopted a categorical, deontologically grounded prohibition against the exposure to such risk. By contrast, when faced with that
same basic issue, the Supreme Court of Canada, expressly using the language
of balancing, held that under Canadian constitutional law the State could
deport an individual despite a serious risk of torture, but only in (undefined)
exceptional circumstances, bearing in mind that the prohibition of deportation was only virtually categoric. 359 Indeed, in refugee law, where the nonrefoulement principle was first developed, the duty not to deport to harm is
expressly qualified. 360
358. See Chahal v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 22414/93, ¶¶ 79–81 (1996) (ECtHR),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58004; Saadi v. Italy, 2008-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 2007, ¶¶
137–41. See further Daniel Moeckli, Saadi v. Italy: The Rules of the Game Have Not Changed, 8
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 534 (2008).
359. See Suresh v. Canada, 2002 SCC 1, ¶¶ 77–78. The Court so ruled despite concluding that international law would not permit deportation in such circumstances. Id. ¶¶ 71–75.
360. See Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention, providing that the benefit of nonrefoulement may not “be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been con-
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Another useful example is Article 7 ATT, whose use of the notion of an
“overriding risk” of harm arguably implies balancing. 361 The meaning of that
provision appears to be that a State can proceed with an arms transfer if,
after an incommensurable calculus of some kind, the State finds that the
possible positive consequences for peace and security outweigh the possible
negative ones. Yet, although the choice of the term “overriding risk” was
deliberate, some States have interpreted it as not implying balancing at all but
solely as a synonym for a criterion of non-negligible possibilities, such as
substantial risk. 362 Note, however, that even if the balancing conception of
Article 7 is regarded as correct, the inchoate wrong at issue is the authorization of the arms transfer as such. In our complicity scenarios by contrast,
responsibility arises only if the aid provided actually contributed to a serious
violation of IHL or IHRL that was in fact committed. That is, the harmful
consequences of the aid materialized and are serious.
The balancing question is not obvious. Here we might again resort to a
sliding-scale type of rule, depending on both the nature of the fault element
and the importance of the interests at stake. If the fault element is one of
purpose and a State is found to have acted with the purpose of facilitating
the violation of any rule of international law, it would go against the very
logic of a rule-based order to allow for some kind of balancing in complicity
if such balancing is irrelevant for the actual commission of the wrong. 363
If, however, the assisting State’s fault is indirect intent (including situations of willful blindness) or based on a subjective or objective appreciation
of risk, the balancing problem is more complicated. Conceivably, for example, a State could be practically certain that the assistance it provided would
assist the partner in a violation of the human right to privacy of specific
individuals yet provide the assistance for the purpose of protecting the lives
of others. The diversity of possible interests affected is such that it would, in
my view, be difficult to accommodate any balancing within complicity rules
as such. Rather, the assisting State could potentially rely on a form of justification internal to a specific regime, such as IHL or IHRL, with regard, for
example, to necessary and proportionate interferences with privacy. Or, the
victed by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.” Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33(2), July 28,
1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
361. See CASEY-MASLEN ET AL., supra note 221, ¶¶ 7.17, 7.20, 7.90–95.
362. Id. ¶¶ 7.92–94. See also David et al., supra note 339, at 89–90 (using an exclusively
probabilistic approach).
363. See SIMESTER ET AL., supra note 51, at 156.
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State could invoke a circumstance precluding wrongfulness, such as distress 364 or necessity 365 under general international law, subject to the very
strict conditions of these rules, 366 and subject to the State’s potential liability
for violating some other applicable duty, such as a positive obligation of prevention.
If we are dealing with purely risk-based forms of fault, the assisting State
can find itself in the position of gambling on which of two equally unappetizing outcomes will occur. Its assistance may or may not facilitate the
wrongful act, and its suspension of assistance may or may not lead to other
bad consequences down the line. As argued above, in my view, a risk-based
form of fault is most appropriate for serious violations of IHL and IHRL. 367
The moral gravity of these violations is such that either a balancing argument
should be categorically impermissible, as in the IHRL non-refoulement context, or the burden of making such an argument should be exceptionally
high. Exposing the population of some other country to the risk of war
crimes certainly cannot be justified simply because the assisting State wanted
to make money by selling weapons. 368 The more difficult example would, of
364. See ILC ASR, supra note 4, art. 24 (only way of saving life of persons in the care of
the State, admissible only if the wrongful act does not create a comparable or greater peril).
365. See id. art. 25 (safeguarding an essential interest of the State invoking necessity
from a grave and imminent peril, without harming other such interests, inadmissible for
rules that already incorporate necessity criteria of their own, as with military necessity in
IHL). See id. art. 25 cmt. ¶ 20.
366. See generally CRAWFORD, supra note 9, at 274–324. Note that Article 25(2)(a) ASR
does not permit resort to necessity when such reliance is implicitly or explicitly excluded by
the international obligation in question, as is the case with many rules of IHL. Similarly,
Article 26 ASR does not allow for the invocation of circumstances precluding wrongfulness
regarding breaches of jus cogens. The International Law Commission reiterated this position
in its 2019 Draft Conclusions on peremptory norms (jus cogens), which it adopted on first
reading. International Law Commission, Report on the Work of Its Seventy-first Session,
U.N. Doc. A/74/10, at 145, conclusion 18 (2019). See further Helmut Aust, Legal Consequences
of Serious Breaches of Peremptory Norms in the Law of State Responsibility: Observations in the Light of
the Recent Work of the International Law Commission, in PEREMPTORY NORMS OF GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW (JUS COGENS) 227 (Dire Tladi ed., 2021). This however does not solve
the balancing problem for our purposes even for complicity in serious violations of IHL
and IHRL. That the prohibition of some conduct, such as torture, is jus cogens, does not
necessarily entail that the prohibition on State complicity in that conduct, however defined
and under whatever general or special rule, is also jus cogens—it may but need not be.
367. See supra Sections III.B.5, III.C.3.
368. Cf. Council Common Position (EC) No. 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008,
art. 10, 2008 O.J. (L 355) 99 (Providing that “[w]hile Member States, where appropriate,
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course, be the one in which the assisting State is providing its assistance, such
as intelligence, with the aim of saving the lives of others. 369
To conclude, while assisting States may find themselves choosing between “lesser evils” in their relationships with their partners, including with
regard to the provision of intelligence, it is difficult to accommodate such
concerns by introducing a balancing element directly into complicity rules.
(To be clear, this discussion assumes that the assisting State has taken whatever mitigation measures were at its disposal, but that these measures are
assessed as ineffective so that the fault element of the complicity rule cannot
be negated on the basis of lowered probability—the issue is rather whether
the State can balance the irreducible real risk of harm that it appreciates from
continuing the assistance against the harm it appreciates from stopping the
assistance.) The potential for States to rely on a balancing exception abusively would entirely swallow up the rule. Such considerations may, however,
be exceptionally accommodated by the justificatory logic of regime-specific
rules or by generally accepted circumstances precluding wrongfulness. 370
Even if a balancing argument regarding assistance to serious violations of
IHL and IHRL were not categorically inadmissible, the space for making
may also take into account the effect of proposed [arms] exports on their economic, social,
commercial and industrial interests, these factors shall not affect the application of the above
criteria [regarding a clear risk of serious violations of IHL and IHRL].”).
369. Cf. Elgizouli v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] UKSC 10
[hereinafter Elgizouli v. Home Secretary]. UK Supreme Court finding that the United Kingdom’s transfer of an individual’s personal data to the United States, which exposed the individual to the risk of the death penalty, was in violation of applicable data protection law;
on the balancing issue discussed above note Lady Hale’s obiter view (id. ¶ 15) that the transfer
of data would have been allowed “if it was urgently necessary to save life or prevent an
imminent crime.” See also id. ¶ 233 (per Lord Hodge):
It is not difficult to envisage circumstances in which the Secretary of State might want to
provide intelligence to the government of another country to avert serious loss of life in a
planned terrorist attack and that intelligence might expose a person in the custody of the
foreign state to criminal charges which may carry the death penalty. The United Kingdom’s
international obligation to protect the right to life under article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which section 1 of the 1998 Act introduced into our domestic laws,
would, it appears to me, require the Secretary of State to balance the necessity of providing
information to save lives against the possibility of facilitating the imposition of the death
penalty on that person.

370. In a similar vein, but with a focus on criminal complicity, see Miles Jackson, Virtuous Accomplices in International Criminal Law, 68 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW
QUARTERLY 817 (2019). For defenses to complicity in the private law context, see DAVIES,
supra note 102, at 222–54.
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such an argument would appear to be small. In particular, the assisting State
could never offset a causally proximate risk of the assistance facilitating a
serious violation of IHL or IHRL by invoking a causally distant and inherently more speculative assessment that maintaining cooperation would save
more lives in the long run. Nor could balancing ever be acceptable if the
assisting State did not first employ all feasible mitigation measures that could
have reduced the probability and the magnitude of the two competing
harms.
E. Conclusion
The generally applicable complicity rule in Article 16 ASR has by now
achieved acceptance from States, despite its lack of determinacy. I have argued here that debates about its fault element have too often been stuck in
a false dilemma of intent versus knowledge. I have also argued that culpability in complicity should better be thought of as a set of different options
than as a singular requirement. First, an assisting State would be sufficiently
culpable if it acted with the purpose/direct intent of facilitating the wrongful
act of another State despite any deficits in knowledge—that is, even if it
thought that the wrongful act was unlikely to be committed or that its aid
would not be used to commit it. Second, an assisting State would be sufficiently culpable if it acted with oblique/indirect intent—that is, if it was practically certain that the assisted State would commit the wrongful act and
would use the aid provided to do so and chose to provide the assistance
nonetheless. Third, an assisting State would also be culpable if it acted with
willful blindness, with the purpose of avoiding acquiring information but for
which it would have been acting with oblique intent.
This tripartite fault element is workable, normatively coherent, and does
not pose a risk of excessively inhibiting potentially beneficial inter-State cooperation. The culpability element of Article 16 ASR also provides a normative baseline for other, primary rules prohibiting complicity, which would be
specific and tailored to sub-regimes of international law, such as IHL and
IHRL, the two regimes most relevant to issues of intelligence sharing in multinational military operations. In principle, the culpability elements of other
complicity rules that protect particularly compelling interests can only be
identical to or lower, but not higher, than that of Article 16.
The constituent elements of regime-specific complicity rules will always
depend on the architecture of State obligations within that regime, in particular on the nature and scope of other negative and positive obligations. The
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existence of negative duties that impose inchoate liability for exposing third
parties to the risk of harm or of wide-ranging positive duties of prevention
will lessen the need for regime-specific complicity rules or for their variation
from Article 16 ASR. For example, in the Bosnian Genocide case the ICJ simply
imported the requirements of Article 16 into the Genocide Convention–specific complicity rule. It had little need to do otherwise since it interpreted the
positive duty to prevent genocide in an exceptionally broad way and found
Serbia liable for failing to comply with that duty.
But even in such regimes, as in human rights law, regime-specific complicity rules can be useful. First, they can be helpful for the purposes of fair
labeling and the assigning of blameworthiness—a State that was complicit in
genocide is more culpable than one that has merely failed to prevent it, a
distinction that may also have consequences for the scope of its responsibility, as to, for example, reparations. 371 This is evident, for example, from the
European Court’s “acquiescence or connivance” cases, especially those on
extraordinary rendition. 372 Second, unlike the generally applicable rule in Article 16, regime-specific rules can cover State assistance to non-State actors,
such as armed groups or corporations. Third, regime-specific complicity
rules can have a wider scope of application than even regime-specific positive obligations. For example, the negative duty to refrain from assisting violations of IHRL is more likely than the positive duty of prevention to be
regarded as applying extraterritorially. 373 Fourth, negative obligations of restraint under regime-specific complicity rules may be less contested than
more onerous positive duties with regard to the conduct of third parties; this
is the case with IHL, where States are much more likely to accept the proposition that they are restrained from assisting other actors from committing
serious violations of IHL than that they are bound to prevent such actors
from committing such violations regardless of their own involvement. 374
Finally, special complicity rules can use broader, risk-based forms of culpability when very important interests are affected, in particular regarding

371. Thus, for example, in Bosnian Genocide the Court held that its own finding that
Serbia violated the positive duty to prevent genocide constituted sufficient satisfaction for
Bosnia and that no further reparation was due. That certainly would not have been the case
had the Court found Serbia to have been complicit in the Srebrenica genocide. See further
Milanovic, State Responsibility for Genocide, supra note 172.
372. See supra Section III.C.2.
373. See supra Section III.C.4.
374. See supra Section III.B.1.
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the basic protections due to the human person. In cases of assistance to serious violations of IHL and IHRL, it is appropriate to resort to modes of
liability akin to dolus eventualis or recklessness, where a State is aware of a risk
that the assisted party would commit such violations that the assistance
would facilitate but consciously disregards the risk and chooses to provide
the assistance nonetheless. The risk threshold could be calibrated differently—for example, one of likelihood, or a substantial risk, or a real risk—
depending on the context and the interests at stake. In the human rights
context in particular, it is perfectly possible for different human rights bodies
to come up with different risk thresholds. But the precise formulation of the
risk threshold is, I would submit, less important in practice than is the acceptance of the general idea. Responsibility grounded in conscious risk taking, pursuant, say, to a culpability standard such as recklessness, is so commonplace in municipal legal systems in both civil and criminal contexts that
it is difficult to see what a principled objection to it for complicity in serious
violations of IHL and IHRL would normatively be. States already accept a
cognate of such responsibility in the ATT context, for example. To reiterate,
the assisting State is responsible in this risk-taking scenario only if the risk
actually materializes—that is, the assisted party actually commits the wrongful act and uses the aid provided to do so.
It would be more problematic, however, to base a State’s responsibility
for complicity in its negligence in acquiring or analyzing relevant information—
that is, in some kind of “should have known,” constructive knowledge standard. Such a standard could, in principle, apply not just to constructive
knowledge to the level of practical certainty—the State could have had actual
knowledge but did not because it failed to make the necessary inquiries. It
could apply to some level of risk—the State did not know but should have
known that there was a likelihood/a substantial risk/a real risk of the harmful result occurring; that is, the risk was not foreseen but was foreseeable. As
explained above, the problem with this approach is that it assumes a duty of
diligence in acquiring and processing information. Such a duty simply cannot
apply across the board to all possible violations of international law, although
it may be appropriate in specific settings. 375 Even there, however, it may be
more appropriate for positive duties of prevention than for negative rules on
complicity, because the latter connote a higher degree of blameworthiness.
For example, in the Bosnian Genocide case, the ICJ absolved Serbia of responsibility for the Srebrenica genocide on the basis that it was not conclusively
375. But see LANOVOY, supra note 11, at 339–40.
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established that Serbian authorities “supplied aid to the perpetrators of the
genocide in full awareness that the aid supplied would be used to commit
genocide.” 376 By contrast, it found Serbia responsible for failing to comply
with the positive obligation to prevent genocide, which arose once Serbia
“was aware, or should normally have been aware, of the serious danger that
acts of genocide would be committed,” 377 the ICJ employing both a riskbased form of culpability and a constructive knowledge standard as to that
risk. On the facts, however, the Court found that Serbia did subjectively
know about the serious risk. It did not rely on the constructive knowledge
prong of the test—that is, Serbia’s possible negligence in appreciating the
existence of a serious risk. 378 Even so, a more relaxed constructive
knowledge standard may be appropriate precisely because a State that has
failed to prevent genocide is to be regarded as less blameworthy than a State
actively complicit in it. 379
Both IHL and IHRL can comfortably be interpreted as containing regime-specific complicity rules, with risk-based forms of fault for complicity
in serious violations. Thus, for example, Serbia may not have been complicit
in genocide by providing assistance (including money, weapons, and intelligence) to the Bosnian Serbs, but it was complicit in serious violations of IHL
and IHRL (and not just in Srebrenica) because it was fully aware of the pattern of previous violations and thus of the serious risk (or even certainty)
that the Bosnian Serbs would use the aid provided to commit such violations
and nonetheless chose to continue providing it. In short, by contributing to
these violations while consciously disregarding the risk, Serbia failed to comply with its duty to respect and ensure respect for IHL and its duty to respect
IHRL—the greater strictness of the culpability element of the complicity rule
in the Genocide Convention could arguably be justified by fair-labelling concerns, due to the greater comparative gravity of the underlying violation and
its criminal character. Also, while the extraterritoriality problem specific to
376. Bosnian Genocide, supra note 7, ¶ 423. This was at least partly due to the fact that the
decision to carry out the genocide was made shortly before it was actually implemented.
377. Id. ¶ 432. The Court speaks of the “serious risk” that genocide will be committed.
Id. ¶ 431.
378. Id. ¶¶ 436–38.
379. Cf. LANOVOY, supra note 11, at 233–34 (arguing that this position is paradoxical
because it entails that the duty not to be complicit in genocide is less important than the
duty to prevent it). But this is not the case. It is because the complicit State will be regarded
as more blameworthy and the reputational and legal consequences of its responsibility will
be more severe that a stricter culpability standard is appropriate.
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IHRL 380 somewhat decreases the practical import of complicity under IHRL
for assisting States, 381 the long-term trend is towards a broad approach to
extraterritoriality. States will find themselves increasingly exposed to legal
risk and litigation before domestic and international courts on this basis. 382
That said, due to the strictness of Article 16 ASR there is a real risk of an
accountability gap if the IHRL-specific complicity rule or rules do not ultimately consolidate in the manner which I have suggested. One remedy for
that gap would be to lower the fault requirements of Article 16 itself, but, as
I have argued, the normatively more desirable position is to utilize regimespecific rules with risk-based forms of fault.
As explained above, responsibility for complicity will be excluded if,
through effective mitigation measures, the assisting State reduces below the
prescribed risk threshold the possibility of its assistance facilitating the violation. 383 But the fault of the assisting State remains a subjective one. That
mitigation measures ultimately did not prove to be effective does not ipso
facto mean that the assisting State did not honestly think that they would be.
However, the objective unreasonableness of any such belief in light of the
prevailing facts may enable the inference that the belief was not in fact held
honestly, or put differently, that the mitigation measures were a sham.
Finally, it remains unclear whether, the prescribed risk threshold having
been crossed and remaining unaffected by any mitigation measures, the state
can ever be justified in taking that risk of rendering assistance in order to
prevent some other risk of harm from materializing. Can, in other words,
the assisting State ever be absolved from disregarding a risk (even a certainty)
of harm and contributing to a violation of IHL and IHRL because it assessed
that discontinuing the assistance would create a risk of harm to its own population or some other comparable interest? As explained, such balancing
would likely either be categorically excluded or exceptionally difficult to
make out when risks of serious violations of IHL or IHRL are at play. 384
380. See supra Section III.C.4.
381. See, e.g., Elgizouli v. Home Secretary, supra note 369 (various opinions noting that, as
Strasbourg jurisprudence currently stands, the ECHR does not cover the extraterritorial facilitation of the death penalty through the sharing of information).
382. For an instructive analysis on this point with regard to domestic litigation on Germany’s possible complicity in allegedly unlawful U.S. drone strikes in Yemen, see Leander
Beinlich, Drones, Discretion, and the Duty to Protect the Right to Life: Germany and Its Role in the
United States’ Drone Programme before the Higher Administrative Court of Münster, 62 GERMAN
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 557 (2021).
383. See supra Section III.D.
384. Id.
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A QUESTION OF PERSPECTIVE

A. Ex Ante and Ex Post, Internal and External
Before looking more closely at various scenarios of intelligence sharing in
multinational military operations, it is important to discuss the question of
perspective in making assessments about an assisting State’s culpability. As
we have seen, State responsibility will largely depend on how the fault element of general or specific complicity rules is construed and applied. However, the assessment of what the assisting State knew or intended can happen
at different points in time, for different purposes, and by different actors—
and this matters greatly.
First, it is the assisting State itself that must assess what it exactly
“knows” at the time it is deciding to provide or continue providing assistance, such as the sharing of intelligence. The abstraction of the State cannot,
of course, know anything; rather, the assisting State’s relevant organs and
agents, those individuals who are, in fact, tasked with making this decision,
need to make an assessment of the information at their disposal. 385 The precise circle of individuals making such a decision and the process whereby
they do so will vary from State to State. 386 That circle may be wide and the
process formalized and bureaucratic, with input from legal advisers at vari-

385. See supra Section II.B.
386. For a more extended discussion, see Moynihan, supra note 11, at 38–41.
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ous points, or the decision making may be opaque, not rule-bound, and concentrated in only a few people. 387 For example, U.S. and Russian governments and intelligence agencies will not make their decisions in remotely the
same ways. 388
That said, it is these individuals who first need to assess, from an ex ante
perspective, whether it is practically certain that their partner would commit
a wrongful act and would use the aid provided to do so or whether there is
simply some level of risk of this occurring. Such judgments will benefit from
direct access to all the information the assisting State has at its disposal, including its confidential intelligence. They will also include assessments about

387. Perhaps the best-known process formalized by statute for vetting foreign security
partners for risk of serious human rights violations is the one set by the “Leahy law” in the
United States. See, e.g., Gaston, supra note 337, at 7–9. For an example of a State policy
document, grounded in legal obligations, dealing specifically with the sharing and receipt of
intelligence with partners in situations of risk of serious harm to detained individuals and
setting out various procedural and substantive requirements in that regard, e.g., by requiring
escalation of decisions to ministerial level when a serious risk emerges, see HM Government, The Principles Relating to the Detention and Interviewing of Detainees Overseas and the Passing
and Receipt of Intelligence Relating to Detainees (July 2019), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-involvement-with-detainees-in-overseas-counter-terrorism-operations [hereinafter UK Principles]. A previous iteration of that document, the Consolidated
Guidance, similarly applied to intelligence and military officers engaging in relevant activity.
The UK Investigatory Powers Commissioner (a former judge) concluded in his 2019 review
that the UK services generally acted in compliance with the Consolidated Guidance. See
Annual Report of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner 2019, ¶¶ 8.59–62; 9.42–53;
10.54–55 (Dec. 15, 2020), https://www.ipco.org.uk/publications/annual-reports/. For a
critical overview of the complicity of UK agencies in torture and other forms of ill-treatment
in the “war on terror,” including an assessment of their practice in applying the Consolidated
Guidance, see Ruth Blakeley & Sam Raphael, Accountability, Denial and the Future-Proofing of
British Torture, 96 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 691 (2020). For an authoritative (but incomplete) account of British complicity, see INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE, DETAINEE MISTREATMENT AND RENDITION: 2001–2010, 2018, HC 1113 (UK). For another
example, see Canada’s Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act S.C.
2019, c. 13, s. 49.1. The ministerial directions issued thereunder are focused on processes to
be followed in situations in which the sharing or receipt of intelligence would result in a
substantial risk of the mistreatment of an individual. See further National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, NSIRA Review 2020-03, Review of Departmental Implementation
of the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act for 2019 (Dec. 16,
2020), https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/NSIRA_Review_2020-03.
pdf.
388. For an overview of U.S. processes regarding decisions to share intelligence in support of potentially lethal operation, see Howard, supra note 1, at 36–46.
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the legal risk the assisting State would be exposed to if it provided the assistance.
In this ex ante perspective, purpose-based forms of culpability, including
willful blindness, are essentially irrelevant. No sane State official will openly
admit to acting with an improper purpose, certainly not while a decision is
being made. 389 Conceivably a legal adviser or some kind of independent
commissioner might conclude that a minister or a lower-ranking executive
official is acting with such a purpose, but this is highly unlikely. 390 And in
those States whose officials directly intend to facilitate violations of international law or are willfully blind to them, it is implausible in the extreme to
think that purpose-based culpability tests would be of any practical relevance
from their own internal perspective.
When it comes to knowledge to the level of practical certainty or some
level of possibility or risk, from an ex ante perspective this will always, as
explained above, be a probabilistic assessment, based, for example, on the
sharing State’s own intelligence. 391 In particular, there is little practical difference (and no categorical one) between a State’s officials thinking that a future
event or the future behavior of a third party is nearly certain or only highly
likely. An instructive example in this regard is how U.S. intelligence doctrine
instructs analysts to “indicate and explain the basis for the uncertainties associated with major analytic judgments, specifically the likelihood of occurrence of an event or development, and the analyst’s confidence in the basis

389. As an example, the UK Principles, supra note 387, refer only to the relevant official’s
knowledge, belief, or appreciation of risk of harm. The possibility that a UK official is acting
with a purpose to facilitate the harm is never mentioned.
390. See also CASEY-MASLEN ET AL., supra note 221, ¶ 6.13 (discussing ATT drafting
history and noting that the representatives of Mexico and the ICRC remarked that the use
of a purpose standard in an early draft of Article 6 ATT would render that provision practically inoperable; this standard was subsequently replaced with a knowledge one).
391. See supra Section II.C. See also R (Campaign Against the Arms Trade) v. Secretary
of State for Business, Innovation and Skills [2019] EWCA (Civ) 1020 [94] (UK government
arguing in judicial review proceedings challenging export of weapons to Saudi Arabia that
the “exercise [of assessing what the partner would do with the aid given] is predictive and
involves the evaluation of risk and as to the future conduct of Saudi Arabia in a fluid and
complex situation”), [165] (Court of Appeal agreeing that this was a “prospective and predictive exercise”).
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for this judgment” 392 and to use the following scale to express degrees of
(un)certainty, without mixing the terms from each row: 393
almost no
chance

very
unlikely

unlikely

roughly
even
chance

likely

very likely

almost
certain(ly)

remote

highly
improbable

roughly
even odds

probable
(probably)

highly
probable

nearly
certain

01–05%

05–20%

improbable
(improbably)
20–45%

45–55%

55–80%

80–95%

95–99%

The appreciation of likelihood can be distinguished from the analysts’
confidence that the assessment is correct, 394 which is based on the quality of
the information available and may range from high, to moderate, to low. 395
Clearly, in many situations, even in States with very sophisticated governmental and intelligence apparatuses, the relevant officials will not be making their decisions using a probabilistic scale, such as the one above, let alone
a numerical one. In any event, their reasoning will be prone to all sorts of
biases; in particular, the consumers of intelligence products at the political

392. Office of the Director of National Security, Intelligence Community Directive
203, at 3 (Jan. 2, 2015), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICD/ICD%20203%20Analytic%20Standards.pdf.
393. Id.
394. “To avoid confusion, products that express an analyst’s confidence in an assessment or judgment using a ‘confidence level’ (e.g., ‘high confidence’) must not combine a
confidence level and a degree of likelihood, which refers to an event or development, in the
same sentence.” Id. There are however numerous instances in actual practice in which degrees of confidence and likelihood are used interchangeably despite this admonition and the
relationship between likelihood and confidence is left unexplained. In particular,
[n]one of the extant standards correctly explain that confidence is a second-order judgement
that is in fact related to probability judgements. That is, given a stated confidence level (e.g.,
95% certainty), the less confident an analyst is in his or her estimate, the wider the confidence interval should be. For example, if two analysts estimate that there is a 75% chance
that x will occur in the next 3 months, the analyst who bounds her 95% confidence interval
with the values [55%, 95%] is clearly less confident than the analyst who bounds the 95%
confidence interval with the values [65%, 85%].

ASSESSMENT AND COMMUNICATION OF UNCERTAINTY IN INTELLIGENCE TO SUPPORT
DECISION-MAKING 19 - 14 (David R. Mandel ed., 2020).
395. See MARK M. LOWENTHAL, INTELLIGENCE: FROM SECRETS TO POLICY 178 (6th
ed. 2014).
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level will often misunderstand the analyst’s assessment of uncertainty. 396
That said, my main point, I think, stands: if the officials of a State, acting in
good faith, appreciate ex ante that it is highly probable that their partner
would misuse the intelligence provided to commit a wrongful act, for practical purposes their assessment is not categorically different from one of near
or virtual certainty.
The position is, however, different when we go substantially down the
probabilistic scale. Especially in those situations in which a serious violation
of IHL or IHRL may be at play and in which, accordingly, a risk-based form
of culpability may apply, the assisting State’s officials acting ex ante will essentially be gambling on whether to take a calculated risk and provide the
assistance. That decision may be constrained by formal internal processes,
such as a requirement to obtain legal advice or refer decisions upwards in
the hierarchy. They will similarly have to assess probabilistically whether any
mitigation efforts would actually be effective in reducing the risk of harm
and then decide on which such measures to implement. Recall, however, that
the assisting State will be responsible for complicity only if after the assistance, such as intelligence, is provided the harm and facilitation actually occur. 397
Second, the assessment of what the relevant officials of the assisting
State knew or intended can be done ex post after the provision of assistance
occurred. It can be done by some actor other than those organs of the assisting State who decided to provide assistance—perhaps a domestic or international court, a UN expert, a political body, a parliamentary committee,
an inspector-general, a public inquiry, or authorities of some other State.
Such external assessors or reviewers will have the benefit of hindsight—they
396. The recent literature in psychology and decision science strongly suggests that
verbal estimates of uncertainty are much less effective in conveying the relevant degree of
uncertainty than are numerical probabilities. On this point and biased cognition in intelligence analysis more generally, see Mandeep K. Dhami et al., Improving Intelligence Analysis with
Decision Science, 10 PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 753 (2015); David R. Mandel, Accuracy of Intelligence Forecasts From the Intelligence Consumer’s Perspective, 2 POLICY INSIGHTS
FROM THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES 111 (2015); Mandeep K. Dhami, Towards an
Evidence-Based Approach to Communicating Uncertainty in Intelligence Analysis, 33 INTELLIGENCE
AND NATIONAL SECURITY 257 (2017); Ian K. Belton & Mandeep K. Dhami, Cognitive Biases
and Debiasing in Intelligence Analysis, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY
548 (Riccardo Viale ed., 2020). See also PHILIP E. TETLOCK & DAN GARDNER, SUPERFORECASTING: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF PREDICTION (2015) (detailing the findings of the
Good Judgment Project, which, inter alia, compared the reliability of amateur forecasters
who were selected for lower levels of cognitive bias with that of intelligence analysts).
397. See LANOVOY, supra note 11, at 238.
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will be able to know for a fact whether the violation occurred, to what extent
the assistance contributed to it, and to what extent mitigation efforts were
effective. They will also have to make inferences about what the officials of
the assisting State knew or intended. 398 But even though they would have the
benefit of hindsight, some ex post external assessors may be hampered in their
ability to fully establish the facts because, say, they do not have access to
relevant evidence. It is unlikely, for instance, that the assisting State would
provide its internal intelligence products to an international human rights
body. In short, an ex post reviewing authority can, perhaps somewhat paradoxically, simultaneously know both more and less than the persons who
made the decision to assist knew ex ante.
Contrary to arguments sometimes made in the literature against intent
or purpose-based culpability tests, 399 it will be reasonably practical for an ex
post external assessor to find that an assisting State acted with the purpose/direct intent to facilitate a wrongful act. After all, in municipal administrative
law, domestic courts can find without any “smoking gun” type of evidence
that State officials acted with an improper purpose, even if they do so relatively infrequently. 400 In human rights law, human rights bodies have also
increasingly found that States that have restricted human rights for ostensibly legitimate aims, such as the prevention of crime, have in reality acted with
ulterior purposes, such as the suppression of dissent. 401 Domestic and international courts both routinely establish the intent of individuals in the criminal context. 402 Even in that context, it is perfectly standard to use a finding
that a person knew to practical certainty or to a very high degree of likelihood
that the assistance they provided would be used to commit a crime to draw
an inference that the person acted with purpose to facilitate the crime. 403
398. See Moynihan, supra note 11, at 16. For an example, see NZOIGIS REPORT, supra
note 303, ¶¶ 116–21.
399. See, e.g., Corten, supra note 30; LANOVOY, supra note 11, at 338.
400. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER FORSYTH & WILLIAM WADE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 352–
56 (11th ed. 2014).
401. See, e.g., Navalnyy v. Russia, App. No. 29580/12, ¶¶ 174–75 (2018) (ECtHR),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-187605 (restrictions on the rights of Russian dissident Aleksey Navalny imposed for the ulterior purpose of suppressing political pluralism);
Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (No. 2), App. No. 14305/17, ¶¶ 436–37 (2020) (ECtHR),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-207173 (Court using concordant inferences to establish that the detention of Turkish opposition leader pursued the ulterior purpose of stifling
pluralism and limiting freedom of political debate).
402. See AUST, supra note 6, at 242–44.
403. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 115, at 575–76; SIMESTER ET AL., supra note 51, at
144–45.
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The key point here is that in the vast majority of situations of State complicity an assisting State’s purpose to facilitate does not have to be established
to anything approaching a criminal law, “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of proof. 404 Similarly, for findings of purpose, as with any finding of fact,
a court or any other external assessor can rely on circumstantial evidence,
resort to reasonable inferences, or even reverse the burden of proof. 405 Nor
does a court necessarily need to identify by name the specific state officials
whose ulterior purpose it has established (although it may choose to do
so). 406 When, for example, the European Court found that Russia was acting
with an ulterior purpose of suppressing political pluralism when it subjected
Aleksey Navalny to criminal prosecution, it did not specifically identify Vladimir Putin or the relevant executive, prosecutorial, and judicial officials involved in Navalny’s case as possessing such purpose. 407 Thus, while purposebased culpability standards are of little practical relevance from the ex ante
perspective, the same simply cannot be said for the ex post one.
When it comes to knowledge-based forms of fault, the task of any external ex post reviewing entity is always to determine what the assisting State
subjectively believed at the relevant time; the temptation to interpret the facts
with the benefit of hindsight is, of course, a great one but must be resisted. 408
A particularly complex problem—and not an uncommon one—arises
from the fact that different State officials may be in the possession of information relevant to the State’s ex ante assessment of risk of harm resulting
from the sharing of intelligence, but these officials might themselves not sufficiently exchange information among themselves. The picture of the real
level of risk would therefore be incomplete, simply because no individual
State official would know everything that they needed to know to make the
assessment properly. For example, the CIA and the State Department might
not provide all of the relevant information at their disposal to the Department of Defense; a risk assessment by the DoD may then come to the mistaken conclusion that there was no certainty or substantial risk that an assisted partner would commit a wrongful act, and proceed to authorize the
404. See also CASEY-MASLEN ET AL., supra note 221, ¶ 6.183. On the European Court’s
flexible approach to evidence for establishing State fault in due diligence obligations, see
Stoyanova, supra note 40, at 611–12.
405. See CRAWFORD, supra note 9, at 408; Finucane, supra note 204, at 417; LANOVOY,
supra note 11, at 239–40. See also SIMESTER ET AL., supra note 51, at 147–48.
406. See Section II.B supra.
407. See supra note 401.
408. For the same point regarding indirect intent as a subjective mode of fault in criminal law, see BLOMSMA, supra note 95, at 72–73.
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sharing of intelligence with that partner. In such a scenario no single U.S.
official subjectively made the assessment that the risk existed, and then consciously disregarded that risk. The State as a singular entity did possess all
the necessary information, but the individual making the specific decision to
assist a partner did not.
One approach to this problem would be to aggregate all of the relevant
pieces of information at the disposal of the State’s various officials and to
attribute to the State as a whole the requisite degree of knowledge. This is,
in fact, the approach taken by some jurisdictions in the analogous context of
corporate liability—a good example would be the U.S. “collective
knowledge” doctrine. 409 But this approach reduces the exercise of assessing
the risk of what a partner would do to the mere addition of isolated items of
information, when in fact that exercise—even at a purely individual level—
requires this information to be processed and analyzed so that a judgment
can be made and a risk subjectively be perceived. Employing such a doctrine
in effect downgrades the fault requirement to negligence—the State did not
know, but should have known, of the certainty or risk of harm, since none
of its officials subjectively perceived the requisite degree of risk. 410 As explained above, such objective fault standards are better suited to positive
duties of prevention than to negative duties of restraint in a complicity
framework. 411
The most difficult cases will always be those that are based on an assessment of risk. This will especially be the case when the assisting State’s ex ante
assessment of risk was also based on the anticipated effectiveness of riskreducing mitigation measures. Considerations of institutional competence
may, in such cases, warrant some level of deference to the judgments made
by the initial decision maker, but such deference cannot be unlimited. And
even if the external assessor’s task of establishing whether the assisting State
409. See, e.g., United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that corporations compartmentalize knowledge, subdividing the elements of specific
duties and operations into smaller components, that the aggregate of those components
constitutes the corporation’s knowledge of a particular operation, and that it is irrelevant
whether employees administering one component of an operation know the specific activities of employees administering another aspect of the operation). English law does not use
a similar doctrine and corporate fault is more circumscribed. See CELIA WELLS, CORPORATIONS AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 132–36 (2001).
410. For a particularly sophisticated discussion in the context of corporate liability, see
Mihailis Diamantis, Functional Corporate Knowledge, 61 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW 319
(2019).
411. See supra Sections III.B.5 and III.C.3.
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was culpable when it provided the assistance requires the assessor to determine what the assisting State’s official subjectively believed ex ante, both the
ex ante and the ex post assessments can be made using rational, objective criteria.
B. Assessing Risk
What then are the factors that the officials of the assisting State should rely
on ex ante to determine whether their partner will commit a wrongful act and
would use the aid provided to do so, and on which any external assessor can
also rely to determine ex post what the assisting State knew or intended? Two
contextual elements are crucial: first, the issue of whether the assistance being provided, such as the sharing of intelligence, is a one-off event or part of
a continuing cooperative relationship; and second, whether the future violation of international law that the partner might commit is itself a one-off,
isolated event or part of a pattern of similar violations. 412 If there is a durable
cooperative relationship the assisting State is more likely to be able to assess
reliably what its partner will do. And a pattern of prior behavior in similar
circumstances is likely the best possible evidence of what the partner will do
in the future. 413 The same goes for the effectiveness of any proposed mitigation measures—for example, diplomatic assurances that get breached time
and again cannot be relied upon as effective forms of mitigation. 414 In any
event, the officials of the assisting State making their decisions ex ante will do
so dynamically, taking into account the evolving circumstances and changes
in the information available to them. 415

412. See EU User’s Guide, supra note 210, ¶ 2.13, at 55 (“Isolated incidents of international humanitarian law violations are not necessarily indicative of the recipient country’s
attitude towards international humanitarian law and may not by themselves be considered
to constitute a basis for denying an arms transfer. Where a certain pattern of violations can
be discerned or the recipient country has not taken appropriate steps to punish violations,
this should give cause for serious concern.”).
413. See COMMENTARY OF 2016, supra note 208, ¶ 161 (“In the event of multinational
operations, common Article 1 thus requires High Contracting Parties to opt out of a specific
operation if there is an expectation, based on facts or knowledge of past patterns, that it
would violate the Conventions, as this would constitute aiding or assisting violations.”).
414. See also Blakeley & Raphael, supra note 387, at 705–76 (discussing ineffective assurances).
415. See also Moynihan, supra note 11, at 17.
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Here we can again usefully draw on the examples of risk-based culpability in the contexts of arms transfers and IHRL non-refoulement jurisprudence. 416 The ICRC, for example, notes that the three most important indicators for assessing whether the recipient will use transferred weapons to
commit serious violations of IHL and IHRL are (1) the recipient’s past and
present record of respect for IHL and IHRL, including any efforts they have
taken to suppress violations that have occurred; (2) their intentions as expressed through formal commitments, including the provision of appropriate training; (3) their capacity to ensure that the assistance provided is used
properly, including the existence of accountable authority structures. 417
A particularly instructive example is the judgment of the Court of Appeal
of England and Wales in Campaign Against the Arms Trade, 418 which dealt with
the UK government’s continuing grant of licenses for weapons export to
Saudi Arabia despite claims that these weapons were used to commit serious
violations of IHL, viz., those of the principle of distinction, in the conflict in
Yemen. These were judicial review proceedings, which under the public law
principles of England and Wales require the courts to determine whether the
relevant UK minister acted irrationally in determining that there was no “clear
risk” that Saudi Arabia would commit serious violations of IHL in Yemen. 419
In other words, this was a very deferential type of external ex post review of
whether the initial ex ante assessment was correctly made. Yet, even so, the
Court of Appeal found that the minister did act irrationally because he deliberately chose not to determine whether Saudi Arabia had violated IHL in
the past in relation to any specific incident of concern:
The question whether there was an historic pattern of breaches of IHL on
the part of the Coalition, and Saudi Arabia in particular, was a question
416. See further CASEY-MASLEN ET AL., supra note 221, ¶¶ 6.94–99.
417. ARMS TRANSFER DECISIONS—A PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 250, at 14–21. See
also EU User’s Guide, supra note 209, ¶ 2.13, at 55 (“Clear risk. A thorough assessment of
the risk that the proposed export of military technology or equipment will be used in the
commission of serious violations of international humanitarian law should include an inquiry into the recipient’s past and present record of respect for international humanitarian
law, the recipient’s intentions as expressed through formal commitments and the recipient’s
capacity to ensure that the equipment or technology transferred is used in a manner consistent with international humanitarian law and is not diverted or transferred to other destinations where it might be used for serious violations of this law.”).
418. R (Campaign Against the Arms Trade) v. Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills [2019] EWCA (Civ) 1020.
419. Id. [57], [145].
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which required to be faced. Even if it could not be answered with reasonable confidence in respect of every incident of concern . . . it is clear to us
that it could properly be answered in respect of many such incidents, including most, if not all, of those which have featured prominently in argument. At least the attempt had to be made. 420

Similarly, the Court rightly noted that the partner’s pattern of behavior was
a key factor for assessing the effectiveness of any risk-reducing measures of
mitigation:
[P]erhaps the most important reason for making such assessments is that,
without them, how was the Secretary of State to reach a rational conclusion
as to the effect of the training, support and other inputs by the UK, or the
effect of any high level assurances by the Saudi authorities? If the result of
historic assessments was that violations were continuing despite all such
efforts, then that would unavoidably become a major consideration in
looking at the “real risk” in the future. It would be likely to help determine
whether Saudi Arabia had a genuine intent and, importantly, the capacity
to live up to the commitments made. 421

After the Court’s judgment, the UK government conducted a new assessment and (dubiously) concluded that any past Saudi violations of IHL in
Yemen were isolated incidents and that “Saudi Arabia has a genuine intent
and the capacity to comply with IHL.” 422
Whether it is, in fact, true that there is no “clear risk” of serious violations
of IHL from weapons transfers to Saudi Arabia is beside the point for our
present purposes. 423 Rather, the key point is that there is no reason of principle why the sharing of intelligence should be treated any differently than
transfers of arms or technologies, such as cyber tools, when it comes to the
making of assessments of whether the assistance provided may be used to
commit a wrongful act. The formal rule may be different—the prohibition
420. Id. [138].
421. Id. [144].
422. See Secretary of State for International Trade, Trade Update, House of Commons
(July 7, 2020), https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/20
20-07-07/HCWS339.
423. The new decision has also been challenged in judicial review. See Arms Sales to War
in Yemen Back in Court, CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARMS TRADE (Apr. 22, 2021),
https://caat.org.uk/news/arms-sales-to-war-in-yemen-back-in-court/; UK Arms Exports
to Saudi Arabia: Q&A, House of Commons Briefing Paper (Jan. 29, 2021), https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-8425/CBP-8425.pdf.
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of complicity in CA1 rather than the ATT regime or a domestic equivalent—
but the nature of the decision-making process is the same. In particular, patterns of prior behavior are the best predictor of how the assisted party will
behave in the future (although, of course, there will be exceptions, for example, if there is a change of leadership in the assisted State or entity). Similarly,
patterns of mitigation measures failing to work are the best indicator that any
further such measures will also be ineffective.
In one sense, however, the sharing of intelligence is somewhat different
from other forms of assistance. If the intelligence is genuinely so relevant
that it can, in fact, substantially contribute to the commission of a wrongful
act, it is almost inevitable that it will be so used—think, for example, of information shared for targeting purposes in a military operation. Once the
recipients acquire the information, they cannot unlearn it. And if they are
intent on committing a wrongful act, such as torture, the intelligence will
invariably get used if relevant. 424 In that sense, the ex ante risk assessment
becomes simpler—the inquiry is going to be focused primarily on whether
the partner intends to commit a wrong and less on whether the partner is
likely to use the information given since the latter may be a foregone conclusion if the answer to the former question is positive. This also makes mitigation measures that are primarily focused on the intelligence itself less likely
to work, although some safeguards may be possible (e.g., conditioning the
transfer of information on its compartmentalization, restriction to only specific, more trustworthy, officials of the partner State or entity, or implementing technological safeguards).
V.

TWO SCENARIOS OF INTELLIGENCE SHARING IN
MILITARY OPERATIONS

A. Intelligence Sharing That Assists a Wrongful Act
Let us now discuss the two basic scenarios of complicity on the basis of
intelligence sharing in multinational military operations: first, intelligence
sharing that assists an internationally wrongful act; second, the sharing and
receiving of intelligence that was obtained unlawfully. I will start with the
former, which has also percolated through much of the preceding discussion.
In this scenario, during a military operation State A is sharing intelligence
with State or non-State actor B, which then facilitates B’s commission of an
424. See Nottingham Workshop Report, supra note 10, at 20.
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internationally wrongful act. That wrongful act can be a serious violation of
IHL or IHRL, such as torture, or a less serious violation of either regime. Or
it can violate some other rule of international law, such as the sovereignty of
a third State, the law of the sea, or diplomatic law. The generally applicable
complicity rule in Article 16 ASR would cover all such instances. Regimespecific complicity rules, such as those of IHL and IHRL, would only apply
to State assistance to the violation of rules particular to these regimes, such
as the prohibition of torture, the right to life, or the principle of distinction.
It is clear that, in the right circumstances, the sharing of intelligence,
within or without a multinational military operation, can transgress the general and specific complicity rules in international law. 425 For example, among
the participants of the Nottingham workshop there was widespread agreement that the sharing of intelligence can significantly or substantially contribute to a wrongful act by a third party. 426 In a scenario in which A provides
intelligence to B that is then used to torture X, the fulfillment of the causal
nexus requirement will depend on the nature of the information provided.
For instance, if A gave B the information that X suffers from an irrational
fear of insects and that information then leads B to put X in a cramped
wooden box with a choice selection thereof, 427 the nexus requirement would
be met—the torture would not have been applied in that particular way absent the shared intelligence. The same position would apply if A gave B information about X’s family so as to enable B’s agents to threaten X with
violence to them, or if A gave B information about X’s whereabouts that
allowed B to detain him or her in the first place. While there will invariably
be cases that pose difficulties in assessing the causal contribution of a particular item of intelligence to the wrongful act, most cases will not be particularly hard.
The real difficulty, as explained, lies with the culpability elements of Article 16 ASR and any regime-specific complicity rules. Here there was significant disagreement among the experts assembled at the Nottingham intelligence sharing workshop. Much of that discussion vacillated between intent
and knowledge as the two competing models for the assisting State’s fault. 428

425. See AUST, supra note 6, at 198.
426. See Nottingham Workshop Report, supra note 10, at 10, 16.
427. See Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, supra note 285, ¶¶ 52, 57 (detailing interrogation techniques approved by the U.S. Department of Justice).
428. See Nottingham Workshop Report, supra note 10, at 6–10.
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But as I have argued in this article, that dilemma is largely a false one. International law rules on complicity allow for a variable geometry of forms of
fault, which may also depend on the severity of the underlying violation. 429
Thus, under Article 16 ASR, an assisting State will be responsible for
sharing intelligence with another State that facilitated the wrongful act of the
latter if the assisting State (i.e., its organs or agents) did so:
(1) with the purpose/direct intent of facilitating the wrongful act, that is
in a situation in which the facilitation of the wrongful act was the conscious
object of the assisting State’s conduct, regardless of any deficits in the assisting State’s knowledge;
(2) with the oblique/indirect intent of facilitating the wrongful act, that
is while being practically certain that the assisted State will commit the
wrongful act and practically certain that it will use the intelligence provided
to do so, and consciously choosing to provide the intelligence despite this
practical certainty;
(3) with willful blindness, that is, with the purpose of avoiding acquiring
information but for which the assisting State would have acted with indirect
intent.
The culpability element of Article 16 would apply to intelligence sharing
that contributes to any violation of international law, regardless of the subject
matter, so long as the same rule binds the two States. This culpability element
also forms the minimum baseline for regime-specific complicity rules, the
fault requirements of which can only be looser, more expansive than those
of Article 16.
As explained, the IHL- and IHRL-specific complicity rules have the
added benefit of applying to State assistance, including the sharing of intelligence, to non-State actors. For serious violations of IHL and IHRL, they arguably have the further benefit of employing risk-based forms of fault. That
is, the State sharing intelligence would be liable under these complicity rules
if it was aware of a degree of risk that its assistance would be used to facilitate
a serious violation, such as torture, but consciously disregarded that risk and
proceeded to provide the assistance nonetheless. 430 The risk threshold would
certainly be satisfied if it was more likely than not that the assisted partner
would commit the wrong and would use the aid provided to do so. It would
probably also be satisfied if the risk was below likelihood but was nonetheless serious, substantial, real, or clear. For assistance to nonserious violations
429. See supra Sections III.A.4, III.B.5, III.C.3.
430. See supra Sections III.B.5, III.C.3.
1387

International Law Studies

2021

of IHL and IHRL, the regime-specific complicity rules would employ the
Article 16 ASR forms of fault only, but again with the added benefit of applying to State aid to non-State actors as well.
The scenario of intelligence sharing to assist a wrongful act has two basic
sub-variants. In the first, the simpler and more focused one, a specific item
of intelligence is shared that assists a specific wrongful act. This can either
be an isolated occurrence or a whole series or pattern of such acts, normally
as part of a durable cooperative relationship. In the second variant, intelligence sharing is part of systematic aid and assistance to a war effort more
generally, but under the shadow of a risk that the aid provided would facilitate serious violations of IHL and IHRL—think of, for example, the aid that
Serbia provided to the Bosnian Serbs during the conflict in Bosnia, or the
aid that the United States provided to the contras in Nicaragua and to various
Iraqi and Kurdish forces in the fight against ISIS.
In both of these variants, intelligence sharing as part of a wider, more
durable cooperative relationship will enable the assisting State to form more
reliable predictions about what its partner would do and implement widerranging mitigation measures and assess their effectiveness. As explained
above, if these measures bring down appreciable risk below the proscribed
threshold, the assisting State may continue providing the assistance. 431
The emergence of a clear pattern of ongoing violations by the assisted
partner will both elevate the assisting State’s appreciation of the risk of future
violations and constitute evidence that the mitigation measures are ineffective. Thus, for example, the Intelligence and Security Committee of the British Parliament found that between 2001 and 2010 there were “232 cases recorded where it appears that UK personnel continued to supply questions or
intelligence to liaison services after they knew or suspected (or, in [the Committee’s] view, should have suspected) that a detainee had been or was being
mistreated.” 432 The Committee also found that UK intelligence agencies
“also suggested, planned or agreed to rendition operations proposed by others in 28 cases [and that there were] a further 22 cases where SIS or MI5
provided intelligence to enable a rendition operation to take place.” 433 In
each of these cases specific intelligence facilitated a specific wrongful act.
While it is possible that when individual decisions were being made, especially in the early stages of the “war on terror,” British officials did not know
to practical certainty or appreciated a degree of risk that the intelligence
431. See supra Section III.D.
432. INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE, supra note 387, at 3.
433. Id.
1388

Intelligence Sharing and Complicity

Vol. 97

would facilitate a wrongful act by third parties, such as the United States, or
hoped that mitigation measures would reduce that risk, that notion becomes
impossible to sustain after a pattern of behavior emerges over time. 434
In the second variant, if the assisting State is aware to practical certainty
(for violations of all rules of international law) or to some lower degree of
proscribed risk (for serious violations of IHL and IHRL) that its assistance,
including intelligence, would be used to commit internationally wrongful
acts, it cannot escape responsibility by saying that it was intending to assist
the war effort more generally and not any specific violations of international
law that took place within that war effort. 435 The two are practically inseparable, 436 at the very least in those cases in which there is an evident pattern
of violations by the recipient partner, as, for example, with regard to ethnic
cleansing by the Bosnian Serb military during the Bosnian conflict, the torture and inhuman treatment of high-value terrorist detainees by U.S. forces
434. Id. at 4 (Committee finding that “the combination of high-level briefing from the
CIA in September 2001, the individual cases of mistreatment and rendition being reported
by deployed officers to senior managers in January 2002, and the media reporting of torture,
mistreatment and rendition in January/February 2002, make it difficult to comprehend how
those at the top of the office did not recognise in this period the pattern of mistreatment by
the US. . . . This could indicate that the Agencies were deliberately turning a blind eye so as
not to damage the relationship and risk the flow of intelligence. . . . That being said, we have
found no ‘smoking gun’ in the primary material to indicate that the Agencies deliberately
overlooked reports of mistreatment and rendition by the US as a matter of institutional
policy.”).
435. Depending on the circumstances, assistance to the war effort could also violate
other rules of international law, such as the prohibition of intervention, a point that I will
not deal with here.
436. Cf. Bosnian Genocide, supra note 7, ¶ 422, where the ICJ held that
the quite substantial aid of a political, military and financial nature provided by the FRY to
the Republika Srpska and the VRS, beginning long before the tragic events of Srebrenica,
continued during those events. There is thus little doubt that the atrocities in Srebrenica
were committed, at least in part, with the resources which the perpetrators of those acts
possessed as a result of the general policy of aid and assistance pursued towards them by
the FRY.

However, Serbia was found not to be responsible for complicity of genocide because it had
not been not aware that genocide would be committed. The Court did not have jurisdiction
over Serbia’s complicity in any other violation of international law, including the CA1 duty
to respect IHL or the appurtenant duty not to provide assistance to serious violations
thereof. In other words, it is perfectly possible for Serbia not to have been complicit in
genocide on the basis of Genocide Convention–specific complicity rules but to have been
complicit in serious violations of IHL committed by the Bosnian Serbs in Srebrenica and
elsewhere during the Bosnian conflict.
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in the war on terror, or Russia’s assistance to the Assad regime in Syria. 437
The only way to keep complicity rules from capturing a generalized assistance scenario is to confine them strictly to purpose-based forms of fault. 438
But, as explained above, this is inappropriate even for the baseline rule in
Article 16 ASR, let alone for regime-specific rules of IHL and IHRL. 439 This,
of course, assumes that the general assistance to the war effort materially
facilitated the specific wrongful acts in question—that is, that the causal
nexus element was satisfied. 440 But so long as it did, States cannot simply say
that they were intending to help their partner win the conflict and not to assist
them in violating international law. Such an approach would, for example,
excuse Russia of all liability for assisting the numerous atrocities committed
by the Assad regime against its own people in Syria, if purpose/direct intent
to facilitate the atrocities could not be inferred. 441
The real difficulty with the assistance to the wider-war-effort scenario is
that such assistance normally produces substantial appreciable benefits for
the assisting State (and possibly third parties) in terms of advancing its foreign policy, economic, and national security agendas. This can create stark
dilemmas. Providing intelligence and other assistance to (say) Iraqi and
Kurdish forces in the fight against ISIS had the immediate benefit of helping
to dismantle a terrorist regime that has inflicted untold suffering on the peoples of Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere. Yet, the recipients of such assistance may
well have committed serious violations of IHL and IHRL to which the assistance causally contributed, such as the torture or other mistreatment of
437. The key factor here would be the application of the causal nexus or contribution
element of a complicity rule to specific facts, not that of the mental element. Compare in
that regard in the criminal context Greenawalt, supra note 115, at 594.
438. Even there, purpose to facilitate could be inferred by some external fact-finder,
based on the pattern of violations.
439. See supra notes 116–118 and accompanying text (regarding the specific direction
tangent in the ICTY complicity jurisprudence, which was also motivated by overinclusiveness concerns). See also JACKSON, supra note 8, at 84 (“[W]hat’s lying behind these cases is
the question of how legal doctrines of complicity, premised to some degree on individualized connections between accomplice and principal, can deal with large-scale provisions of
aid to groups or collections of actors carrying out a mix of lawful and unlawful activities.”).
440. One situation in which generalized assistance would probably not satisfy the nexus
requirement is that of the assisting State providing assistance whose receipt enabled the
partner to divert its own resources to the commission of the wrongful act. See Moynihan,
supra note 11, at 9–10.
441. For a discussion thereof, see Robert Lawless, A State of Complicity: How Russia’s
Persistent and Public Denial of Syrian Battlefield Atrocities Violates International Law, 9 HARVARD
NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL 180 (2018).
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captured ISIS fighters. No mitigation measures may sufficiently curb the risk
of such violations, but stopping the assistance may lead to equally bad consequences (say, the resurgence of ISIS or the prolongation of the conflict).
This, therefore, leads to the question I have touched upon above of
whether the risks of such harms can be balanced against each other in some
kind of lesser-evil, utilitarian calculus. 442 While it appears inevitable that
States will engage in such a calculus as a matter of policy—for example, UK
ministers have openly acknowledged doing so 443—risk-taking is difficult for
the law to accommodate in the face of a causally proximate risk of assistance
to serious violations of IHL and IHRL except, perhaps, in the most extreme
(and unlikely) situations, through the application of circumstances precluding wrongfulness under the ASR or through any IHL- and IHRL-specific
rules that may incorporate balancing. In most situations, it would not be
possible to justify proceeding with the sharing of intelligence while appreciating a risk of a serious violation of IHL and IHRL when such a violation
subsequently occurs and is facilitated by the shared intelligence. In other
words, a State engaging in risk-taking behavior generally must accept the legal consequences of doing so—its responsibility for complicity—if the risk
materializes.
B. Sharing and Receiving Unlawfully Obtained Intelligence
Let us now turn to the second basic scenario of intelligence sharing in multinational military operations—one where it is the intelligence itself that was
442. See supra Section III.D.
443. Under current policy guidance, see supra note 387, ministers retain a significant
amount of discretion in deciding how to proceed in situations in which the sharing of intelligence creates a risk (but not certainty) of harm. In 2019 an internal Ministry of Defence
policy document stated that in such cases intelligence should not be shared “unless ministers
agree that the potential benefits justify accepting the risk and the legal consequences that
may follow.” See Use of Torture Overseas, 660 Parl. Deb. HC (6th ser.) (2019) col. 504
(question by David Davies MP). Even more interesting are the (somewhat internally inconsistent) testimonies of several ministers before the Intelligence and Security Committee;
some of the ministers thought that they could (although none have done so) exceptionally
authorize the sharing of intelligence when there was a serious risk it would facilitate torture
but doing so would prevent a “ticking bomb” scenario. They were more open to authorizing
sharing if the risk was “merely” that of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. It was accepted that they could not lawfully authorize the sharing of intelligence if they know or
believed (i.e., were practically certain) that torture would occur. See INTELLIGENCE AND
SECURITY COMMITTEE, DETAINEE MISTREATMENT AND RENDITION: CURRENT ISSUES,
2018, HC 1114, at 75–77.
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unlawfully obtained, and is then shared, received, and used. For example,
State A tortures a terrorist suspect it has captured into divulging intelligence,
subjects its population to systematic electronic surveillance in violation of
international privacy standards, or acquires the information from a third
State in a manner that violates that State’s sovereignty or the inviolability of
diplomatic premises. A then proceeds to share this information with State
B, which is either practically certain or aware to some level of probability that
the intelligence was acquired unlawfully by A. B nonetheless uses that information (which is ultimately proven to be reliable, despite its mode of acquisition), for purposes, such as targeting drone strikes, that are otherwise compliant with applicable IHL and IHRL.
In this scenario, A undoubtedly acted unlawfully—vis-à-vis some other
State or an individual—when collecting the intelligence. It will also most likely
be acting unlawfully by the further act of sharing the intelligence with B. This
will most clearly be the case if the underlying violation is one of IHRL, for
example, if the intelligence was obtained through torture or contrary to the
right to privacy. 444 For example, the jurisprudence of the European Court—
very likely to be emulated by other human rights bodies once they have the
opportunity to deal with such cases—is clear that State acts beyond the collection of personal information—including its automated and human processing, analysis, and sharing with third parties—each constitutes a separate
interference with privacy. 445 This is also the position of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany under the German Basic Law. 446 Indeed, the
sharing of information could be a violation even if the collection was not,
depending on whether the sharing can separately satisfy the justifiability test
under IHRL, that is, it was provided for in law, pursued a legitimate aim, and
was necessary and proportionate for the achievement of that aim—and applies safeguards specifically designed for the intelligence sharing context:

444. The same goes in principle for violations of data protection law. See Elgizouli v.
Home Secretary, supra note 369. To be clear, I am not saying that every act of spying, foreign
or domestic, necessarily violates IHRL privacy guarantees—on the contrary, much of what
States do in the espionage context could be justified under the IHRL necessity and proportionality framework.
445. See Big Brother Watch v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 58170/13, 62322/14 &
24960/15, ¶¶ 324–31, 496–97 (2021) (ECtHR), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001210077.
446. 1 BvR 2835/17, supra note 319, ¶¶ 213–14.
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[I]t is now clear that some States are regularly sharing material with their
intelligence partners and even, in some instances, allowing those intelligence partners direct access to their own systems. Consequently, the Court
considers that the transmission by a Contracting State to foreign States or
international organisations of material obtained by bulk interception
should be limited to such material as has been collected and stored in a
Convention compliant manner and should be subject to certain additional
specific safeguards pertaining to the transfer itself. First of all, the circumstances in which such a transfer may take place must be set out clearly in
domestic law. Secondly, the transferring State must ensure that the receiving State, in handling the data, has in place safeguards capable of preventing
abuse and disproportionate interference. In particular, the receiving State
must guarantee the secure storage of the material and restrict its onward
disclosure. This does not necessarily mean that the receiving State must
have comparable protection to that of the transferring State; nor does it
necessarily require that an assurance is given prior to every transfer.
Thirdly, heightened safeguards will be necessary when it is clear that material requiring special confidentiality—such as confidential journalistic material—is being transferred. Finally, the Court considers that the transfer of
material to foreign intelligence partners should also be subject to independent control. 447

The European Court thus found, for example, that Sweden failed to implement proper safeguards when sharing intelligence with its partners because, inter alia, the Swedish domestic legal framework did not provide that
agencies had to establish that it was necessary and proportionate to share
information implicating the privacy interests of a specific individual and to
assess whether their partner had minimum safeguards in place. 448 The position of the Federal Constitutional Court is substantially similar in the German context. 449 Most States do not have domestic legal frameworks that reg-

447. Big Brother Watch, supra note 445, ¶ 362.
448. Centrum för rättvisa v. Sweden, App. No. 35252/08, ¶¶ 326–30, 371 (2021) (ECtHR), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-210078.
449. 1 BvR 2835/17, supra note 319, ¶¶ 231–64. In particular, the Court held:
Sharing data with other countries is ruled out if there is reason to fear that its use would
lead to violations of fundamental principles of the rule of law. Under no circumstances may
the State be complicit in violations of human dignity. In particular, it must appear certain
that the information will be used neither for political persecution nor for inhuman and
degrading punishment or treatment in the receiving State. The legislator must ensure that
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ulate the sharing of intelligence in a way that would satisfy IHRL requirements in terms of regulatory quality and clarity and effective domestic oversight. 450
The more difficult question is whether a State is acting wrongfully not
by sharing but by soliciting, receiving, and using unlawfully obtained and shared
information, perhaps for targeting purposes in a military operation. It is a
question of fact, of course, as to whether the receiving State is aware of some
degree of risk that the information was shared or obtained unlawfully; in our
scenario above, that knowledge is postulated, but in real life the users of, for
example, a fused intelligence product may not actually have any idea about
the sourcing of a given item of information. 451 That said, even given the requisite degree of knowledge, this scenario does not in principle engage the
general complicity rule in Article 16 ASR, which applies only to prospective
assistance to an ongoing or future wrongful act. 452 Like most domestic legal
systems, international law does not contain a general rule on accessories after
the fact. 453 Modern criminal law similarly tends to create such liability only
through the legislative creation of specific new offenses, such as the peddling
the sharing of data collected by German authorities with other countries or international
organisations does not erode the protections of the European Convention on Human
Rights and other international human rights treaties. Given the exceptional nature of surveillance and data sharing measures carried out by intelligence services, which may involve
contacts with States not firmly committed to the rule of law, it must be ensured that the
information provided is not used to persecute certain ethnic groups, stifle opposition or
detain people without due process, kill or torture them in violation of human rights or
international humanitarian law. The Federal Intelligence Service itself is responsible for examining and determining which rules of international law have to be observed in this respect. In principle, receiving States must agree to rights to information so that adherence to
international human rights standards can be monitored.

Id. ¶ 237 (citations omitted).
450. See generally Secret Global Surveillance Networks: Intelligence Sharing between Governments
and the Need for Safeguards, PI (Apr. 24, 2018), https://privacyinternational.org/report/1741/secret-global-surveillance-networks-intelligence-sharing-between-governmentsand-need (reviewing forty-two countries and finding an alarming level of under-regulation).
451. See, e.g., NZOIGIS REPORT, supra note 303, ¶¶ 181–83, 323–25 (Inspector-General
concluding that a New Zealand government agency inadvertently came into possession of
information obtained by U.S. use of torture but disregarded red flags, such as incommunicado detention, that could have pointed to the provenance of the information); Nottingham
Workshop Report, supra note 10, at 20. To be clear, I am not arguing that the receiving State
has a positive duty to check whether every item of information it receives or is given access
to was obtained unlawfully—that would be a wholly impracticable requirement.
452. See Nottingham Workshop Report, supra note 10, at 20.
453. See JACKSON, supra note 8, at 10, 73.
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of stolen property. 454 The ILC expressly excluded the provision of assistance
after the wrongful act from the scope of Article 16; 455 a fortiori, the mere
passive receipt of information unlawfully obtained cannot violate that rule
either, because it does not actually facilitate the commission of the wrong,
which has already been completed. 456
Article 16 could be engaged, however, if the factual pattern were such
that B was not a mere passive recipient of unlawfully obtained information
but actually provided assistance to A’s wrongful act of unlawfully collecting
and/or sharing intelligence. This could be the case in, for instance, situations
of continuing cooperative relationships in which each party provides the
other with some quid pro quo in a revolving cycle of interactions—B could
be providing money, its own intelligence, or other assistance to A, which
would continue sharing its intelligence with B. 457 If the underlying violation
was a serious breach of jus cogens, the rule in Article 41(2) ASR that prohibits
States from assisting the maintenance of a situation created by such a breach
could potentially be engaged. 458
Similarly, a pattern of receiving information from a State that acquired it
in violation of international law can evolve into an indirect form of prohibited assistance to that State. As noted by the UK Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights in the context of information procured through torture:
[I]f the Government engaged in an arrangement with a country that was
known to torture in a widespread way and turned a blind eye to what was
going on, systematically receiving and/or relying on the information but
not physically participating in the torture, that might well cross the line into
complicity. Systematic, regular receipt of information obtained under torture is in our view capable of amounting to “aid or assistance” in maintaining the situation created by other States’ serious breaches of the peremptory norm prohibiting torture. As a number of witnesses to our inquiry put
it, the practice creates a market for the information produced by torture.
454. FLETCHER, supra note 78, at 645–46.
455. See AUST, supra note 6, at 221.
456. See also Ahmed & Anor v. The Queen [2011] EWCA (Crim) 184 [42] (“On ordinary
principles of English law, if A aids or abets (ie assists) B to commit torture, or if he counsels
or procures (ie encourages or arranges) torture by B, then A is no doubt guilty, as is B. But
simply to receive information from B which is needed for the safety of A’s citizens but
which is known or suspected to be the product of torture would not, without more, amount
in English law to either of these forms of secondary participation.”).
457. See Nottingham Workshop Report, supra note 10, at 20–21.
458. See also Moynihan, supra note 11, at 22–23; AUST, supra note 6, at 339.
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As such, it encourages States which systematically torture to continue to
do so. 459

Even if the receipt and possession of unlawfully obtained and shared
intelligence do not as such transgress the complicity rules of general international law, they may violate regime-specific rules, such as those of IHRL or
diplomatic law. For example, the storage and processing of an individual’s
private information by the recipient State may constitute a separate violation
of the right to privacy of that individual, regardless of the fact that it had no
involvement whatsoever in its collection if the receiving State did not satisfy
the requirements of the necessity and proportionality test, including an adequate domestic legal framework with sufficient safeguards against abuse.
Applying this approach, the European Court found that the United
Kingdom’s regulation of the receipt of shared intercept intelligence was
compatible with Article 8 ECHR. 460 That conclusion may be debatable on
the facts, in particular because the Court seemed to dispense with the requirement of authorization independent from the executive when it came to
the solicitation of intelligence from a partner. 461 It is also not entirely clear
how the Court’s analysis would apply to standing arrangements whereby the
receiving State has direct access to the raw intelligence in the systems and
databases of the sharing State or ones operated jointly. 462 The basic point
remains, however, that at least insofar as the sharing and receipt of information that may implicate privacy interests is concerned, the receiving State
must have an adequate domestic legal framework with sufficient safeguards
in place, including independent oversight. It appears manifest that most
States do not have such frameworks and are therefore exposing themselves
to a substantial legal risk of violating IHRL. 463

459. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ALLEGATIONS OF UK COMPLICITY IN
TORTURE: TWENTY–THIRD REPORT OF SESSION 2008–09, HL Paper 152/HC 230, ¶¶ 41–
42 (UK).
460. Big Brother Watch, supra note 445, ¶¶ 500–514.
461. See id. annex (joint partly dissenting opinion by Lemmens, J., Vehabović, J., Ranzoni, J., and Bošnjak, J.).
462. See UK Mass Interception Laws Violates Human Rights and the Fight Continues . . . , PI
(May 26, 2021), https://privacyinternational.org/long-read/4526/uk-mass-interceptionlaws-violates-human-rights-and-fight-continues.
463. See Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, The Right
to Privacy in the Digital Age, ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/39/29 (Aug. 3, 2018). See also Secret
Global Surveillance Networks, supra note 450.
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But this conclusion comes with two caveats. First, the extraterritoriality
problem looms large in intelligence-sharing cases and is yet to be addressed
explicitly by human rights bodies. In particular, while it is clear that human
rights treaties would apply to B if B received information from A about individuals within B’s territory, it remains unsettled whether the treaties would
apply if A shared with B information about individuals in A’s own territory
or that of a third State. 464 Second, one would reasonably expect the relevant
privacy guarantees to be applied more flexibly in the context of a military
operation than in situations of relative normalcy, something that the IHRL
necessity/proportionality framework can comfortably allow, but the point
remains untested. Again, the privacy guarantees would apply in the first place
only if the nature of the shared information was such that it actually implicated the privacy interests of individuals. 465
Finally, the actual use of the unlawfully obtained and shared information
would generally not taint an operation of the recipient State that would otherwise be lawful. For instance, if B used information obtained through the
use of torture by A to target an individual in a drone strike, and that individual turned out to be a combatant, the strike was thus directed against a purely
military target. In such a case, there would be no violation of IHL even
though B relied on information obtained through torture. Similarly, on an
IHRL analysis, if a State used lethal force against an individual who in fact
posed to others an imminent threat that could not be neutralized in any other
way so that the use of force would be compatible with the right to life, 466 the
lawfulness of the use of force would not depend on the fact that some of the
relevant information pointing to the threat was obtained unlawfully and

464. The extraterritoriality issue has been avoided by the European Court (so far) on
the basis that at least some of the applicants were in the respondent State’s territory. See Big
Brother Watch, supra note 445, ¶ 272. See also Marko Milanovic, The Grand Normalization of
Mass Surveillance: ECtHR Grand Chamber Judgments in Big Brother Watch and Centrum för
rättvisa, EJIL:TALK! (May 26, 2021), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-grand-normalization-ofmass-surveillance-ecthr-grand-chamber-judgments-in-big-brother-watch-and-centrum-forrattvisa/.
465. For example, information about the location of a military facility, weapons schematics or operational plans would not generally implicate individual privacy interests.
466. See, e.g., General Comment No. 36, supra note 275, ¶ 12 (setting out IHRL criteria
for lawful deprivations of life).
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shared with the recipient State—if, again, the information was objectively
accurate. 467
On the contrary, the rules of both IHL and IHRL may positively require
resort to such intelligence, regardless of the fact that it was collected and
shared unlawfully. If, say, the receiving State is put on notice through the
shared information that there are civilians in an area that it intends to strike,
ignoring that information would put the receiving State in violation of its
duty to take all feasible precautions in attack and verify that all targets are
military ones. 468 Or, if the recipient State is put on notice of an imminent
terrorist attack against one of its cities, it would act against its positive duty
to protect the right to life of its people if it chooses simply to disregard that
information on the ground that it was obtained unlawfully. 469 However, the
use of unlawfully obtained and shared information would be prohibited in
specific contexts, for example, by the exclusionary rule applicable in judicial
proceedings where the use of information obtained through torture would
467. Information obtained by torture generally will not be; however, the information
may nonetheless be obtained unlawfully in a way that does not entail its unreliability, e.g., in
violation of State sovereignty or the human right to privacy.
468. See CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY, supra note 202, rr. 15–16; Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts arts. 57(1), 57(2)(a), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
469. See A v. Home Secretary (No 2) [2005] UKHL 71 [47] (“If under such torture a
man revealed the whereabouts of a bomb in the Houses of Parliament, the authorities could
remove the bomb and, if possible, arrest the terrorist who planted it. There would be a
flagrant breach of article 3 [ECHR] for which the United Kingdom would be answerable,
but no breach of article 5(4) or 6.” [Lord Bingham], [68]–[69]). (“[I]f use of such information
might save lives it would be absurd to reject it. If the police were to learn of the whereabouts
of a ticking bomb it would be ludicrous for them to disregard this information if it had been
procured by torture. No one suggests the police should act in this way[;] . . . [in] these
instances the executive arm of the State is open to the charge that it is condoning the use of
torture. So, in a sense, it is. The government is using information obtained by torture. But
in cases such as these the government cannot be expected to close its eyes to this information at the price of endangering the lives of its own citizens. Moral repugnance to torture
does not require this.” [Lord Nicholls], [161].) (“Generally speaking it is accepted that the
executive may make use of all information it acquires: both coerced statements and whatever
fruits they are found to bear. Not merely, indeed, is the executive entitled to make use of this
information; to my mind it is bound to do so. It has a prime responsibility to safeguard the
security of the State and would be failing in its duty if it ignores whatever it may learn or
fails to follow it up. Of course it must do nothing to promote torture. It must not enlist
torturers to its aid (rendition being perhaps the most extreme example of this). But nor need
it sever relations even with those States whose interrogation practices are of most concern.
So far as the courts are concerned, however, the position is different. [Lord Brown].)
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violate a defendant’s right to a fair trial 470 or when the use of information
obtained in violation of diplomatic law could further infringe the rights of
the injured State. 471
In sum, in the scenario in which intelligence is unlawfully obtained and
shared, the most difficult issues are those regarding the responsibility of the
State receiving the intelligence. As a general matter, the mere receipt of unlawfully obtained information does not, as such, fall within the scope of either the general complicity rule in Article 16 ASR or the IHL- and IHRLspecific complicity rules. 472 This will generally be the case in situations in
which the intelligence sharing is sporadic or isolated. However, in situations
of longer-term partnerships, especially those in which a pattern can be discerned in the behavior of the State or non-State actor sharing the intelligence,
such as the use of torture, and when there is a standing relationship of mutual
assistance, the recipient State may no longer be regarded as merely a passive
recipient of tainted information but may be seen as encouraging or actively

470. See, e.g., id. (House of Lords unanimously concluding that evidence tainted by torture was inadmissible in proceedings before a special immigration tribunal). See further Tobias
Thienel, The Admissibility of Evidence Obtained by Torture under International Law, 17 EUROPEAN
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 349 (2006).
471. See, e.g., R (Bancoult) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
(No 3) [2018] UKSC 3 (UK Supreme Court holding that the admission into judicial proceedings of documents obtained unlawfully from the archives of a diplomatic mission or
from its correspondence would in principle violate Articles 24 and 27 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, unless such documents were already in the public domain). See further Robert McCorquodale, Wikileaks Documents Are Admissible in a Domestic
Court, EJIL:TALK! (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.ejiltalk.org/wikileaks-documents-are-admissible-in-a-domestic-court/.
472. But see Martin Scheinin (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism), Report, ¶¶ 54–55
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/3 (Feb. 4, 2009) (arguing that mere passive receipt of information
where the receiving State knew or ought to have known that the information was obtained
through torture, ill-treatment or arbitrary detention would make the receiving State complicit in the wrong). As explained, my position is narrower—in some cases, and likely only
on a subjective culpability standard, the receiving State may be regarded as assisting the
wrongdoing State. Notably, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales rejected Scheinin’s
analysis as “significantly aspirational rather than declaratory of existing law” and “not based
upon either treaty or customary law.” See Ahmed, supra note 456, [44], [48].
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assisting the production and sharing of such information, including by creating a market for such violations. 473 Consider, for example, the United
Kingdom’s receipt of intelligence procured by third States through the mistreatment of detainees in the “war on terror.” Parliament’s Intelligence and
Security Committee investigation found “198 cases recorded where UK personnel received intelligence from liaison services obtained from detainees
whom they knew had been mistreated, or with no indication as to how the
detainee had been treated but where, in our view, they should have suspected
mistreatment.” 474 Depending on the facts, such situations can fall within the
scope of Articles 16 and 41 ASR or of the regime-specific complicity rules.
Again, however, as a general matter, the use of tainted information by the
receiving State, such as for targeting purposes in the course of a military
operation, will not be internationally wrongful except in specific contexts,
for example, in judicial proceedings. But if the information pertains to the
private lives of specific individuals, the processing and use of that information may, in the absence of sufficient privacy safeguards, run afoul of
IHRL even if the State was merely its passive recipient. 475
VI.

CONCLUSION

The complicity rules of international law may be underdetermined. But as
this article has shown we nonetheless possess an ample toolbox with which
to address complicity scenarios, including those triggered by the sharing of
intelligence in the course of multi-partner military operations. Article 16 ASR
is the most powerful tool in that toolbox because of its general applicability
and its usefulness as a normative baseline for other, regime-specific complicity rules. Most of this article was devoted to unpacking the fault elements of

473. Cf. UK Principles, supra note 387, annex A, ¶ 12 (referring to a situation in which
the UK government’s “continued receipt of intelligence is an encouragement of the methods used to obtain it or adversely effects [sic] the conditions under which the detainee is
held” by a third party). See also Méndez, supra note 273, ¶ 55.
474. INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE, supra note 387, at 3.
475. See also U.N. Human Rights Council, Res. 42/15, The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/42/15, pmbl. (Oct. 7, 2019) (The Council emphasizing
“that States must respect international human rights obligations regarding the right to privacy when they intercept digital communications of individuals and/or collect personal data,
when they share or otherwise provide access to data collected through, inter alia, intelligencesharing agreements, and when they require disclosure of personal data from third parties,
including business enterprises.”).
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such rules, elements that pose many complex and difficult questions and
largely determine the reach of these rules.
With regard to Article 16, I have argued that State assistance to another
State that significantly or substantially contributed to the wrongful act of the
latter State will be caught by Article 16 if the assisted State acted with (1)
purpose/direct intent to facilitate the wrongful act, regardless of any deficits
in knowledge; (2) with oblique/indirect intent to facilitate the wrongful act,
that is if it was practically certain that the assisted State would commit the
act, practically certain that the aid provided would facilitate the act and consciously decided to provide the assistance nonetheless; or (3) with willful
blindness, that is with a purpose to avoid acquiring information but for
which it would have been acting with oblique intent. This variegated mental
element is normatively justifiable and practicable, allows us to make sense of
the internally conflicted ILC work product, and enables us to move beyond
the false dilemma between intent and knowledge that has burdened much of
the literature so far. As for Article 41(2) ASR as drafted by the ILC, it possesses no culpability requirement, but its apparent imposition of strict liability for aiding and assisting does not seem appropriate even for serious
breaches of jus cogens. Arguably Article 41(2) can use not only the culpability
requirements in Article 16 ASR but also risk-based modes of fault, subjective
or even objective, for a State negligently failing to know (to some degree of
probability) that its aid would help maintain a situation created by a serious
jus cogens breach.
Regime-specific complicity rules coexist with the generally applicable
ones and can be of great practical import. Both IHL and IHRL contain such
rules, which can apply to State assistance in multinational military operations.
The existence of the IHL rule is not in doubt. Again, we are speaking here
of the negative duty of restraint not to encourage or facilitate violations of
IHL, a duty with which any State can and should comply, and not about the
much broader positive obligation to exert influence on third parties to put
an end to their violations, which remains controversial. Even if some of its
elements remain indeterminate, the IHL-specific complicity rule applies in
all circumstances, regardless of whether the assisting State is involved in the
armed conflict in which violations of IHL might occur, and regardless of the
legal classification of that conflict. As for the IHRL rule, it is in the process
of consolidation, in the course of which it will vary from treaty to treaty. Its
practical utility also depends on the resolution of the extraterritoriality conundrum. Even so, we can reasonably expect that in the long run human
rights bodies will embrace an expansive approach such as the one articulated
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by the German Constitutional Court, holding that all State actions need to
comply with guarantees of fundamental rights regardless of the location of
the affected individual, and that “[u]nder no circumstances may the State be
complicit in violations of human dignity” by sharing intelligence with third
parties committing such violations.” 476
An added value of IHL- and IHRL-specific complicity rules over Article
16 ASR lies in their application to assistance provided to non-State actors
and, potentially, in their more relaxed fault requirements. In particular, as we
have seen, States are arguably not acting in line with their negative duties to
respect IHL and IHRL if they supply assistance to partners while consciously
disregarding a risk that their partners will commit serious violations of those
regimes. That probability threshold may be set at likelihood or one of the
lower levels—substantial, clear, or real risk. In any event, States may implement mitigation measures that can decrease the appreciable risk below the
prescribed threshold. It is unlikely, however, that States can lawfully balance
that risk of harm against some other reason for providing assistance, at least
if serious violations of IHL and IHRL are concerned.
The determination of the assisting State’s fault will depend greatly on the
perspective from which the assessment is being made. The officials of the
assisting State, including legal advisers, will initially make ex ante decisions on
whether the State would be acting with the requisite degree of fault if it provided the assistance. In particular, their assessment of the future conduct of
the assisted party will inherently be contingent and probabilistic. Also, while
it is a standard feature of international law as a decentralized system that
factual and legal issues are initially going to be self-judged, it is perfectly normal for other entities, including domestic and international courts, to make
determinations of the assisting State’s culpability ex post, i.e., after it provided
the assistance that facilitated the wrongful act. From both perspectives, the
key consideration will always be the existence, vel non, of any pattern of behavior by the wrongdoing partner.
Finally, we have seen that there are two basic scenarios of intelligence
sharing in multinational military operations that may raise questions of complicity. The first is the sharing of intelligence that facilitates the wrongful act
of a third party, either sporadically or as part of systematic assistance to a
war effort more generally. The causal contribution and fault elements of Article 16 ASR and the IHL- and IHRL-specific complicity rules may all be met
in such situations. In the second, intelligence is unlawfully collected and
476. 1 BvR 2835/17, supra note 319, ¶ 237.
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shared with the receiving State, which then uses it for its own purposes. In
principle, the mere use of tainted intelligence will not make the receiving
State’s conduct, such as an attack against a military object, unlawful. However, if the State is not merely a passive recipient of such information but
expressly or implicitly encourages or assists the party that wrongfully obtains
and shares it, the various complicity rules will be engaged. The storage, processing, and use of unlawfully obtained personal information may also violate discrete rules of IHRL, such as the right to privacy or (in a specific context) the right to a fair trial.
In sum, while the web of legal rules that apply in complicity scenarios,
such as those of intelligence sharing in military operations, is a complex one,
the conceptual and practical difficulties in interpreting, applying, and developing these rules are not insurmountable. As with all legal rules, their practical implementation will depend primarily on a gradual process of norm internalization and the building up of a culture of compliance for which capacity-building efforts within governments are indispensable, partly as result of
external and internal pressure, advocacy, and litigation. That said, the reality
of coalition operations is that the relevant partners may be subjected to different treaties and mechanisms of outside scrutiny. But it is inevitable that
the greater constraints to which some of the States involved may be subject
will have spillover effects on their partners, who will in practice have to take
them into account. As far as legal risks for partners are concerned, domestic
and international litigation under IHRL will produce the most acute such
risks, a tendency that will only grow in the future.
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